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Abstract 
People talk. People talk to entertain each other, to divulge news, and to gain 
support. Additionally, people talk about shared experiences to figure out what 
"really" happened. But does talking about the past change what we remember? 
That is the overarching question of the research presented in this thesis.   
People remember the same events in different ways; consequently, when 
people discuss the past, they might come across new information. To examine 
how discussion affects people’s memories, we must know what happened during 
a target event and must create conflicts in the discussion to see how those 
conflicts affect people’s memories. To overcome these challenges, I used the 
MORI technique to present different viewers with different movies on the same 
screen at the same time (Mori, 2003; 2007). The MORI technique allows people to 
feel that they have shared an experience—they sit side-by-side and ostensibly 
watch the same movie—yet systematic differences are introduced into their 
memories, and the effect of those differences can be tracked through discussion.  
I report a series of experiments that examine the efficacy of the MORI 
technique and investigate how different social factors contribute to false 
memories. Each experiment used a variation of the same basic three-stage 
procedure. First, pairs of people each unwittingly watched slightly different 
versions of an event. Next, pairs answered questions about the event together; 
some questions guided them to discuss details for which they had seen 
contradictory information. Finally, subjects completed a memory test 
individually to determine what each person really remembered about the event. 
In short, when people watched a movie via the MORI technique, they could 
see and remember the details of the movie (Experiments 1A and 1B), and they 
did not notice or implicitly remember details from the alternate (blocked) movie 
version—the version their partner saw (Experiments 3A and 3B). Additionally, 
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discussion corrupted people’s memories (Experiments 2A, 2B, 4, 5 and 6). People 
were influenced by their partner’s suggestions: they falsely remembered details 
from their partner’s version of the event, even though those details contradicted 
what they personally saw. Consistent with the Source Monitoring Framework, 
the corrupting influence of the discussion depended on social factors in the 
interaction (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008). For instance, 
people were more likely to remember false details that their romantic partner 
suggested than false details that a stranger suggested (Experiment 4). 
Additionally, leading people to believe that their counterpart’s vision was better 
or worse than their own led them to be more or less influenced by their 
counterpart’s false suggestions (Experiment 6). 
In sum, when people share an experience and discuss it they can come to 
remember seeing things that they were only told about after the event. In other 
words, corroboration does not equal accuracy. I discuss the possible—
beneficial—mechanisms underlying these memory errors; draw parallels 
between my research and research on social influence, group remembering and 
transactive memory systems; discuss theoretical, methodological and practical 
implications, and suggest potential applications of my findings and avenues for 
future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Social Influence, Discussion and Memory 
Talking About the Past 
We do not let go of one moment as soon as the next moment arrives; instead, 
we spend our lives constantly looking back and talking about the past. We listen 
as our colleagues, friends and families tell us about what they did or saw or 
heard and we respond by telling them what we did or saw or heard. Sharing 
stories is so important to us that when we cannot share them in person, we share 
them by post, on the phone, via text, email, web-cam, or even by blog.  
People tell each other about their experiences for a wide variety of reasons: to 
entertain and humor each other; to share knowledge and opinions; to gain 
sympathy, attention, approval and trust; and to persuade each other of their 
views (Bartlett, 1932; Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Marsh & Tversky, 2004; Ross & 
Conway, 1986; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). People also share stories of their past as 
a way to explain who they are, to define their identity, their background, 
relationships, motivations and goals (Barclay & DeCooke, 1988; Edwards & 
Middleton, 1986; Fivush, 1991; Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996; MacDonald, 
Uesiliana, & Hayne, 2000; Nelson, 2003). By explaining what they have done, 
people tell each other what they are like, and whether they would like each other 
(Reese & Brown, 2000). As such, when people discuss the past, it provides a 
means to create relationships with others.  
As well as telling others about the individual experiences they have had, 
people also talk about experiences they have shared. Reminiscing with others 
provides a means to investigate what "really" happened; discussion reminds 
people of details they had forgotten and allows them to negotiate and create a 
shared and verified account of the past (Edwards & Middleton, 1986; Edwards & 
Middleton, 1988; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Ross, 1997). 
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Additionally, by talking about their past, people emphasise their shared history 
and the things they have in common, and as a result, they strengthen 
relationships with each other (Barclay, 1996; Fivush, et al., 1996; Halbwachs, 1980; 
Weldon & Bellinger, 1997).  
For the most part, accuracy is not a primary concern of autobiographical 
remembering (Hyman & Faries, 1992, see also Hyman & Loftus, 1998; Neisser, 
1988; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). However, for other types of memories—such as 
eyewitness memories—accuracy is paramount. The justice system relies on 
people to accurately remember what happened at a crime or accident; the course 
of the investigation, any charges laid, and the eventual outcome—whether 
conviction, incarceration, financial liability, or discharge—all depend in part, on 
the accuracy of the remembered information. Given how much people talk 
about the past, it is important to investigate at how discussion might influence 
what they remember. 
What People Remember 
One reason that discussion might affect people’s memories is that different 
people remember different things about the same events. As a result, when 
people talk about the past together, they might come into contact with new 
information. What people notice and remember depends on personal factors 
such as their knowledge or beliefs, and situational factors such their perspective, 
involvement or attention; because these factors are necessarily different for 
different people, the end result is that different people remember different 
details (Bartlett, 1932; Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Edwards & Middleton, 
1986; French, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006; Ikier, Tekcan, Gulgoz, & Kuntay, 2003; 
Loftus, Ledivow, & Duensing, 1992; Ross, 1997; Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001).  
In fact, research shows that when people recall the same event their memory 
reports are often vastly different. For example only a small portion (25%) of the 
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details sibling-pairs recalled about shared childhood events matched each other’s 
recall (French et al., 2006). Similarly, families who independently recalled a story 
recalled vastly different details, with an overlap of only 4% between all four 
family members (Cuc et al., 2006).  
Sometimes people remember events so differently that their memory reports 
contradict each other. For instance, the majority of the twins in a study by Sheen 
et al. (2001) reported at least one disputed memory; these twins each 
remembered the same event from their childhood, agreed that the event 
happened to only one of them, but did not agree on who it actually did happen 
to (see also Ikier et al., 2003). In short, given the different ways that people 
remember the same events, when people discuss the past it is very likely that 
they will be exposed to new information.  
What People Say 
Another reason that people might be exposed to new information about the 
past during discussion is that what people say doesn't necessarily match what 
they remember. The way people talk about their past depends on their goals, the 
social context, the audience, and their ability to describe their memory (Bartlett, 
1932; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005; Edwards & Middleton, 1986; Marsh, 2007; 
Marsh & Tversky, 2004; Ross, 1997). For example, people might talk about the 
past to entertain their friends, to provide information, or to gain sympathy.  
Marsh and Tversky (2004) found that when people talked about past 
experiences, sometimes they minimised and excluded details, and other times 
they exaggerated and added details. Additionally, when the same people told the 
same stories repeatedly, they retold them in different ways for different 
audiences. Interestingly, these people were aware of the distortions in their 
accounts, but they did not always consider their stories to be inaccurate just 
because they were distorted.  
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In sum, remembering the past, describing experiences to each other and 
reminiscing together are all common activities. However, because people 
undoubtedly experience things differently, remember different things about the 
same events, and talk about the past in a way that does not always reflect what 
they remember, when people discuss the past, they might be exposed to new 
information. How does this new information affect people’s memories? 
Misinformation and Memory 
Misinformation Effect 
In fact, a whole body of research on the misinformation effect shows that 
when people are exposed to new information about an event, it can change what 
they remember about it (for example see Belli, 1989; Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 1991; 
Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In misinformation effect studies, people typically 
watch a slide sequence or video of an event, such as a crime or accident. After 
watching the event, subjects are provided with some misleading information 
about it. This misinformation is usually embedded in leading questions that 
subjects answer, or in a written description of the event that subjects read or 
listen to. For instance, subjects might watch someone trying on a blue hat but 
later read that he tried on a black hat (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). 
Later, subjects complete a surprise memory test to examine their memory of 
the original event. The typical result is that people incorrectly report seeing the 
misleading details that were only presented to them after the event. In these 
studies, people have come to remember completely false details, such as non-
existent buildings; they have misremembered the colour of different objects, for 
example remembering a blue hat as black, or a yellow cup as white; they have 
misremembered brands of certain products, for example remembering a can of 
Coke as a can of Pepsi, or a Time magazine as a Newsweek magazine; and they 
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have misremembered what an object actually was, for example remembering a 
hammer as a screwdriver, or a yield sign as a stop sign (see for example Loftus, 
1975; Loftus et al., 1978; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Takarangi et al., 2006).  
In sum, misinformation effect research shows that accessing new information 
after an event can change what people report about the event. Perhaps the effect 
is part of a broader mechanism that provides a means for people to absorb 
information from different sources and boost their knowledge and 
understanding of what happened—at a later date they know and remember 
much more about an experience than immediately afterward (Meade & 
Roediger, 2002). Misinformation research shows that this process also creates the 
potential to contaminate people's memories when they are exposed to inaccurate 
information. However, some features of misinformation experiments might 
work to exacerbate the influence of misleading information. Specifically, the way 
that misinformation is conveyed in misinformation effect studies is quite 
different to how it might be conveyed in real life. Perhaps people would not be as 
influenced by misinformation encountered in the real world. 
Source of the Misinformation 
In most misinformation studies, the misleading suggestions come from the 
experimenter. One problem with this approach is that the experimenter knows 
the details of the target event very well. Thus, subjects might perceive the person 
providing the misinformation—the “misinformation messenger”—to be expert 
about the event, perhaps inflating the impact of their misleading suggestions 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Vornik, Sharman & Garry, 2003). Put another way, the 
same suggestions might have less impact if conveyed by someone less expert.  
In fact, there is some evidence that people’s perceptions of the misinformation 
messenger are crucial to the persuasiveness of the misinformation. One way that 
researchers have attempted to gauge the role of the misinformation messenger 
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has been to tell subjects where the event description came from. For example, 
Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) showed subjects a slide sequence of a car accident, 
and then asked them to read a description of the event. For two groups, this 
description contained misinformation; these subjects were told that the 
description was provided to the police either by an innocent bystander or by the 
faulty driver. A third control group read a description with no misinformation. 
Subjects who were told the misleading description came from an innocent 
bystander showed the typical misinformation effect, reporting information that 
they read but never actually saw. Subjects who were told that the misleading 
description came from the faulty driver were no more misled than subjects who 
saw the control description. In other words, these subjects were able to resist the 
influence of the misinformation, and most likely they did so because the 
messenger had a good motivation to be dishonest.  
A number of studies since Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) have produced similar 
results (for example see Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 
2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Vornik et al., 2003). For instance, Echterhoff et al. 
found that subjects could resist the influence of misinformation when they were 
told that the messenger was untrustworthy or incompetent.  
Another way that researchers have focused on the social aspects of 
misinformation is by showing subjects fake responses made by other 
hypothetical research participants (for example see Basden, Reysen, & Basden, 
2002; Betz, Skowronski, & Ostrom, 1996; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Hoffman, 
Granhag, Kwong See, & Loftus, 2001; Itsukushima, Nishi, Maruyama, & 
Takahashi, 2006; Luus & Wells, 1994; Reysen, 2005; Walther, Bless, Strack, 
Rackstraw, Wagner, & Werth, 2002). Like Dodd and Bradshaw (1980), Hoffman et 
al. (2001) compared the influence of different misinformation messengers; before 
making their own memory judgments, subjects saw a response that they were 
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told was made by a graduate student participating in the study (high credibility) 
or randomly generated by a computer (low credibility). The results fit with those 
of Dodd and Bradshaw: when subjects were told that the answer came from the 
computer, it had no impact on their responses. Yet, when subjects were told that 
the answer came from a graduate student, their responses changed in line with 
the fake answer, increasing or decreasing subjects' accuracy depending on the 
accuracy of the fake response. In other words, subjects made judgments about 
who provided the information and those judgments determined the outcome for 
their memory reports.  
In short, these studies show that people’s judgments about the misinformation 
messenger are important. Yet social influences on memory may be much more 
complicated than simply deciding if the misinformation messenger is good or 
bad; in real life people are exposed to a whole host of factors beyond simply 
knowing who they are talking to. For example, when people are exposed to 
information during a discussion they might evaluate the speaker’s goals and 
intentions (Wyer & Gruenfeld, 1995). Furthermore, people may make social 
judgments based on factors such as the speaker’s appearance, age, body 
language, gender, tone, confidence, as well as based on their own personal 
knowledge, beliefs and expectations about the speaker.  
In fact, some research shows that the misinformation messenger does not 
need to be explicitly labeled as good or bad, but even very subtle factors 
conveyed via sociolinguistic cues can influence subsequent memory 
performance (Vornik et al., 2003). Vornik et al. presented subjects with 
misinformation embedded in an audio description read in either a North 
American or a New Zealand accent. Although accent alone did not determine 
the influence of the misinformation, subjects' perceptions of the speaker's power 
and social attractiveness did affect their susceptibility to the misinformation. 
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Given the vast number of cues that can be conveyed in a real life conversation 
(for example sociolinguistic cues, body language), this finding provides support 
for the idea that misinformation maybe received very differently in real life 
interactions than in the misinformation studies described so far.  
There is some evidence that people might use social cues—that are not 
available in a written narrative—to make judgments about the misinformation 
messenger and to assess the value of the misinformation. In a recent study, 
Itsukushima et al. (2006) provided misinformation by showing subjects either a 
video or a written transcript of someone who had supposedly already taken part 
in the study. Subjects were influenced by the misinformation in both conditions; 
however, this influence was stronger when subjects received the written 
misinformation. Although the situation of watching a video is still far removed 
from a real social interaction, one possible explanation for the difference is that 
subjects were able to make more detailed social judgments about the 
information presented on the video by judging factors such as the speaker's 
appearance, age, body language, linguistic skills, confidence; perhaps these 
judgments led subjects to be less influenced by the same misinformation. 
Taken as a whole, these studies demonstrate that people’s perceptions of the 
misinformation messenger play a role in determining the outcome for memory 
and that even subtle social cues can affect the influence of the misinformation. 
In short, misinformation received in a social interaction may be experienced 
very differently to misinformation received in a misinformation study.   
Other research illustrates that making decisions and remembering in a social 
context is very different to doing so alone. Findings from social influence 
research and transactive memory research provide evidence that the features of 
real life social interactions may play an important role in people’s decision-
making, their behaviour and even what they remember. 
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Social Influence 
Group Pressure 
Asch’s classic studies (1952; 1953; 1966) show that people's judgments and 
decisions can be extremely influenced by the presence and pressure of other 
people. Asch investigated the factors that led to social conformity; in other 
words, he examined the factors that would lead people to follow the crowd, or to 
refuse to follow the crowd.  
Asch (1952; 1953; 1966) asked groups of subjects—made up of one real subject 
and a number of confederates—to do a simple line judgment task; the goal was 
to choose the line from a group of alternatives that was the best match to 
another target line. On some trials the confederates selected the wrong line; as a 
result, subjects were in a situation where their perceptions were contradicted by 
the rest of the group. Subjects who completed the line judgment task 
independently made virtually no errors, yet subjects who completed the line 
judgment task in the group situation conformed to the majority—or at least 
toward the line length of the majority—in one third of all judgments. Whether 
subjects followed the crowd depended on the social dynamics of the situation, 
and specifically how many confederates there were, whether the confederates' 
judgments were unanimous, and the number of dissenters there were. 
Interestingly, some subjects nearly always conformed to the group judgment, yet 
others never did; these results suggest that some kind of personality disposition 
might lead people to be more or less susceptible to social pressure. Asch 
suggested that a person’s underlying character and self-confidence might 
determine whether that person will succumb to social pressure.  
Since Asch's (1952; 1953; 1966) pioneering studies, many researchers have used 
variations of his method, conducting similar studies in different countries. 
Personality factors, culture, relationships among group members, and the 
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specific characteristics of the situation all play a role in determining the impact 
of social pressure (for a review of these studies see Bond & Smith, 1996). 
Informational and Normative Influences 
In these social influence studies subjects might have gone along with the 
majority judgment for one of two reasons. Either, they believed that the incorrect 
judgment was actually correct or they copied the majority judgment even 
though they believed it was wrong (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Deustch and Gerard 
named these two pressures informational influence (when someone believes that 
the majority judgment is accurate and uses it to inform their own judgment) and 
normative influence (when someone capitulates to the social pressure of the 
situation to be polite or save face). In fact, Deutsch and Gerard showed that both 
normative and informational influences contribute to the effects found in these 
types of studies: when subjects gave private judgments (rather than public) and 
there was no normative pressure to conform, they still went with the majority 
judgment some of the time. People use each other to verify reality—in this 
situation when other people contradicted subjects' perceptions, subjects 
sometimes took that contradiction to mean that the other people’s judgments 
were more informative and credible than their own personal judgments 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
These studies provide evidence that people succumb to pressures in social 
contexts that they would not encounter when doing the same tasks 
independently: people may bend their perceptions, decisions and judgments to 
fit with others. Other research shows that the social context has important 
implications for memory performance as well as decision making tasks.  
Transactive Memory Systems 
Most of the time, people know the people they talk to and know what those 
people know about. In close relationships, people know so much about each 
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other that they are able to rely on each other as a kind of external memory aid, 
to boost their collective memory performance. For example, I know my partner 
is good at remembering directions but terrible at remembering phone numbers. 
On the other hand, he knows that I am good at remembering phone numbers, 
but terrible at remembering directions. Because we know each other's areas of 
expertise (and non-expertise), we can use each other in the same way that we use 
diaries, alarms and other memory aids to remember things that we wouldn't 
remember on our own (Stephenson, Kniveton, & Wagner, 1991; Wegner, 1987; 
Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985). I know that I can easily get directions to a 
particular place by asking my partner where to go; equally, he knows if he needs 
a phone number he can ask me. 
Wegner and colleagues used the term "transactive memory systems" to 
describe the way that people in relationships use each other's memories as 
extensions of their own (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985). Transactive memory 
systems develop when people share responsibilities and learn about each other’s 
expertise; in short, people might share transactive memory systems within 
intimate relationships, family groups, friendships and even work groups 
(Hollingshead, 1998a; Hollingshead, 2000; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985).  
Group memory systems work well to the extent that people in the group know 
each other and each other's expertise (Wegner, 1987). Expertise can be established 
in a number of ways. For instance, people in close relationships may gradually 
learn more about each other and each other's expertise as their relationship 
progresses. People who do not share close relationships but work on some task or 
project together might explicitly tell each other what they are good at. 
Alternatively people might rely on stereotypes of gender roles or occupation, or 
make inferences based on factors such as appearance or intelligence to decide 
what other people are good at, and thus whether the information conveyed is 
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reliable (Hollingshead & Fraidin, 2003; Wegner, 1987; Wegner, Erber & 
Raymond, 1991; Wegner et al., 1985).  
A number of studies have demonstrated that people in intimate relationships 
benefit from transactive memory systems (Hollingshead 1998a; 1998b; Wegner et 
al., 1991). For example, Wegner et al. (1991) recruited couples who had been 
together for at least three months, and found that they used each other as 
extensions of their own memories, outperforming pairs of strangers at 
remembering category exemplars in different areas of expertise (for example 
science, food, spelling). Similarly, Hollingshead (1998a, 1998b) showed that 
couples who worked together outperformed pairs of strangers who worked 
together at both general knowledge tests and remembering word lists. One 
important component in transactive memory systems is non-verbal 
communication. Hollingshead (1998b) found that intimate couples lost the 
benefit of their transactive memory when they communicated via computer 
rather than face to face, providing more evidence that the social dynamics of an 
interaction may be crucial to the outcome.  
In sum, transactive memory systems enable people who know each other to 
store and access more information than they would alone. Members have 
specific areas of expertise to concentrate their cognitive effort on, and they know 
what others’ areas of expertise are so they can access information from those 
areas. Additionally, because people know about each other’s expertise (and non-
expertise) they can make judgments about the reliability and value of any 
information conveyed based on who mentioned it. However, transactive memory 
systems also create the potential for errors to creep into memory reports: 
transactive memory may be even more susceptible to distortion than individual 
memories are. In transactive memory systems, people rely on each other to 
remember information; because—by definition—these memories are external, it 
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may be especially difficult for members to notice if the remembered information 
is replaced with other new or false information (Wegner et al., 1985; Wegner, 
1987). As a result, if people know and trust their discussion partner, it may 
increase their risk of memory distortion; when people access information from a 
trusted person, they probably trust that the information is accurate and reliable.  
Taken together, these two bodies of research show that factors in a social 
interaction can affect people’s decisions, behaviours and memories. Not only are 
there a myriad of additional cues available during social interactions, but 
people’s preexisting knowledge and beliefs about their discussion partners may 
have important consequences for decisions and memory. Although this research 
illustrates the potential for memory errors to come about through social 
pressure and transactive memory, it does not provide any evidence that memory 
is actually compromised through these processes.  
Social Influences on Memory 
Some real world examples illustrate how memory might be shaped through 
discussion. Take the case of Anna Lindh, the Swedish Foreign Minister who was 
stabbed in a shopping mall in 2003; she died the following day (Castle, 2003; 
Cowell, 2003a; 2003b; “Swedish Minister,” 2003). According to Granhag, Ask and 
Rebelius (2005) the shoppers who witnessed the attack were taken to a room to 
wait for the police; in the meantime they talked about what they had seen. When 
the police did arrive, each witness was questioned in front of the others. Some of 
the witnesses’ reports were extremely consistent, to the extent that some even 
used the very same adjectives to describe the attacker. Although it is possible 
that the witnesses might have used the same adjectives by chance alone, another 
possibility is that the discussion shaped their subsequent memory reports. 
Another case example illustrates how an error might occur. 
In April 1995, Timothy McVeigh rented a pick up truck from a rental firm 
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called Elliot's Body Shop.  Several days later he set off a bomb to destroy the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring another 
850 (Thomas, 1997a). Three staff members from Elliot's Body Shop remembered 
that two men picked up the rental truck: McVeigh and an accomplice. One of the 
staff members provided a detailed description of the accomplice, which was 
widely publicised during the investigation. However, the description was 
eventually discredited, and the witness no longer knows whether McVeigh 
picked up the truck alone or with an accomplice (Thomas, 1997b; 1997c; 1997d). 
Interestingly, according to Memon and Wright (1999) the other two staff 
members—who both reported an accomplice—initially reported that only one 
man picked up the vehicle. Perhaps discussion between the staff members cued 
them to recall the previously forgotten second man; alternatively perhaps there 
was no accomplice, but one person made a mistake and through discussion, the 
other staff members came to remember someone that was not there (Skagerberg 
& Wright, 2008; Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003; Wright, Self & Justice, 2000). 
Adults are not the only people to discuss their experiences; children might 
also come to remember things that they talk about together. Take for instance 
the Christchurch Civic Crèche Case (see Hood, 2001 for a thorough examination 
of the case). On the basis of the children’s testimony, Peter Ellis—a childcare 
worker at the crèche—was accused and convicted of sexually abusing some of 
the children in his care. However, when suspicion was first raised by one of the 
crèche parents, no child had disclosed any abuse. In fact, it was not for several 
months that the children did start reporting abuse. During that time, many 
children still attended the crèche and were in regular contact with one another. 
One possibility is that the children—many of whom were being questioned by 
their parents and by interviewers from the Department of Social Welfare—were 
discussing these experiences with each other, and leading one another to 
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remember things that had not happened (see Principe & Ceci, 2002). 
In all of these high profile cases, the witnesses’ memory reports guided the 
course of the police investigation. Eyewitness' memory errors have the potential 
to mislead the investigation and waste valuable police time and resources. 
Indeed, if McVeigh really did go to Elliot's Body Shop alone, the massive 
manhunt to find his accomplice was nothing more than a wild goose chase. 
Why did the people in these cases discuss their memories? Paterson and 
Kemp’s (2006a) survey of witnesses suggests one important reason might be that 
discussion works to fill in the blanks. When people find out what other people 
know, and add that information to what they know, they have a better idea about 
what happened, and have more information to share with other people later on. 
It seems that—at least in principle—sharing memories with other people might 
work to improve memory performance by boosting the amount that people 
know. But perhaps discussion can also lead people to remember someone or 
something that was not there. 
Natural Discussions 
A number of studies have examined what happens to people’s memories when 
they discuss a crime or serious event (for example see Alper, Buckhout, Chern, 
Harwood & Slomovitz, 1976; Hollin & Clifford, 1983; Underwood & Milton, 1993; 
Warnick & Sanders, 1980; Yarmey 1992; Yarmey & Morris, 1998). In these studies 
subjects typically watch a video or listen to a recording of an event and then 
discuss it together. The results vary widely, with some studies showing that 
groups are more accurate at remembering, and others showing that groups are 
less accurate. One difficulty in drawing conclusions from these studies is that 
they all use different comparison groups. For instance, some studies compared 
memory reports given during a group discussion with reports given individually 
prior to discussion; other studies compared individual reports made by people 
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who discussed the event with individual reports made by people who did not 
discuss the event. Finally, some of these studies required people to agree on their 
answers—perhaps these people reported details they did not remember simply 
because they were required to agree.  
A more recent approach to research discussion and memory has been to 
compare the details that individuals recall pre and post discussion. For instance, 
Cuc et al. (2006) asked family members to read stories. Each person recalled the 
story individually, discussed it with the family, and then recalled it individually a 
second time. Family members adopted details from each other’s reports into 
their own post discussion recall. Similarly, pairs of siblings who recalled shared 
childhood experiences individually and then in a discussion incorporated parts of 
each other’s recall into their own reports (French et al., 2006).  
Although these studies show that discussion may lead people to incorporate 
information from other's recall into their own, they do not tell us whether that 
information is accurate. It might be that group members simply reminded each 
other of forgotten details, boosting recall. Alternatively, rather than being cued 
to recall forgotten information, people may simply add new details to their 
reports, regardless of whether they previously noticed or remembered those 
details, and regardless of whether those details are accurate. One way to address 
the issue of accuracy is to introduce controlled errors into the discussion; errors 
provide a way to measure what happens when people are exposed to new 
information during a discussion, while ruling out the possibility that they are 
being cued to remember previously forgotten details.  
Introducing Errors 
The two main approaches researchers have used to introduce controlled errors 
into discussion have been to recruit confederates to plant false information, and 
to show two people slightly different materials with the idea that they will then 
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discuss the differences and expose each other to new information.  
Confederates. Confederates introduce controlled errors into a discussion in a 
systematic way, so that each subject is exposed to the same false information in 
the same way. In studies using this method, typically a subject and a 
confederate—who pretends to be another subject—view an event (or some 
materials) together. Afterwards, they discuss what they can remember; during 
this conversation the confederate mentions some false details. In some studies 
subjects give their memory responses during the discussion, and in other studies 
they complete an individual memory test following the discussion. The general 
result is that people come to remember information that was only mentioned by 
the confederate. For example, on the basis of confederate responses, people have 
come to remember seeing missing household items, non-presented words, non 
presented photographs, details missing from a movie and they have even come 
to remember performing actions that they did not do (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & 
Wright, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Paterson & Kemp, 
2006b; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Shaw, 
Garven, & Wood, 1997; Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005). 
As well as leading people to remember less accurately, confederates can also 
lead people to remember more accurately. Specifically, when a confederate 
mentions some correct information during a discussion, people are more likely 
to give the correct response for that item too (for example, Paterson & Kemp, 
2006b; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Shaw, et al., 1997). Thus it appears that a 
helpful mechanism turns bad when people are exposed to bad information.  
These studies show what might happen to memory when people mention 
false information in a conversation. However confederates may behave 
fundamentally differently from people in natural discussions. Confederates are 
told not only to convey the misleading information confidently, they are also 
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told not to comment on anything that the subject says during discussion (for 
example see Paterson & Kemp, 2006b). This kind of dialogue may break normal 
conversational rules, constrain any social dynamics or sociolinguistic factors that 
contribute to memory conformity and may simply feel strange to the subject. 
Indeed, when subjects in a pilot study were paired with a confederate rather than 
with another subject they reported their discussions to be "stilted and awkward" 
(Cuc et al., 2006, p. 754). 
Non-matching materials. To overcome the problem of confederates’ non-
natural conversational behaviour, other researchers have asked pairs of subjects 
to have conversations together. To introduce errors into these more natural 
conversations, the experimenters show subjects slightly different versions of the 
target event (or materials) but lead them to believe they have seen the same 
thing. For example, Gabbert et al. (2003) filmed a crime event from two different 
angles; members of subject-pairs watched different versions of the movie. 
Importantly, there were two critical actions that were unique to each version of 
the movie—thus each subject in a pair saw two things that the other did not see. 
When the pairs discussed the event together they mentioned the unique details 
and exposed each other to misinformation; subjects later reported details that 
their partner only told them about, from the other version of the movie.  
Using this method people have come to remember people and things that 
they had not seen, such as a non-existent criminal accomplice; they have 
misremembered details from stories and from pictorial scenes, for example, 
confusing a house with a tree, or a man with a woman; and they have incorrectly 
remembered a target character's actions, for example misremembering someone 
stealing cash from a wallet instead of stealing a credit card or instead of not 
stealing anything at all (Cuc et al., 2006; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; Wright et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2000). 
 19 
Additionally, using a similar method, children have come to remember 
participating in events that they only heard about from their classmates 
(Principe & Ceci, 2002).  
This method overcomes the major shortcoming of research using 
confederates: two equal parties take part in a natural conversation together, 
without any predetermined scripting on one side. However, this method is not 
without its own shortcomings. Specifically, in order for subjects to have different 
experiences they are separated (either in space or in time) while viewing the 
critical event or materials. Later, subjects are brought back together to discuss 
what they have been led to believe was the same thing. For example, Gabbert et 
al. (2003) asked each subject to complete a filler task while the other watched the 
critical crime movie. However, the subjective experience of sharing an event 
with someone is not captured as well by experiencing the same event (or what 
people believe is the same event) as another person while being separated from 
that person as it is by genuinely experiencing an event together. 
The MORI Technique  
In an effort to capture the unique situation of sharing an experience, while 
still introducing systematic discrepancies into subjects' memory reports, Mori 
and colleagues developed a new presentation technique by adapting the light 
polarisation method used to present three-dimensional (3D) movies (Kanematsu, 
Mori, & Mori, 2003; Mori 2003; Mori 2007). The MORI technique allows two 
viewers to see different movies on the same screen simultaneously—thus the 
viewers have the shared experience of watching the event together, but have 
systematic discrepancies in their memories, which can be brought into a 
discussion.  
Background to the MORI Technique 
Light Polarisation. 3D movies are created using the basic principles of light 
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polarisation. Light waves travel in all directions; polarising filter works to block 
light waves of a certain direction, while allowing the waves of another direction 
to pass through (Hewitt, 2001). Put another way, polarised light waves travel in 
only one direction. For instance, when a polarising filter is aligned horizontally, 
only horizontal light waves pass through while vertical light waves are blocked; 
when a polarising filter is aligned vertically, only vertical light waves pass 
through while horizontal light waves are blocked.  
When two polarising filters are placed in succession, only light waves of the 
same direction can pass through both (Hewitt, 2001; see Figure 1.1). In other 
words, horizontal light waves will pass through multiple horizontal filters (see 
Figure 1.1A), and vertical light waves will pass through multiple vertical filters 
(see Figure 1.1B). However, when two polarising filters are placed at right angles 
to each other, all light waves are blocked and no light can pass through (see 
Figure 1.1C). For instance, if the first filter was vertical, it would allow the vertical 
waves through while blocking the horizontal waves. Thus only vertical waves 
would reach the second filter; if the second filter was aligned horizontally it 
would block these vertical waves. The first filter already blocked the horizontal 
waves, thus no remaining light waves would pass through the second filter. 3D 
movies are created by polarising the images of two different movies in opposite 
directions, so that a different image can be presented to each eye. 
3D movie presentation. In real life, depth perception occurs because the image 
each eye sees is slightly different—this difference occurs because of the distance 
between people’s eyes. To create the impression of depth, slightly different 
images can be presented to each eye—the resulting disparity creates the illusion 
of depth. To create 3D movies, two movies are filmed from slightly different 
angles to simulate the different perspective of each eye. The two movie images 
are polarised—one horizontally and one vertically—by placing a polarising filter 
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in front of each projector lens. The viewer wears polarisation glasses; one lens is 
aligned vertically to allow the vertically polarised image through while blocking 
the horizontally polarised image, and the other lens is aligned horizontally to 
allow the horizontally polarised image through while blocking the vertically 
polarised image (see Figure 1.2). The end result is that the viewers’ eyes each see 
slightly different movies, and the differences create an illusion of depth so that 
certain parts of the movie appear to pop out from the screen.  
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C 
 
Figure 1.1. Illustration of polarisation filters. Horizontally aligned polarisation filters allow only 
horizontal light waves through (A); Vertically aligned polarisation filters allow only vertical light 
waves through (B); Polarisation filters placed at right angles to each other block all light waves 
(C). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Illustration of polarising glasses worn to watch 3D movies; one lens is made from 
horizontal polarising filter, and the other is made from vertical polarising filter. Two movies are 
polarised in different directions, thus each eye sees one version of the movie while the polarising 
filter blocks the other version. 
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Mori and colleagues adapted the technique used to present 3D movies; instead 
of showing different movies to different eyes, they showed different movies to 
different viewers. Rather than using glasses with two lenses aligned at right 
angles to each other, Mori created new glasses with either two horizontally 
aligned polarising filters or two vertically aligned polarising filters (see Figure 
1.3). Thus one pair of glasses would allow the viewer to see the vertically 
polarised movie, while blocking a horizontally polarised movie, and the other 
pair of glasses would do the opposite. Mori and colleagues named their new 
technique the Manipulation of Overlapping Rivalrous Images (MORI) technique 
(Kanematsu et al., 2003; Mori, 2003; Mori 2007). 
If effective, the MORI technique would overcome the limitations of other 
work on memory conformity. Specifically, two viewers would be able to share the 
experience of watching an event together, but would each see a slightly different 
event. As a result, controlled systematic discrepancies should arise during a 
normal discussion between people who feel that they have experienced an event 
together—both in proximity and real time. 
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Figure 1.3. Illustration of polarising glasses worn for MORI technique; lenses are either both 
made from horizontal polarising filter (A); or both made from vertical polarising filter (B). Two 
movies are polarised in different directions, thus each viewer sees one version of the movie while 
the polarising filter blocks the other version. 
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Research Using the MORI Technique 
Mori and colleagues have conducted a number of studies on eyewitness 
memory using the MORI technique. These studies follow the same basic 
procedure. For example, in the original study Kanematsu et al. (2003) filmed two 
versions of a movie. In the movie a pedestrian is standing on the side of a road 
when a car pulls up. The driver gets out and asks for directions, while the 
passenger sneaks out of the car and steals the pedestrian's bag. Finally the car 
drives off, and the pedestrian walks away. There are three critical differences 
between the two movie versions: the colour of the car, the driver's clothes, and 
the direction the pedestrian walks in.  
Kanematsu et al. (2003) filmed the two movies separately, and made 
adjustments to the timing of the movies so they overlapped as much as possible. 
The two movies were displayed on a rear projection screen, with the images from 
the two projectors set up to overlap. One movie was polarised horizontally and 
the other vertically. Subjects took part in the study in pairs—each wearing Mori’s 
new polarisation glasses, under the guise that the glasses would simulate 
nighttime vision. The glasses allowed the wearer to see the image from one 
projector while blocking the image from the other projector (see Figure 1.4). 
After watching the movie, subjects remembered the event individually before 
discussing it with each other. Control subjects then filled out another 
independent report, whereas the experimental subjects were asked to make a 
unified report with their discussion partner; subjects were required to agree on 
the answers for this unified report. Finally, one week later, subjects completed 
another memory test individually. Thus the researchers could compare subjects’ 
initial responses with their later responses to examine what effect discussion had 
on their memories. 
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Figure 1.4. Illustration of equipment set up for MORI technique. Two projectors project two 
movies onto the screen. One movie is polarised horizontally, and the other is polarised vertically. 
Viewers wear polarisation glasses allowing them to see one movie while blocking the other. 
 
Consistent with other research, subjects incorporated elements of each other's 
recall into their own memory reports after discussion. However, these studies too 
have their shortcomings. As described above, subjects in these studies completed 
a number of repeated memory tests, including—in some cases—a unified report 
where subjects were required to agree on their answers. This situation may not 
be a very good parallel to real life eyewitnesses who would—hopefully—never 
be asked to agree on their answers.  
Another issue with these studies is that most use the movies that were 
developed for the original Kanematsu et al. (2003) study. Unfortunately however, 
there are some problems with these movies. Some research suggests that people 
cannot see or remember the critical details from the movies very well. For 
example, in one study, when subjects completed the individual memory test 
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immediately following the movie, only 9 of 60 subjects correctly remembered 
the driver’s clothes from their version of the movie (Mori & Mori, 2006). If people 
cannot remember the critical details of the movie to begin with, it dramatically 
decreases the chance that they will mention those details during discussion with 
another subject, and increases the chance that they will accept the information 
that their partner tells them during discussion. 
Finally, all the studies that have used the MORI technique to date have been 
based on data collected with Japanese subjects (for example, Hirokawa, Matsuno, 
Mori, & Ukita, 2006; Itoh, 2006; Itoh, Umeda, & Kawaguchi, 2005; Mori, 2005; 
Mori & Kitabayashi, 2006). But these results might not translate well to Western 
samples: Japan is widely cited as a country that places emphasis on collectivist 
values (for example Kowner & Wiseman, 2003; Sun, Horn, & Merrit, 2004; Wade-
Benzoni, Okumura, Brett, Moore, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 2002). In a meta-
analysis of Asch-type social conformity studies, subjects in Western 
individualistic cultures demonstrated much less conformity than those in 
collectivist cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996). Similarly, a recent analysis of socially 
desirable responding across cultures found that collective cultural orientation 
was associated with subjects striving to maintain social relationships and gain 
acceptance by conforming to others. In contrast, individualistic cultural 
orientation was associated with responding to emphasise self-reliance (Lalwani, 
Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006). Given that Japanese culture values conformity more 
than Western cultures, and that subjects were required to create a mutual report 
during discussion, it could be that the results thus far are due to response biases 
exacerbated by cultural values.  
One final limitation of the memory conformity studies mentioned so far—
including the MORI technique studies—is what or who makes up the control 
group. In some studies subjects complete repeated individual memory tests, 
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while in others control memory performance is based on a second group of 
people who do not discuss the events together at all. The first design runs the 
risk of making the study goals very transparent, and increases the risk of 
response bias. The second design mimics that of the early misinformation effect 
research, where some subjects are given a narrative with misleading information 
and others are not. More recent misinformation effect studies use within-subjects 
designs, counterbalancing items so that each subject in the study is exposed to 
misleading information for some critical details but not for others. Using this 
method, researchers can look at subjects' baseline memory performance for 
critical details when they have not encountered any misleading information, and 
can examine what role that baseline memory might play in memory distortion. 
The MORI technique provides a means to introduce such counterbalancing into 
research on discussion and memory. By using the MORI technique, researchers 
will be able to introduce controlled errors into natural discussions between 
people who have the experience of a shared history to reconstruct together. If 
effective, the MORI technique provides the means to investigate a wide range of 
social factors and the role they play in memory distortion during social 
interactions. Put another way, the MORI technique may provide an opportunity 
to examine the factors that lead people to be more or less influenced by 
information conveyed in a discussion.  
Source Monitoring Framework 
Taken as a whole, the research on discussion and memory shows that people's 
memories are influenced by discussion with other people. But why are people’s 
memories affected by what other people tell them? These results—and the 
results of misinformation effect research—can be explained by the Source 
Monitoring Framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 
2008; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). According to the SMF, when people remember 
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information, it does not come to mind with a label telling them where it came 
from. Instead, people rely on the qualitative characteristics of the remembered 
details (for example, the amount of perceptual information, vividness, tone of 
the event) and their knowledge and beliefs (for example expectations, judgments 
of plausibility or credibility) to decide where the details came from. Judgments 
about the quantity and quality of these different factors are made along a 
continuum, and different factors have different importance in different source 
monitoring decisions (Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988).  
According to the SMF, source monitoring processes are generally automatic; 
people often make source judgments—as they remember—without realising. 
However, in some situations people make a more deliberate effort to determine 
the sources of their memories—consciously weighing up their knowledge, 
beliefs and the characteristics of their memories. People do source monitoring to 
decide whether something really happened or whether they only thought about 
or imagined it (for example, "Did I fly to the moon yesterday or was it only a 
dream?" and "Did I unplug my hair straightener this morning, or did I only think 
about it?") and to decide which of two (or more) sources information came from 
(for example, "Was it Mollie or Jack who told me that joke?"). 
In more automatic source monitoring people might rely on qualitative 
characteristics such as how familiar or vivid a memory feels to inform them 
where it came from. In more deliberate source monitoring, people use their 
knowledge and beliefs as well (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000). For example, I know that it takes a long time to travel to the 
moon so I can reason that it is quite unlikely I traveled all the way there 
yesterday. Additionally, I might recall that the tooth fairy flew to the moon with 
me; because I don't believe in the tooth fairy, I might reason that it is even more 
unlikely that the event I remember really happened. As a result of consciously 
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weighing up all this information I can conclude that I only dreamed about flying 
to the moon and it never really happened. 
Whether automatic or deliberate, the source monitoring process is far from 
perfect, and is prone to errors (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000). Put simply, a source monitoring error occurs when someone 
attributes information to the wrong source. In memory conformity studies, 
people make source monitoring errors by reporting the misleading details their 
discussion partner suggested instead of reporting the details they actually saw in 
the event. Similarly, people make source monitoring errors in misinformation 
effect studies by reporting misleading details from the post-event narrative or 
post-event questions instead of reporting what they saw. 
These errors can occur in several ways. People might miss the information in 
the event and so rely on post-event information to fill the gaps. Alternatively 
people might remember aspects of the details from both the event and the 
discussion but confuse which information came from where. This confusion 
could result from either automatic or deliberate source monitoring. For instance, 
Jack might automatically decide that a specific detail came from the actual event 
because it feels very familiar to him—yet the familiarity might be due to the 
detail being mentioned in the discussion and thus being considered more 
recently. On the other hand, Mollie might struggle to decide if the hat she saw 
was black or blue, but she knows that Jack said it was blue. For whatever reason, 
Mollie might decide that Jack’s description is more reliable than her own 
memory and so she reports blue. In this case Mollie took the misinformation to 
be evidence of reality. 
Source monitoring errors in these types of studies might mean that subjects 
genuinely—but falsely—remember seeing the inaccurate details they were told 
about, or might mean that subjects have simply decided to report the details 
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their partner suggested (whether strategically or not) even though they have no 
memory of those details. Either way, the end result is that people report seeing 
something that they did not see. For the remainder of this thesis, I will take 
people's independent test responses as evidence of their memories. 
In the SMF, people use their knowledge, beliefs, schemas, and stereotypes to 
inform their source decisions (for example see Cook, Marsh & Hicks, 2003; Hicks 
& Cockman, 2003; Johnson et al. 1993; Lindsay, 2008; Mather, Johnson, 
DeLeonardis, 1999). For instance, people are more likely to attribute information 
to a given source if the information fits with their stereotypes or knowledge 
about the source (Cook et al., 2003; Hicks & Cockman, 2003; Mather et al., 1999). 
Additionally, people are more likely to attribute information to a source if the 
tone of the message fits with their expectations about the source (Holtgraves, 
Srull, & Socall, 1989). As well as using social judgments about the source to 
decide where information came from and how it was delivered, people use social 
judgments to decide the value of a given piece of information (Johnson et al., 
1993; Lindsay, 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987).  
Although it is widely accepted that judgments about the source of 
information are used to guide source monitoring decisions—in order to target 
specific factors—research that examines social aspects of source monitoring 
tends to remove the source from the social context that it belongs to. For 
example, instead of having a conversation with another person, subjects might 
read statements that the person supposedly made; to examine the role of social 
judgments, subjects might be told that the person is a member of a certain 
category (for example, a lawyer), or might be given information that implies 
certain attributes (for example, trustworthiness; see Cook et al., 2003; Dodd & 
Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Hicks & Cockman, 2003; Holtgrave 
et al., 1989; Johnson et al., 1998; Mather et al., 1999).  
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In real life conversations—whether deliberately or not—people make social 
evaluations of each other; but these judgments are not as simple as deciding that 
a given source is positive or negative, or fits into one category or another. Instead 
these judgments might be made on a variety of dimensions simultaneously (for 
example, the speaker’s age, intentions, confidence, attractiveness, 
trustworthiness, occupation). These types of judgments might operate differently 
as a conglomerate in a social interaction than they would when analysed 
separately in a non-social context.  
In fact, some research suggests that misinformation conveyed in a 
conversation maybe even more influential than misinformation encountered in 
other ways (Gabbert et al., 2004; Paterson & Kemp, 2006b). Other research 
suggests that people might not always be influenced by a conversational 
partner’s suggestions (Itsukushima et al., 2006; Vornik et al., 2003); instead they 
might weigh up a multitude of social dynamics within the conversation to decide 
the value of a given piece of information. In other words, the unique social 
dynamics of the conversation might work to increase or decrease the chance that 
someone will be influenced by misinformation. These studies suggest that—to 
fully understand social influences on source monitoring—it is important to 
examine the social context. In short, social aspects of people’s interactions might 
affect their source monitoring behaviour, and as such are an important feature 
of the SMF to investigate further. 
Thesis Overview 
My overarching aim was to build on this body of research in several ways. In 
this thesis, my major goal was to investigate how people's judgments of their 
conversational partners might affect their source monitoring behaviour and thus 
their susceptibility to misleading suggestions conveyed in a conversation. I used 
the MORI technique to present pairs of people with two slightly different 
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versions of an event to discuss together. Before addressing my primary goal, I 
first report six experiments that examine the effectiveness of the MORI 
presentation technique for conducting research on discussion and memory. In 
the second part of the thesis, I report three experiments that examine how 
different social dynamics contribute to memory distortion in social interactions. 
In Experiments 1A and 1B (Chapter 2) I aimed to establish appropriate 
materials for use with the MORI technique. To that end I conducted two pilot 
misinformation effect studies, using Takarangi et al.’s (2006) misinformation 
materials. I tested subjects’ ability to remember the critical details from the 
movies. If subjects’ baseline memory performance was above chance it would 
demonstrate that subjects could see and remember the critical details. Better 
memory for control details (where subjects were not exposed to misinformation) 
than misled details (where subjects were exposed to misinformation) would show 
that subjects’ memories were influenced by misinformation conveyed in a 
narrative description. 
In Experiments 2A and 2B (Chapter 3), I investigated whether subjects’ 
memories were influenced by misinformation mentioned by another person. 
Instead of providing subjects with misinformation in the form of a narrative 
description, subject-pairs discussed some critical details together. If subjects were 
better at remembering nondiscussed (control) details, than discussed (misled) 
details, it would provide evidence that they were influenced by misinformation 
conveyed in a discussion. In Experiment 2A I used an adapted version of 
Takarangi et al.’s (2006) misinformation materials; in Experiment 2B, I developed 
a new target event and stimulus set to generalise the results beyond Takarangi et 
al.’s materials. 
In Experiments 3A and 3B (Chapter 4), I aimed to rule out 
counterexplanations of the results. Specifically, I wanted to investigate whether 
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subjects could see the alternate version of the movie—the version that was 
supposed to be blocked. In Experiment 3A I asked increasingly suggestive 
questions to examine whether subjects would report seeing the alternate movie 
version. For half of the subjects, both movies were played and overlapped via the 
MORI technique; for the other half only one version was played, so there was no 
overlapping image to notice. If subjects in the overlap group did notice the other 
version of the movie they should be more likely to say so than subjects in the 
non-overlap group. If both groups were equally likely to say they saw two 
versions it would suggest the results were due to the demand characteristics of 
the questions. 
In Experiment 3B I used a second-choice test to examine whether subjects had 
any implicit memory for the alternate movie. Subjects watched half of the movie 
(and half of the critical details) while the other version was played and blocked 
via the MORI technique; for the remaining critical details the other movie 
version was not played so there was no overlapping image. If subjects had any 
implicit memory of the alternate movie, they should be more likely to pick the 
correct answer from that version for critical details that were overlapped than for 
critical details that were not overlapped.  
In Experiment 4 (Chapter 5), I examined whether people's relationships with 
each other affected their susceptibility to false memories. Subjects took part with 
either their romantic partner or a stranger. If relationship features such as trust 
and respect affected subjects’ source monitoring decisions, then subjects who 
took part with their romantic partner should be more influenced by the 
misinformation than subjects who took part with a stranger.  
In Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapters 6 and 7), I was interested in whether 
subjects’ expectations about their own abilities and about their discussion 
partner’s abilities might affect their source monitoring decisions. To address this 
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question I told subjects that they either had the same, better or worse ability to 
see the movie than their partner did. If subjects’ expectations about their own 
abilities affected their source monitoring decisions, those subjects who had high 
expectations of themselves might be less influenced than those who had low 
expectations of themselves. Alternatively, if subjects’ expectations about their 
discussion partner—the misinformation messenger—affected their source 
monitoring decisions, those subjects who had high expectations of their partners 
might be more influenced than those who had low expectations. Finally, if 
subjects’ expectations about themselves and their expectations about the 
misinformation messenger both affected their source monitoring decisions, 
those subjects who expected to be better than the messenger might be less 
influenced, and those who expected to be worse than the messenger might be 
more influenced.  
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1: Misinformation Materials and the MORI Technique 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that—at least with the 
Kanematsu et al. (2003) movie—people may not be able to see details very well 
when images are presented via the MORI technique (see Mori & Mori, 2006). One 
possible cause of this problem is that the technique requires researchers to 
present the movies on a semi-transparent rear-projection screen, and as a result 
the image quality is not as sharp or bright as people might be used to. My first 
goal was to test whether people were able to make out and remember the details 
of a movie presented via the MORI technique. To that end, I conducted two pilot 
studies using Takarangi et al.’s (2006) misinformation materials.  
Takarangi et al. (2006) developed a completely counterbalanced set of 
misinformation materials made up of two versions of a movie, and four versions 
of a corresponding narrative. The movie shows an electrician named "Eric" 
working in an unoccupied house. During the movie Eric strays from his duties, 
wanders around the house, delves into personal possessions, and steals various 
items. The movie is identical across both versions except for eight critical 
differences (see Table 2.1). Takarangi et al. filmed only one version of the movie, 
and then digitally altered it to create the eight critical differences. For example, 
in one version of the movie Eric stops to look at a picture of the Leaning Tower 
of Pisa, and in the other he looks at a picture of the Eiffel Tower instead.  
Takarangi et al.'s (2006) study followed the basic misinformation effect 
method described in Chapter 1. Subjects watched one version of the movie, then 
read a narrative that described the movie. The narrative contained misleading 
information about some of the critical details, but not others. Finally, subjects 
completed a recognition test to see how well they remembered details from the 
movie. Takarangi et al.’s results showed a large misinformation effect: subjects 
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were worse at remembering the misled details, details for which they were 
exposed to misinformation in the narrative. In other words, on the test, subjects 
reported what they read in the narrative rather than what they saw in the movie.  
Takarangi et al.’s (2006) materials are ideal for use with the MORI technique 
because the two versions overlap perfectly at all points except during the 
presentation of the eight critical details. Recall that Kanematsu et al. (2003) 
filmed their two movies separately, and made adjustments to the speed of the 
movies in order to get the versions to overlap as much as possible. One common 
concern that reviewers have about the MORI technique is that if subjects tilt 
their heads during the movie presentation, the angle of the polarisation will 
change, and they will be able to see the "blocked" image. However, if the two 
images match perfectly—as Takarangi et al.’s do—and they are played in time 
with one another, then even to the naked eye for the vast majority of the movie 
it would appear that only one movie was being played. Thus, if subjects did tilt 
their heads at some point during Takarangi et al.’s movie, it is very unlikely that 
they would notice the two images. In short, the design of Takarangi et al.’s 
materials should work well with the MORI technique.  
The primary purpose of these pilot studies was to test whether subjects could 
see and remember the critical details of a movie presented via the MORI 
technique. If subjects were able to see and remember the critical details, their 
baseline memory performance should be better than chance levels on the final 
recognition test. Additionally, if subjects could remember the critical details of 
the movie, I wanted to examine whether those memories were susceptible to 
distortion. If subjects’ memories were influenced by misinformation, then they 
should be better at remembering details for which they saw no misinformation 
(control details) than details for which they saw misinformation (misled details). 
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Table 2.1 
Critical differences between Takarangi et al.’s (2006) movie versions 
Critical Detail Version 1 Version 2 
Logo on Eric’s van 
 
RJ’s Electricians 
 
AJ’s Electricians 
Bed in first room 
 
Made 
 
Unmade 
Drink from fridge 
 
Coke 
 
Pepsi 
Colour of mug 
 
White 
 
Yellow 
Colour of cap 
 
Black 
 
Blue 
Magazine 
 
Time 
 
Newsweek 
Checked the time 
 
Wall clock 
 
Wristwatch 
Looked at picture 
  
Leaning Tower of Pisa 
 
Eiffel Tower 
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Experiment 1A 
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 16 students from the Introduction to Psychology Research 
Programme (IPRP) pool took part in return for course credit. Each session had 
either one or two subjects.  
Design 
I followed Takarangi et al.'s (2006) method, but used the MORI technique to 
show subjects the movie. Regardless of the number of subjects per session, both 
movie versions were played; each subject watched one version of the movie 
while the other version was blocked. 
Materials and Procedure 
Subjects came to the laboratory and sat down at a table facing the rear 
projection screen. As a cover story, I told subjects that the study was about 
people’s sensory impressions at different levels of visual acuity. More specifically, 
at the beginning of the session I told them:  
We are interested in people’s sensory impressions at different levels of visual acuity. 
Visual acuity basically means how well you can see. So, right now you should have 100% 
visual acuity either because your eyes work properly, or because you have correcting 
lenses on. We want to know what happens to people’s sensory impressions when their 
visual acuity is degraded by different amounts. 
While explaining the study, I brought the subjects' attention to a stack of four 
boxes containing "acuity glasses.” Each box was labeled as though it contained 
different strength acuity glasses; for example, one box read "95% Acuity Glasses: 
4 pairs" (see Figure 2.1A). In fact, only the "95% Acuity" box contained glasses; the 
other boxes were empty, but were displayed to add authenticity to the cover 
story. Next, I told subjects:  
Today, you will be in the 95% acuity condition, so that's not too different to normal 
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vision. I will give you a pair of 95% acuity glasses and I am going to show you a movie of 
a tradesman named Eric working in a house; I just want you to watch the movie through 
the glasses, and then we will do a couple of related tasks afterwards. You might find that 
the movie looks a bit funny through the glasses, but don't worry—that is basically how 
they are supposed to work. We do find that people see best when they keep their head 
straight rather than tilted, so we ask that you keep your head as straight and still as 
possible while you watch the movie. If you already wear glasses, the acuity glasses 
should fit over the top.  
I gave each subject a pair of polarisation glasses from the 95% acuity box (see 
Figure 2.1B). There were three phases to the study: first subjects watched the 
movie, next they read a narrative about the movie, and finally, they completed a 
surprise memory test.1 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 2.1. Photographs of boxes ostensibly containing different strengths of “Acuity Glasses” (A) 
and people wearing polarisation glasses (B).  
 
Phase 1. The two movie versions were each played on a separate Apple iBook 
PowerPC G4; each iBook was connected to a NEC ViewLight Mobile DPL 
projector, model LT75ZJ, and the two images were projected onto the rear of a 
                                                
1 Examples of the materials used in this experiment and subsequent experiments appear in the 
Appendices. 
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semi-transparent projection screen (see Figure 2.2A). The rear projection screen 
was made from a 1.22 m x 1.82 m wooden panel and had a 29 cm x 38 cm cutout 
holding the semi-transparent screen. All the equipment was hidden from 
subjects' view by the rear projection screen (see Figure 2.2B). Two projectors were 
mounted one above the other in a metal stand, each tilted toward the screen so 
that the two images overlapped. One movie was polarised horizontally by 
attaching a polarising filter horizontally to the projector stand in front of the 
lens. The other movie was polarised vertically by doing the same with another 
filter placed at 90 degrees (see Figure 2.2C and 2.2D).  
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
Figure 2.2. Photographs of equipment used for MORI technique: Behind the rear projection 
screen (A); from subjects’ view, at the front of the projection screen (B); the projector stand and 
polarisation filter (C) and the projector stand used in later studies (D). 
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Each subject either wore glasses that allowed him or her to see the 
horizontally polarised image while blocking the vertically polarised image, or 
wore glasses that did the opposite. Subjects sat at a table facing the rear 
projection screen for the duration of the study. The movie(s) had no audio, and 
ran for 6:28 min. In order for subjects’ memories to fade, and to prevent them 
from thinking about the movie, following the movie subjects completed a 15-min 
filler logic puzzle.  
Phase 2. Next, subjects read one of four versions of the narrative description 
used in Takarangi et al.’s (2006) study. The narratives were between 781 and 786 
words long and were identical except for information about the eight critical 
details. Each narrative contained misleading information about four critical 
details, and generic information about the other four. The misinformation was 
counterbalanced to match the corresponding detail presented in the other 
version of the movie. For example, if someone watched Eric looking at the Eiffel 
Tower in the movie, the misleading information would say he looked at the 
Leaning Tower of Pisa, whereas the generic information would say he looked at 
a picture on the wall. Each critical detail acted equally often as a misled detail 
and as a control detail. 
Phase 3. After completing another five-minute filler task, subjects were given 
a surprise memory test. I told subjects that the questions were testing their 
memory for the movie; this point was reiterated in written instructions at the 
start of the test. The test was taken from Takarangi et al. (2006); there were 20 
two-alternative forced-choice recognition questions. Eight of the questions asked 
about the eight critical details; for these questions subjects were presented with 
the correct detail from each of the two movie versions. In other words, subjects 
chose between the correct detail from the movie they saw and the misleading 
detail from the other movie and narrative. For example "Eric looked at a picture 
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of the ______ tower" was followed by the two alternatives "Leaning" and "Eiffel". 
The remaining twelve questions were fillers. After each question, subjects used a 
scale to rate how confident they were that their answer was correct, where 1 = not 
at all confident, and 5 = very confident. 
Subjects were thanked for their time at the end of the session, and were fully 
debriefed when the study was complete.  
Results and Discussion 
Before addressing the primary purpose of the study—whether subjects could 
see and remember the critical details—I first examined how well they 
remembered the non-critical filler details: these details were the same in both 
versions of the movie. In fact, subjects were very good at answering these twelve 
questions on the test, and there were no differences between the movie versions, 
M = 11.00 correct (92%), SD = 0.93; M = 10.88 correct (91%), SD = 1.55, t < 1, ns. 
Remembering Critical Details 
I next analysed subjects' performance on each of the control details, details for 
which they read only generic information. Here and throughout the thesis, 
memory performance is based on the proportion of correct responses for each 
subject. In a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test, chance performance 
is 50%; thus to establish that subjects could see and remember the details from 
the movie, each detail should yield a proportion correct score greater than .50 
(when acting as a control detail).  
For each of the eight critical details, I calculated the proportion of correct 
control responses; these proportions are displayed in Figure 2.3. The red line 
illustrates chance performance (.50). As Figure 2.3 shows, for four of the eight 
critical details, subjects’ baseline memory performance was at or below chance, 
suggesting that the movie was not clear enough for them to be able to make out 
and remember the critical details. Specifically, subjects were poor at 
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remembering the bed, drink, mug, and cap details.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Proportion of correct control responses for each critical detail. Error bars depict 
standard errors of the means. 
 
Summary 
In short, subjects remembered the filler details but not the critical details. If 
subjects have poor memory for the critical details it is unlikely that those details 
would arise during discussion between the subject and another person. In 
Experiment 1B, I aimed to improve memory for these critical details.  
Experiment 1B 
I used Takarangi et al.’s (2006) original files and the same software to make 
several changes to these problem details. Takarangi et al. (2006) created the two 
versions of the cap detail and the mug details by changing the colour of the 
original filmed material. For instance, the cap was originally blue; Takarangi et 
al. created a second version by changing it to black. Because the images on the 
semi-transparent screen were quite dark, I was concerned that the image wasn’t 
clear enough for subjects to tell the whether the cap was blue or black, or 
whether the mug was white or yellow. I made these differences more 
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pronounced by creating a new red version of the cap to replace the blue version, 
and a new green version of the mug to replace the yellow version. Table 2.2 
depicts the new versions of the revised critical details. I changed the 
corresponding information in the narratives and on the test to reflect these new 
critical details. For the other two problem details (bed and drink) I added extra 
footage to the movie so the critical details appeared onscreen for longer. The 
new versions of the movie ran for 6:34 min.  
 
Table 2.2 
Updated critical details in revised versions of Takarangi et al.’s (2006) movie  
Critical Detail Version 1 Version 2 
Colour of mug 
 
White 
 
Green 
Colour of cap 
 
Black 
 
Red 
 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty IPRP students took part in return for course credit. 
Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 1A. 
Materials and Procedure 
The method and procedure were the same as Experiment 1A, except I used the 
revised movie versions, narratives and recognition test. 
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1A, subjects performed very well on the twelve filler 
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questions, and there were no differences in memory performance between the 
two versions of the movie M = 11.40 correct (95%), SD = 1.07; M = 11.10 correct 
(93%), SD = 0.88, t < 1, ns.   
Remembering Critical Details 
Of most interest was subjects’ baseline memory performance. As Figure 2.4 
shows, the proportion of correct control responses was above chance for every 
detail. Collapsing across details, subjects were good at reporting what they had 
seen in the new movie versions, with an overall proportion of .75 correct 
responses for control details (SD = .21). 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Proportion of correct control responses for each critical detail. Error bars depict 
standard errors of the means. 
 
In short, subjects remembered the critical details from the revised movie 
versions. If subjects have good baseline memory for the critical details those 
details should arise during discussion between the subject and another person. In 
other words, using the revised Takarangi et al. (2006) materials might work well 
with the MORI technique in order to get subjects to expose each other to 
misinformation during a discussion. Before I could study how discussion might 
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affect people’s memories, I first needed to establish whether subjects’ memories 
of the revised movie versions were susceptible to the influence of 
misinformation. If subjects’ memories were especially clear, perhaps the 
misinformation would not influence what they remembered. 
Misinformation Effect 
To see if subjects’ memories were affected by the misinformation contained in 
the narrative, I calculated the proportion of correct responses each subject gave 
for control details and misled details; these proportions are displayed in Figure 
2.5. As Figure 2.5 shows, subjects were better at remembering control details than 
misled details, t (19) = 3.44, p < .01, Cohen's d = 0.78.2 In other words, subjects’ 
memories were influenced by the misinformation contained in the narrative, and 
they incorrectly reported the misinformation instead of what they saw. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Proportion of correct responses for control and misled details. Error bars depict 
standard errors of the means. 
 
Next, to examine the contribution of each critical detail, I calculated subjects’ 
mean performance for each detail when it acted as a control detail and when it 
                                                
2 Effect sizes were calculated using G*Power v3.0. 
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acted as a misled detail. These data are displayed in Figure 2.6. As the figure 
shows, people were more likely to report the correct answer for the critical 
details when they acted as control details, t (7) = 3.15, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 2.05. 
 
 Figure 2.6. Proportion of correct control and misled responses for each critical detail. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Confidence 
These results tell us about subjects’ memory accuracy, but they do not tell us 
about subjects’ subjective experiences of their memories. I next compared 
subjects’ confidence ratings for their responses to control and misled details. As 
shown on Figure 2.7, subjects were moderately confident in all their responses, 
and slightly more confident in their responses to misled than control details, t 
(19) = 2.54, p = .01, Cohen's d = 0.56. Taken together, the results so far suggest that 
reading misinformation hurt subjects’ accuracy, yet boosted confidence in their 
memory reports. 
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Figure 2.7. Mean confidence for control and misled details. Error bars depict standard errors of 
the means. 
 
Another way to look at subjects’ experiences of their memories is to examine 
confidence in their correct and incorrect responses. To that end, I calculated 
subjects’ confidence when they said that they saw a detail in the movie, and 
compared subjects’ confidence in their correct responses on control details (true 
memories) with their incorrect responses on misled details (false memories). As 
shown in Figure 2.8, subjects were equally confident in both types of responses: 
relying on the misinformation did not affect subjects’ confidence in any way, t 
(16) < 1, ns. Put another way, subjects were just as confident in their false 
memories as they were in their true memories. 
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Figure 2.8. Mean confidence for correct responses on control details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on misled details (false memories). Error bars depict standard errors of the 
means. 
 
Summary 
Considered as a whole, the data from Experiment 1B suggest that the revised 
versions of Takarangi et al.’s (2006) materials work effectively with the MORI 
technique. Subjects remembered control details at a level higher than chance, 
but were still influenced by misleading suggestions. My next goal was to see 
whether I would get the same pattern of results if—instead of reading a 
misleading narrative about the event—subjects discussed the event together.  
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Chapter 3 
Experiment 2: Misinformation Delivered via Discussion 
Misinformation delivered in a narrative may be experienced in a qualitatively 
different way from misinformation delivered in a discussion. Specifically, 
information in a narrative might be ascribed some expert quality by virtue of it 
coming from the experimenter, or by virtue of the amount of highly detailed 
information in it (Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). 
Additionally, misinformation provided in a written form may miss the vast array 
of social dynamics that may be at play in a real life interaction. My next step was 
to examine whether people would be susceptible to misinformation conveyed by 
a peer during discussion about a movie presented via the MORI technique. 
Experiment 2A 
My main goal in this study was to build on the methodology of the previous 
MORI technique research described in Chapter 1. To that end, I used a within-
subjects design so that each subject discussed some critical details but not others. 
Using a within-subjects design provided a means to make fair comparisons 
between subjects’ memories for nondiscussed critical details and discussed 
critical details, parallel to the comparisons made between people’s memories for 
control and misled details in a misinformation effect study. Additionally, in 
order to make these comparisons, subjects needed to complete only one memory 
test at the very end of the study; as mentioned in Chapter 1, in previous MORI 
technique research, subjects were required to complete repeated memory tests to 
examine their pre and post discussion memories. In short, the repeated tests 
might have made it obvious to subjects that the researchers were interested in 
how discussion shaped memory; by requiring subjects in my study to complete 
only one test, this transparency should be decreased.  
If people are influenced by misinformation conveyed in a conversation by 
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someone who has shared an experience, then subjects should be better at 
remembering nondiscussed details than discussed details. 
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 40 IPRP students participated in pairs in return for course credit.   
Design 
The study was a within-subjects design. For each subject, four of the eight 
critical details acted as discussed details, parallel to the misled details in a 
misinformation study; the other four acted as nondiscussed details, parallel to 
the control details in a misinformation study.  Critical details were fully 
counterbalanced so that each served equally as a nondiscussed and discussed 
detail.   
Materials and Procedure 
The method was based on Experiment 1B and had three phases. 
Phase 1. First, subjects watched the movie as described in Chapter 2. One 
member of each pair watched one version of the movie, and the other person 
watched the other version. After the movie, subjects completed a 15-minute filler 
task. 
Phase 2. In the second phase of the study, instead of reading a narrative 
description, subject-pairs were asked to talk about what they saw in the movie. In 
order for subjects to discuss some critical details, but not others, their discussions 
were guided by questions. Twelve discussion questions were presented one at a 
time on the rear projection screen using Microsoft PowerPoint®; each question 
asked about a detail from the movie and provided five alternative answers (see 
Figure 3.1). Four of the twelve questions targeted critical details; for these four 
questions, the correct answer from each movie version appeared in the list of five 
alternatives (see Figure 3.1A). The other four critical details were not mentioned 
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during the discussion, and served as the nondiscussed (control) details at test. 
The remaining eight discussion questions were fillers, and were not mentioned 
again (see Figure 3.1B).  
 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of slides used in discussion for critical questions (A) and filler questions (B). 
 
The experimenter recorded subjects’ conversations using an Olympus® DS – 
2000 digital voice recorder, and also noted subjects’ answers during the 
discussion. Subject-pairs were asked to discuss the questions together, figure out 
the answer, and tell the experimenter what answer they decided on. If the 
subjects could not agree, they were permitted to give separate answers. 
Pilot testing showed that pairs of people generally answered the questions 
within 30 seconds, so to ensure they had ample time, subjects were given up to 
one minute to discuss each question, and were warned when they had 10 seconds 
remaining. After subjects told the experimenter their answer(s), the 
experimenter displayed the next question. Following the discussion, subjects 
completed a filler task for five minutes.  
Phase 3. Finally, subjects completed a surprise recognition test independently; 
the test was identical to the test used in Experiment 1B. For the eight critical 
questions, the two alternatives were structured so that subjects chose between the 
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correct detail from their version of the movie and the correct detail from their 
partner’s version. 
Results and Discussion 
Twenty pairs of subjects completed the study; however, all data—except for 
discussion duration—were analysed on an individual level, yielding a total of 40 
subjects.3 Consistent with Experiment 1B, subjects were good at remembering the 
twelve non-critical aspects of the movie, M = 9.42 correct (79%), SD = 1.72. To 
address the main research question—whether discussion with another person 
influenced subjects’ memories—I analysed subjects’ responses to discussed and 
nondiscussed details on the independent recognition test.  
Discussion Duration 
Before turning to the primary question, I first examined how long subjects 
took to complete the discussion. There was no evidence that people felt rushed to 
choose an answer during the discussion—if they did, the length of their 
discussions should have been close to the 12 minutes allowed. In fact no one took 
the full 12 minutes: subjects took between 2:43 min and 6:56 min to complete the 
discussion, M = 4:37 min, SD = 0:59. 
Subjects were warned when only 10 seconds remained to answer a given 
question—this situation only arose 4 times out of a possible 240 (2%). 
Importantly, for 3 of these 4 instances subjects were warned while discussing 
filler questions. Only one subject-pair was given a warning while discussing a 
critical question (out of a possible 80 instances). These results suggest that 
allowing subjects one minute to discuss each question retained control over the 
discussion phase of the study, yet did not limit subjects’ ability to answer the 
questions, or force them to conform on critical details due to time pressure. 
                                                
3 Appendix J provides and explanation and justification for using the individual subjects—instead 
of the subject-pairs—as the unit of analysis. 
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Not surprisingly, subjects did take slightly longer on average to discuss 
questions about critical details—where they had seen contradictory 
information—than questions about filler details. Subjects' discussions of critical 
questions ranged between 6 s and 61 s, M = 25.40 s, SD = 7.12, while their 
discussions of filler questions took between 7 s and 60 s, M = 21.88 s, SD = 5.20, t 
(19) = 2.24, p = .02, Cohen's d = 0.50. 
Exposure to Misinformation 
Before I could turn to the primary research question—whether subjects 
influenced each other’s memories—I needed to determine what the discussion 
partners told each other. In misinformation studies such as Experiment 1, 
subjects typically read or listen to a narrative containing misleading information 
(for example see Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Lindsay, 
1990; Loftus, 1991; Loftus et al., 1978; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Takarangi et 
al., 2006; Vornik et al., 2003); as a result, the experimenters have complete control 
of the information that subjects are exposed to. In my study, the method was not 
so simple; I relied on subjects to expose each other to the misleading 
information, and had no control over whether they did so. Instead, I could only 
examine what subjects did say after the fact; I used the experimenter’s written 
record of subjects’ discussion answers, and transcripts of the digital voice files to 
determine what was said during the discussion. 
Subjects were exposed to between 1 and 4 misleading details, M = 2.03, SD = 
0.89; in total they were exposed to the misleading postevent information only 81 
out of a possible 160 times (51%). Because subjects were exposed to different 
numbers of misleading details, to compare subject’s memories I calculated—for 
each subject—a proportion correct score for discussed and nondiscussed details. I 
use the word nondiscussed to refer to control details, the details that subjects 
were not asked about at all during the discussion. I use the word discussed to 
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refer to the 81 instances in which subjects were exposed to the misinformation 
during discussion.  
The remaining 79 instances—when subjects were asked about a critical detail 
during the discussion, but were not exposed to the misinformation—do not 
speak to my research questions, and were not included in any further analyses. 
This non-exposure occurred because subjects did not always assert the correct 
answer from their version of the movie during the discussion: sometimes they 
provided an incorrect answer either because they guessed or because they were 
mistaken and other times they simply agreed with what their partner said 
without offering an alternative.  
Remembering Discussed Details 
To answer the main research question—whether subjects were influenced by 
misinformation provided to them in a discussion—I compared the proportion of 
correct answers subjects gave for nondiscussed details with the proportion of 
correct answers they gave for discussed details. Did discussion affect subjects’ 
memories of the critical details? As Figure 3.2 shows, the answer is yes. At test, 
subjects were more likely to report the correct answer for nondiscussed critical 
details than discussed critical details, t (39) = 6.82, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.11. In other 
words, when subjects remembered discussed details, they sometimes reported 
what their partner told them instead of what they saw. 
These results fit with the source monitoring explanation in Chapter 1: whether 
they were aware of it or not, subjects reported seeing details that they were only 
told about during the discussion. When people make source decisions, one factor 
that might be important is how they perceive the misinformation messenger. 
More specifically, people might make social appraisals about the messenger to 
decide whether the information conveyed is valuable or not (Johnson et al., 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
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people tend to be misled when they judge the misinformation messenger to be 
credible, reliable, trustworthy, attractive or powerful, but resist the suggestions 
when they judge the messenger not to have those kinds of attributes (Dodd & 
Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Vornik et al., 2003). In this study, 
misinformation was delivered to subjects via a peer who had ostensibly shared an 
experience with them. The results suggest that subjects generally judged others 
with whom they shared an experience to be a reliable source of information 
about that experience; as a result, they reported seeing details their partner only 
told them about. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of correct responses for nondiscussed and discussed details. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
I next examined the contribution of the eight individual critical details when 
they acted as nondiscussed details and when they acted as discussed details. 
These data appear in Figure 3.3. As the figure illustrates, subjects were more 
likely to give correct responses for the critical details when they had not been 
discussed, t (7) = 10.87, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 3.84. 
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of correct nondiscussed and discussed responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
In sum, both the subject-level analysis and the item-level analysis showed that 
discussion hurt subjects’ memory performance; people were influenced by their 
partner’s suggestions, and as a result were worse at remembering details they 
discussed. Importantly, people were not always misled by what their partner told 
them; instead, 33% of the time that people were exposed to the misinformation, 
they still gave the correct answer at test. There is some evidence that—like 
Asch’s (1952; 1953; 1966) results—individual personality differences might have 
led subjects to be more or less influenced by their partner’s suggestions. More 
specifically, when considering only subjects who were exposed to 2 or more 
pieces of misinformation, some subjects were misled by everything their partner 
told them (12 of 28; 43%) yet others were never misled at all (2 of 28; 7%); perhaps 
some kind of personality disposition might lead these subjects to respond in the 
same way across different details. For instance, Asch suggested that people’s self-
confidence might determine how influenced they would be. In my study it might 
be that subjects who were never misled had high self-confidence, and subjects 
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who were always misled had low self-confidence. The remaining 14 subjects 
(50%) were misled on some details but not others; this result suggests that rather 
than making a blanket assessment of their discussion partner and everything 
their partner said, these people might have made source judgments based on 
different factors at different times. Put another way, different factors in the 
interaction might have led them to be more or less influenced by the 
misinformation. 
Taken as a whole, these findings have implications for the way people 
remember the past. As discussed in Chapter 1, people talk about their past 
experiences all the time, and in doing so they probably expose each other to new 
information. These results show that when people talk about the past, they might 
incorporate new information from each other’s reports into their own memory, 
and later report seeing something they did not see. 
Confidence 
As Figure 3.4 shows, and consistent with Experiment 1B, subjects were 
moderately confident in all their responses, and they were just as confident in 
their responses to discussed and nondiscussed details, t < 1, ns. I next examined 
how confident subjects were in their correct and incorrect responses. As Figure 
3.5 shows, relying on misinformation had a cost: when subjects claimed to have 
seen a critical detail in the movie, they were more confident about their correct 
memories for nondiscussed details than their false memories for discussed 
details, t (32) = 1.85, p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.32. Put another way, when subjects were 
misled by their partner’s suggestions, they became less sure of themselves. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean confidence for nondiscussed and discussed details. Error bars depict standard 
errors of the means. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean confidence for correct responses on nondiscussed details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on discussed details (false memories). Error bars depict standard errors of the 
means. 
 
There are at least two explanations for this result. First, it might be that 
subjects were not 100% certain about what they recalled during the discussion—
thus when they did convince their partner to report the misinformation, at most 
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they could only pass on their own less-than-perfect confidence. Second, it might 
be that the subject-pairs initially disagreed about the discussed details, and the 
confusion led them to doubt whatever their eventual answer was, thus 
decreasing their confidence. 
Features of the Discussion 
Even though subjects experienced decreased confidence they still reported 
seeing the misinformation. Most subjects were influenced by some of their 
partner’s misleading suggestions but not by others; I wondered whether any 
features of the discussion led subjects to be more or less influenced by the 
misinformation. To address this question, I used transcripts of the discussions to 
examine four aspects of each subject’s discussion for each critical detail: [1] if the 
subject spoke first; [2] if the subject disputed what his or her partner said; [3] if 
what the subject said was disputed by his or her partner; and [4] if the subject 
used the misleading detail as an answer to the critical discussion question. 
Interestingly, in every instance that one subject disputed what the other said 
during the discussion, the other subject reciprocated and disputed what the 
subject said. Whether coincidental, or the result of a conversational rule, the data 
for factors 2 and 3 matched perfectly, and there was no point in examining them 
separately. Instead, I combined the two factors to take into account whether or 
not there was a dispute in the discussion. I used the final three dichotomous 
discussion features, and examined the proportion of instances that subjects were 
and were not misled. Table 3.1 displays—for the 81 instances that subjects were 
exposed to the misinformation—the proportion of instances where each of the 
three discussion features occurred and the subsequent proportion of instances 
where subjects went on to be misled in the recognition test. As Table 3.1 shows, 
after subjects were exposed to the misinformation, they went on to use the 
misinformation (rather than what they personally saw) as their answer at test 
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most—but not all—of the time. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Proportion discussion feature occurrence and subsequent proportion subjects misled for 81 
instances subjects exposed to misinformation 
DISCUSSION  TEST 
Discussion Features Feature      
(n cases) 
 Misled               
(n cases) 
Answer    
Misinformation .73 (59)  .85 (50) 
Alternative .27 (22)  .18 (4) 
Dispute     
Dispute .36 (29)  .28 (8) 
No Dispute .64 (52)  .88 (46) 
Speaking Order    
Spoke First .22 (18)  .33 (6) 
Spoke Second .78 (63)  .76 (48) 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE  .67 (54) 
Note. Proportion Correct = 1 – Proportion Misled (n cases Correct = 81 – n cases Misled). 
 
 
Subjects always gave public responses during the discussion, and as such it is 
not possible to distinguish whether these responses were driven more by 
normative or informational influences (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). However, 
subjects’ subsequent test responses do provide some insight. As displayed in the 
first two lines of Table 3.1, subjects used the misinformation as their final answer 
at test more often when they had previously used it as a discussion answer. 
Although these data do not provide a perfect measure, they suggest that most of 
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the time that subjects agreed with their partner during the discussion, they did so 
because they believed their partner’s recall to be accurate and reliable, and as a 
result went on to use that information as an answer at test. In other words they 
appeared to exhibit informational influence. However, some subjects also 
appeared to exhibit normative influence, complying with their partner and 
answering with the misinformation during discussion—perhaps for social 
reasons—but reverting to their own answer in the independent test (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955).  
More rarely, people sometimes answered with something other than the 
misinformation during the discussion, but went on to use the misinformation as 
their answer on the independent recognition test. There are at least two 
explanations for this finding. For instance, it might be that subjects resisted the 
misinformation during the discussion and instead answered with one of the filler 
alternatives. Then later, when the incorrect filler alternative was not offered on 
the final test, they shifted their decision to the misinformation. Alternatively, it 
might be that the influence of misinformation changed over time, leading 
people to be more influenced by it during the independent test than they were 
during the discussion. In fact, other research shows that misinformation can 
become more influential over time as it becomes less tightly tied to information 
about the misinformation messenger (Underwood & Pezdek, 1998). 
Table 3.1 also shows that subjects were misled less often when they disputed 
each other during discussion of the critical detail. However, sometimes when 
people disputed each other during the discussion, they were still eventually 
misled, suggesting that even if people initially resist or reject misinformation, 
they may still be influenced by it later on. Finally, only a small portion of the 
time that subjects were exposed to the misinformation did they speak first 
during the discussion of that detail. This finding suggests that speaking order 
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may play some role in determining exposure to misinformation. Additionally, 
when people were exposed to the misinformation, they were misled less often 
when they spoke first.  
In sum, there was no one pathway for misinformation: misinformation 
introduced to the discussion by another person was received in a variety of ways, 
with a number of different outcomes. Given the differences in how 
misinformation was received, I wondered if it was possible to predict whether 
someone would be misled on a given detail based on what happened during the 
discussion of that detail. 
Predicting False Memories 
Gabbert et al. (2006) found that whether people speak first about a given detail 
predicts whether they will be misled on that detail: the first speaker is much 
more likely to influence the second speaker’s independent memory report than 
vice versa. One limitation to these findings is that the experimenters could not 
control whether subjects mentioned the misinformation to each other during 
discussion, and they did not account for exposure to misinformation in their 
analysis. As Lindsay (2007) observed, in Gabbert et al.’s study, sometimes when 
one subject spoke first, that subject was actually the only person to mention a 
detail at all; other times, the subject's discussion partner disputed his or her 
claim and mentioned the contradictory detail second. As a result, speaking first 
was confounded with exposure to misinformation: if someone spoke first about a 
given detail, and the other person did not respond, the second person was more 
likely to be influenced because the first person was never exposed to any 
misinformation.  
I wanted to examine if any discussion features predicted whether subjects 
were misled on a particular detail in this study. More specifically I wanted to test 
whether my results fit with Gabbert et al. (2006), and I wanted to follow up 
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Lindsay’s (2007) concerns by investigating the role of exposure to 
misinformation in determining any predictors. To that end, I ran two nominal 
logistic regressions.  
In both analyses, I treated critical details as independent cases, and entered 
the three dichotomous discussion features—whether the subject used the 
misinformation as a discussion answer, whether there was dispute during the 
discussion, and whether the subject spoke first—into the regression to predict if 
subjects were eventually misled on a particular detail. In the first regression—
the all-items regression—I followed Gabbert et al. (2006) and included all 160 
instances where subjects were asked to discuss critical details, regardless of 
whether they were exposed to the misinformation when discussing those details. 
In the second analysis—the exposure-only regression—I overcame Lindsay’s 
criticism of Gabbert et al.’s analysis by including only the 81 instances that 
subjects were actually exposed to the misinformation during discussion. By 
considering only cases where subjects were exposed to the misinformation, 
everyone should have an equal chance of being misled on any given detail. Thus, 
I can rule out the possibility that any predictors are confounded with people not 
being exposed to misinformation, and thus being less likely (or unlikely) to be 
misled. In other words, in the exposure-only regression, if any features of the 
discussion do predict whether subjects are misled, it will show that those features 
are important in determining people’s susceptibility to misinformation, while 
controlling for the possibility that those features are related to exposure to 
misinformation. If, as Lindsay (2007) suggested, speaking first only predicted 
being misled in Gabbert et al.’s study because exposure to misinformation was 
not taken into account, then speaking first should be a significant predictor of 
being misled in the all-items regression, but not in the exposure-only regression.  
All-items regression. When all 160 instances were included in the analysis, all 
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three factors predicted whether subjects were misled on a particular detail. The 
odds ratios showed that subjects were 35 times more likely to be misled if they 
used the misinformation as an answer during the discussion, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 
29.30, p < .01, and they were 16 times less likely to be misled if there was dispute 
during the discussion, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 12.64, p < .01. Additionally, in line with 
Gabbert et al.’s (2006) results, subjects were five times less likely to be misled if 
they spoke first when discussing a critical detail, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 10.32, p < .01.  
Exposure-only regression. When considering only the 81 instances that 
subjects were exposed to misinformation, only two factors predicted whether 
subjects were misled. If subjects used the misinformation as their discussion 
answer, they were 21 times more likely to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 81) = 14.43, p < .01, 
and if there was dispute during the discussion subjects were 17 times less likely 
to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 81) = 14.89, p < .01. 
Taken as a whole, these results point to three important conclusions. First, 
using the misinformation as a discussion answer was the best predictor of being 
misled later on. In both analyses, subjects were far and away more likely to be 
misled if they had previously used the misinformation as a discussion answer, 
suggesting a role for prior usage in influencing memory. Second, when subjects 
experienced dispute in the discussion they were much less likely to be influenced 
by the misinformation. Perhaps the experience of a shared dispute led subjects to 
be more deliberative, less trusting of what their partners said, and thus less likely 
to be misled. However, recall that in every instance where one subject disputed 
what the other subject said, the other subject reciprocated and disputed what the 
first subject said, so the two factors could only be analysed in combination. 
Rather than the experience of a reciprocal dispute, perhaps one of these 
features—being disputed or doing the disputing—drives the effect. Finally, in 
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support of Lindsay’s (2007) suggestion, whether a subject spoke first when 
discussing a critical detail predicted being misled only in the all-items 
regression, where exposure to misinformation was not taken into account. In 
other words, the results suggest that the effect of speaking first might be driven 
by whether subjects were exposed to misinformation in the first place.  
Speaking order may play an important role in the real world: speaking order 
might determine whether people will be exposed to misinformation, and thus 
whether they will be misled. To address this issue, I conducted another nominal 
logistic regression—the predicting-exposure regression—to see if any discussion 
features predicted whether subjects were exposed to misinformation.  
Predicting-exposure regression. Both speaking order and dispute predicted 
whether subjects were exposed to the misinformation. Not surprisingly, when 
there was dispute in the discussion, subjects were 22 times more likely to be 
exposed to the misinformation than when there was no dispute, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 
23.42, p < .01. Additionally, the odds ratio showed that subjects who spoke first 
were 13 times less likely to be exposed to the misinformation than subjects who 
did not speak first, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 28.54, p < .01. Even though speaking first might 
not be associated with susceptibility to false memories, these results support the 
idea that speaking first in a discussion is associated with whether people will 
come into contact with new information. 
Summary 
In sum, the revised materials from Experiment 1B worked in combination 
with the MORI technique to produce a misinformation effect via discussion. 
Specifically, subjects experienced an event together, yet systematic discrepancies 
in their memory reports arose naturally in a discussion about the past, and led 
them to remember details of the event inaccurately. Subjects’ discussions of the 
critical details were qualitatively different from one another and some of these 
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differences predicted the outcomes for memory. Although the misinformation 
was received in a variety of ways, subjects’ overall accuracy was worse for 
discussed than nondiscussed details: subjects sometimes reported seeing what 
their partner told them instead of what they saw. My next goal was to generalise 
this pattern of results beyond Takarangi et al.’s (2006) modified Eric event to 
ensure that the results were not tied to this specific stimulus set. 
Experiment 2B 
I created a new event to test the generalisability of the results in Experiment 
2A. The new stimulus set was designed in the same way as Takarangi et al.'s 
(2006) materials, but featured a new target event, a party.  
Method 
Subjects 
Forty IPRP students participated in pairs in return for course credit.   
Design 
The study had exactly the same design as Experiment 2A. 
Materials and Procedure 
The only differences between this study and Experiment 2A were the 
materials used, and the filler task duration—everything else was identical. The 
misinformation effect in Experiment 2A was very strong (Cohen’s d = 1.11), and 
thus unlikely to be affected by other manipulations. In order to decrease the 
magnitude of the effect (so I would be able to examine the influence of different 
manipulations in subsequent studies) I shortened the length of the filler tasks to 
10 min and 3 min respectively. 
The new event was about a party-goer named “Chad.” Like Takarangi et al. 
(2006), I created two movie versions, with eight critical differences between them 
(see Table 3.2). For example, in one version of the movie Chad steals a wallet, and 
in the other he looks at the wallet but puts it back.  
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Table 3.2 
Critical differences between Chad movie versions 
Critical Detail Version 1 Version 2 
Door 
 
Rung bell 
 
Knocked on door 
Mug 
 
Blue 
 
Pink 
Decoration 
 
Birthday Banner 
 
Tinsel 
Alcohol 
 
Vodka 
 
Wine 
Accidentally went into 
 
Laundry 
 
Bedroom 
Balloons 
 
Red 
 
Blue 
Added to drink 
 
Lemon 
 
Drug 
Put wallet 
 
In his pocket 
 
Back on bench 
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As in Experiment 2A, for each subject, four critical details acted as discussed 
details, and four acted as nondiscussed details.  Critical details were 
counterbalanced so each served equally as a nondiscussed and discussed detail.  
The movie had no audio, and ran for 6:35 min. I updated the discussion slides and 
recognition test from Experiment 2A to ask about details from the Chad movie. 
The structure of the questions, and the number of questions focused on critical 
and filler details was exactly the same as Experiment 2A.  
Results and Discussion 
All data were analysed on an individual level, yielding a total of 40 subjects. 
Consistent with Experiment 2A, subjects were good at remembering the twelve 
filler details, M = 9.08 correct (76%), SD = 1.21. 
Discussion Duration 
Also consistent with Experiment 2A, there was no evidence that subjects felt 
rushed to answer during discussion using the new stimulus set. Total discussion 
duration ranged from 2:45 min to 7:04 min, well under the 12 min allowed, M = 
4:13 min, SD = 1:12. Additionally, only two times (out of a possible 80; 3%) were 
subjects reminded that they had 10 seconds left when discussing critical 
questions. Five warnings (out of 160 possible instances; 3%) were given when 
subjects were discussing filler details. 
Subjects did take longer to discuss critical details than filler details. Discussion 
time for critical details ranged from 9 s to 59 s, M = 24.10 s, SD = 7.61; discussion 
time for filler details ranged from 4 s to 72 s, M = 19.53 s, SD = 7.07, t (19) = 2.37, p 
= .01, Cohen's d = 0.53.  
Exposure to Misinformation 
Subjects were exposed to between 0 and 4 misleading details, M = 2.63, SD = 
0.98; in total they were exposed to misinformation on 106 out of 160 instances 
 69 
(66%). As in Experiment 2A, I counted details where subjects were exposed to the 
misinformation during discussion as discussed details and details that were not 
asked about during discussion as nondiscussed details, and for each subject I 
calculated a proportion correct score for discussed and nondiscussed details.4 
Remembering Discussed Details 
Did discussion affect memory for the new movie? As Figure 3.6 shows, the 
answer is yes. Just like Experiment 2A, subjects were more likely to report the 
correct answer for nondiscussed details than discussed details, t (39) = 5.64, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.88.  
 
Figure 3.6. Proportion of correct responses for nondiscussed and discussed details. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Additionally, as displayed in Figure 3.7, analyses of each critical detail showed 
that subjects were more likely to give the correct response for critical details 
when they were not discussed than when they were discussed, t (7) = 3.89, p < .01, 
                                                
4 Two subjects were exposed to misinformation for details that were intended to act as 
nondiscussed details; this situation seemed to arise when subjects tried to recall related details to 
help them answer a discussion question. For example, when trying to recall what colour the 
balloons were, one subject mentioned seeing red tinsel. These details were excluded from the 
analyses—the two subjects' proportion correct scores and related confidence judgments were 
based only on the three nondiscussed details that were not mentioned at all during the 
discussion. 
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Cohen’s d = 1.38. 
 
 Figure 3.7. Proportion of correct nondiscussed and discussed responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Consistent with Experiment 2A subjects responded to the misinformation in 
different ways: considering only the 36 subjects who were exposed to at least two 
misleading details, some subjects were always influenced by what their partner 
said (n = 4; 11%), some were never influenced by what their partner said (n = 7; 
19%), and some were influenced some of the time (n = 25; 69%). 
Confidence 
Consistent with Experiment 2A, discussion did not affect subjects’ confidence 
in their responses; as shown in Figure 3.8 subjects were moderately confident in 
their responses for both discussed and nondiscussed details, t < 1, ns. Additionally, 
as shown in Figure 3.9, when subjects reported seeing a critical detail in the 
movie, they were more confident about their correct memories for nondiscussed 
details than their false memories for discussed details, t (30) = 3.32, p = < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.60. 
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Figure 3.8. Mean confidence for nondiscussed and discussed details. Error bars depict standard 
errors of the means. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Mean confidence for correct responses on nondiscussed details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on discussed details (false memories). Error bars depict standard errors of the 
means. 
 
Features of the Discussion 
As in Experiment 2A, I used transcripts of the subjects' voice files to determine 
what happened during the discussions. Of the 106 instances that subjects were 
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exposed to misinformation, there were only eight instances in which subjects 
disputed what their partners said and their partners did not reciprocate. In other 
words, for the most part, data about whether subjects disputed their partners and 
whether subjects were disputed by their partners overlapped; the two factors 
were different enough that I could not combine them into one general item, yet 
not different enough to consider separately. I decided that whether subjects 
disputed what their partner said might shed more light on whether they were 
influenced by what their partner said so I included this feature in the analysis. 
As in Experiment 2A, for each of the 106 instances where subjects were 
exposed to misinformation, I calculated the proportion of instances that each of 
the three discussion features occurred, and the subsequent proportion of times 
that subjects went on to be misled. These data are consistent with Experiment 2A 
and are presented in Table 3.3. As the table shows, when subjects were exposed to 
misinformation, they used that misinformation as their answer at test nearly half 
of the time. 
As displayed in the first two lines of Table 3. 3, subjects used the 
misinformation as their final answer at test more often when they had previously 
used it as a discussion answer; in other words, they appeared to exhibit 
informational influence. However, not all subjects behaved in this way; 
sometimes they appeared to exhibit normative influence, and used the 
misinformation as a discussion answer, but reverted to the correct answer on the 
test (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Additionally, sometimes subjects answered with 
something other than the misinformation during the discussion, but used the 
misinformation as their answer on the independent recognition test.  
Table 3.3 also shows that subjects were misled less often if they disputed what 
their partner said; however, people were sometimes misled by what their partner 
said even if they initially disputed it. Finally, in discussions where subjects were 
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exposed to misinformation they rarely spoke first and they were misled less 
often when they did speak first.  
 
 
Table 3.3 
Proportion discussion feature occurrence and subsequent proportion of subjects misled for 106 
instances that subjects were exposed to misinformation 
DISCUSSION  TEST 
Discussion Features Feature      
(n cases) 
 Misled               
(n cases) 
Answer    
Misinformation .58 (62)  .74 (46) 
Alternative .42 (44)  .09 (4) 
Dispute     
Dispute .48 (51)  .24 (12) 
No Dispute .52 (55)  .69 (38) 
Speaking Order    
Spoke First .34 (36)  .33 (12) 
Spoke Second .66 (70)  .54 (38) 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE  .47 (50) 
Note. Proportion Correct = 1 – Proportion Misled (n cases Correct = 106 – n cases Misled). 
 
 
In sum, these patterns of results were very similar to those found in 
Experiment 2A: misinformation mentioned during the discussion was received in 
different ways at different times, and led to different outcomes.  
Predicting False Memories 
As in Experiment 2A, I next wanted to see if any discussion features predicted 
whether subjects would be misled on a particular detail. As such, I conducted the 
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same two analyses, the all-items regression, and the exposure-only regression.  
All-items regression. When including all instances that subjects were asked 
about critical details—regardless of whether they were exposed to 
misinformation—there were two predictors of whether subjects were misled. 
Subjects who agreed to use the misinformation as an answer during the 
discussion were 18 times more likely to be misled than those who did not, χ2  (1, 
N = 160) = 37.74, p < .01. Additionally, there was an interaction: subjects were three 
times less likely to be misled if they spoke first during the discussion of a critical 
detail, and they disputed what their partner said, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 4.39, p = .04.  
Exposure-only regression. Consistent with Experiment 2A, when including 
only the 106 instances that subjects were exposed to misinformation, whether 
subjects used the misleading information as an answer during discussion 
significantly predicted whether they would be misled. In fact, when subjects did 
use the misinformation as their discussion answer, they were 19 times more 
likely to be misled than when they used something else as their answer, χ2 (1, N = 
106) = 21.94, p < .01. Additionally, whether subjects disputed the accuracy of their 
partner’s suggestions marginally predicted whether they would be misled, χ2 (1, 
N = 106) = 3.13, p = .08; according to the odds ratio, subjects were less likely to be 
misled when they disputed what their partner said.  
Taken together these results fit with Experiment 2A: Subjects were most likely 
to be misled if they used the misinformation as a discussion answer and were not 
as likely to be misled if they disputed what their partner said during the 
discussion. Importantly, whether subjects spoke first in discussing a particular 
detail only played a role in predicting being misled when exposure to 
misinformation was not considered.  
Predicting-exposure regression. Consistent with Experiment 2A, speaking 
order and dispute both predicted whether subjects were exposed to 
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misinformation when discussing a particular detail. According to the odds ratios, 
subjects were ten times more likely to be exposed to misinformation when they 
disputed what their partner said, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 15.90, p < .01 and four times less 
likely to be exposed to misinformation when they spoke first, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 
6.90, p < .01. Additionally, there was an interaction between the two factors: when 
subjects spoke first but disputed what their partner said, they were three times 
less likely to be exposed to misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 160) = 5.22, p = .02. 
These results fit with those of Experiment 2A. As a matter of course, people 
cannot be misled unless they are exposed to misinformation (Lindsay, 2007). 
Speaking first plays a role in predicting exposure to misinformation, but when 
exposure to misinformation is taken into account, speaking first does not appear 
to predict susceptibility to false memories.  
Summary 
Taken together, these two experiments show that when people share an 
experience, and then talk about that experience together, they might incorporate 
details from each other's memory reports into their own memories. Although the 
misinformation was received in a variety of ways during the discussions, the net 
effect was to decrease subjects’ accuracy when they later remembered discussed 
details independently. Specifically, subjects sometimes reported seeing details 
that contradicted what they actually saw. However, other times subjects resisted 
the influence of the misinformation. In both studies, subjects were more likely to 
be misled when they did not dispute what their partner said during the 
discussion and when they used the misinformation as their discussion answer.  
Experiments 2A and 2B demonstrate an effective method to research the 
influence of discussion on memory, across two different target events and 
stimulus sets. As described in Experiment 2A, using this method, subjects were 
able to experience an event together, yet systematic discrepancies in their 
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memory reports arose naturally in a (structured) discussion about the past, and 
led them to remember details of the event inaccurately. The results of the two 
experiments suggest that people can incorporate details from other people’s 
memories into their own memory when they discuss the past together. 
One possible counterexplanation for these results—often raised by 
reviewers—is that the “blocked” movie version may not really be blocked at all. 
In other words, instead of being misled by what their partner told them, perhaps 
subjects saw both versions of the movie and were more likely to report the detail 
from the “blocked” version when their partner also mentioned that detail in 
discussion. If subjects did see both versions of a critical detail, I would expect 
them to say so during the discussion of that detail. Yet, subjects never mentioned 
seeing both versions of a detail, and often seemed surprised when their partner 
recalled a different detail. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that subjects 
did see both movie versions. My next goal was to address these concerns by 
establishing whether subjects could see the alternate version of the movie. 
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Chapter 4 
Experiment 3: Noticing and Remembering the Alternate Movie 
Although the results of Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that people can come 
to remember seeing things that they only heard about during a discussion, 
reviewers often raise another possible explanation: perhaps subjects saw the 
alternate movie version—the version that was supposed to be blocked from 
subjects’ view—thus the “new” information mentioned during discussion was not 
really new at all. In other words, perhaps people reported seeing the misleading 
details because they actually saw those details during presentation of the movie. 
However, there are several problems with this alternative explanation.  
First, pilot testing with both naïve and informed subjects suggested that 
people could not see the alternate movie version. For illustration, Figure 4.1 
displays photographs of how the laundry/bedroom critical detail appeared on the 
rear projection screen through the different polarising glasses.5 Second, subjects 
did not mention anything about seeing the other movie nor did they mention 
anything about seeing different versions of the critical details. If subjects saw 
Chad walk into a laundry and into a bedroom, they would have reported seeing 
both when trying to answer the relevant discussion question—yet no subjects did 
so. Third, subjects often seemed surprised when their partner recalled a 
contradictory detail during the discussion; if these subjects had also seen the 
contradictory details during the movie, they would not have been surprised by 
their partner’s responses. Finally, if subjects did notice two versions of a critical 
detail they would have become suspicious about the study goals—perhaps even 
realising they were supposed to see something different from what their 
discussion partner saw. If subjects became suspicious about the study goals, it 
                                                
5 Because the light was projected from behind the screen—directly towards the camera—these 
photographs are not very clear. They are included simply to provide a rough idea of what 
subjects saw.  
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would have increased their vigilance and source monitoring behaviour; it seems 
very unlikely that these people would be misled by anything their discussion 
partners told them. For instance, if subjects thought their discussion partner saw 
a different movie, they would have judged any information mentioned by their 
partner as unreliable, and thus should have resisted the influence of the 
misinformation (see Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980, Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1987).  
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 4.1. Overlapped laundry/bedroom critical scene photographed through no polarising filter 
(A); horizontal polarising filter (B); and vertical polarising filter (C). 
 
 
Despite these counterexplanations, in the studies reported so far I did not 
check if subjects noticed that there were two versions of the movie playing. 
Perhaps subjects did notice the alternate movie but—for some reason—they did 
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not say anything about it. In some discussions, subjects did mention both 
versions of a critical detail; for example, subjects sometimes had difficulty 
deciding whether Chad knocked on the door or rang the doorbell. It seemed that 
these subjects were struggling to remember which one of the two actions they 
had seen, rather than struggling to decide which of two remembered actions 
they should answer with. However, there is no evidence to show that subjects did 
not see both. The usefulness of the MORI technique would be severely limited if 
subjects did notice that there were two versions of the movie and two versions of 
the critical details. As such, my next goal was to examine whether subjects 
noticed the alternate movie version while watching a movie via the MORI 
technique. 
Experiment 3A: Explicit  Noticing 
One problem with simply asking people whether they noticed the alternate 
movie version is that they might report seeing the alternate version to save face 
rather than because they actually did notice it. I attempted to limit these kinds of 
response biases—where the questions demand a certain answer—in several ways. 
First, rather than asking subjects straight out if they saw the alternate movie, I 
gave them a number of opportunities to give that answer in response to several 
less—but increasingly—suggestive questions. Second, to gather a baseline 
measure of how often subjects would respond "yes" to the critical questions, I 
used a between-subjects design. For half of the subjects, I played the two movie 
versions using the MORI technique, as in Experiments 1 and 2. For the other 
subjects, everything was set up identically but I played only one version of the 
movie. In other words, there was no alternate movie for these subjects to notice; 
if subjects in this condition reported seeing the alternate movie it would suggest 
that they did so due to the demand characteristics of the questions. Finally, I 
used Laney, Kaasa, Morris, Berkowitz, Bernstein & Loftus’ (2008) "Red Herring 
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technique" to disguise the true purpose of the study.  
The Red Herring Technique  
In the Red Herring technique, researchers convey a fake cover story about the 
purpose of the study. Then, to stop the research-savvy subjects from deducing 
the true purpose of the study based on the questions they encounter, the critical 
questions are embedded among other questions that hint toward another fake 
purpose. For example, as a cover story Laney et al. (2008) told subjects they were 
interested in how personality was related to food preferences; they were really 
interested in whether they could change people’s eating preferences by leading 
them to falsely believe that they had either a good or bad experience with 
asparagus during childhood. To disguise the true purpose of the study, Laney et 
al. hid the critical asparagus questions among questions that implied they were 
interested in the problem of obesity. 
In this study, I used the same cover story as Experiments 1 and 2—that I was 
interested in sensory impressions at different levels of visual acuity—in 
combination with the Red Herring technique. I disguised the critical questions 
about noticing the alternate movie version among questions that asked subjects 
to make social appraisals of the main character, Chad. 
If subjects reported seeing the alternate movie version, and especially if they 
did so in response to the least suggestive questions, it would support reviewers’ 
concerns that people might see the “blocked” movie version when watching a 
movie via the MORI technique.  
Method 
Subjects 
In total forty subjects participated in pairs; 14 were IPRP students who took 
part in return for course credit, and 26 were recruited by advertising around the 
campus and received a $10 grocery voucher. 
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Design 
The experiment was a between-subjects design. Half of the subjects made up 
the overlap group; they watched one version of the Chad movie while the 
alternate version was played and blocked via the MORI technique. The 
remaining subjects made up the non-overlap group; these subjects also watched 
one version of the Chad movie, but the alternate movie version was not played. 
Materials and Procedure 
Aside from whether subjects were in the overlap or non-overlap group, the set-
up of the experiment was exactly the same as Experiment 2B. However, there was 
no memory test in this study; immediately after watching the Chad movie, 
subjects worked through a question booklet independently. 
Question booklet. The question booklet contained 13 questions. After 
answering each question, subjects were asked to provide an explanation for the 
answer that they gave. Eight of the thirteen questions were Red Herring 
questions, and implied that I was interested in subjects’ social judgments about 
Chad. For example, one Red Herring question read, "If you saw Chad at the 
party, would you have tried to change his behaviour in any way?”  
The four critical questions appeared in positions 5, 10, 11 and 12 and increased 
in suggestiveness as subjects progressed through the booklet. The first critical 
question asked subjects if they noticed anything unusual about the movie. Next 
subjects listed all the reasons they could think of that they might not agree with 
some of their partner’s answers if they were asked to discuss the movie together. 
Then, to test the Red Herring, the third question asked subjects what they 
thought the true purpose of the study was. The last critical question asked 
subjects whether they thought they saw the same movie as the person next to 
them. Finally, question 13 asked subjects what they knew about the study before 
they took part. Subjects were asked to work through the booklet in order, and not 
 82 
to return to any previous pages.  
Results and Discussion 
To answer the overarching question—whether subjects noticed the alternate 
movie version—I address each of the four critical questions in turn.  
Did subjects notice anything unusual about the movie? In fact, every subject 
in the non-overlap group and 18 subjects (90%) in the overlap group reported 
noticing something unusual about the movie. I examined subjects' explanations 
to see what was unusual. In the vast majority of these explanations subjects 
criticised the quality of the movie and the lack of sound (evidently my movie 
making skills were not quite up to the discerning subjects’ expected standards). 
One subject from the overlap group did mention seeing multiple images; her 
explanation read "Chad's actions kind of doubled like when you have bad 
reception on TV and you see 2 people rather than one.” The angle of this 
subject's head and/or polarisation glasses must have changed the angle of the 
polarisation allowing her to see parts of both movie versions. However, she did 
not mention seeing any conflicting details, just poor quality images. 
Additionally, this subject did not conclude that the double images resulted from 
different movies; instead, in the subsequent questions she made no mention of 
the two images. When listing all the reasons that she may not have agreed with 
her partner if they discussed the movie together, she did not even entertain the 
possibility that they might have seen different movies. Most interesting though, 
when this subject was asked at the end of the study whether she thought she had 
seen the same movie as her partner, she replied "yes" and gave the explanation 
"There's one screen. How can there be two movies playing?” 
In sum, the vast majority of subjects did not notice the alternate movie and 
the one subject who did report seeing two images seemed not to even consider 
the possibility that there were two movies playing.  
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Reasons for disagreement. The next critical question asked subjects to list all 
the reasons that they might not agree with the person next to them if they 
discussed the movie. Subjects listed between 0 and 10 reasons, M = 3.65, SD = 1.81; 
the majority centered on people having different backgrounds and experiences, 
and seeing the world differently depending on their personality, opinions, beliefs 
or expectations. Additionally, a number of subjects mentioned the possibility 
that they may have paid attention to different things in the movie, or they may 
have had different eyesight ability to begin with. 
Three subjects mentioned the possibility that they may have seen something 
different from their partner. All three of these subjects were in the non-overlap 
group, suggesting that their ideas were speculative, rather than based on 
noticing the alternate movie version. Additionally, all three subjects provided 
between one and four other reasons why they might have disagreed with their 
partner suggesting that they were simply noting a possibility, rather than 
genuinely believing that they did see something different. In short, when 
confronted with the situation that subjects in Experiments 2A and 2B 
experienced, most people did not even consider the chance that they might have 
seen something different from their partner.  
True purpose of the study. The Red Herring was effective at hinting a fake 
reason for the study: the majority (83%) of subjects' responses were broadly 
consistent with the Red Herring theme and focused on judgments of behaviour. 
Not one subject mentioned anything to do with multiple images in response to 
this question.  
Did subjects think they had seen a different movie to their partner? The vast 
majority (93%) of subjects thought they had seen the same movie as their 
partner, and many subjects expressed surprise at the question. For example, 
subjects’ explanations included:  
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Subject Ka: 
 
We both looked at the same screen... therefore the same 
movie? And I would be totally surprised at how you could 
get us to look at the same screen yet see different things… 
Subject Pa: There was only one screen and we were both looking at it 
together, I can't imagine how we both could have watched 
different movies simultaneously on the same screen…  
Subject Rb: We were in the same room at the same time watching the 
same movie—I don't think the glasses were going to change 
that.  
Subject Db: He is sitting about half a metre away from me, looking in 
the same direction. I would like to think if there were 
another screen I would have been able to see it.  
However, three subjects were not so sure. Two subjects did not think they had 
seen the same movie as their partner, and another one provided an ambiguous 
response. One subject who thought he had seen a different movie to his partner 
was in the non-overlap condition, so could not have seen the alternate movie. He 
deduced that there were two movies because the earlier questions implied that 
there were:  
Subject Da: Because the questions before that on “if you two were asked 
about the movie do you think you may disagree on things?” 
seemed to imply that we would disagree on things because 
we did in fact watch different movies. 
The other subject who thought she saw a different movie from her partner 
was in the overlap group. Yet, rather than believing there were different movies, 
her explanation implied that she thought people would experience the same 
movie differently depending on their own histories. 
Subject Ga: We both would have assumed Chad to be doing different 
things depending on our past experiences. 
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Finally, another subject in the overlap condition gave an ambiguous response; 
again, there was no evidence that this subject noticed the alternate movie 
version. His explanation read:  
Subject Fa: I sort of thought maybe we were seeing different movies we 
laughed at different times. Might just be because we 
thought those bits were funny, but I don't really know. 
Summary 
Taken together, these results show that for the most part, subjects did not 
notice the alternate movie version when they watched a movie via the MORI 
technique. Additionally, subjects were not particularly suspicious that I might 
have shown them different movies—despite the demand of the critical questions, 
the one subject who did notice overlapping images, did not think the different 
images came from different movies. Considering these results in combination 
with the fact that subjects in Experiments 2A and 2B did not mention seeing 
conflicting versions of the critical details, it seems fair to conclude that 
generally, subjects who watch a movie via the MORI technique, do not notice the 
alternate movie or the alternate versions of the critical details.  
However there is another way that using the MORI technique might promote 
a misinformation effect. Perhaps—even though subjects were not aware of it and 
did not explicitly report it—they saw the conflicting details without realising and 
somehow their implicit memory of the alternate movie influenced their 
discussion behaviour or their responses at test. For instance, perhaps subjects saw 
both movie versions and were simply more likely to report the details from the 
alternate version when their partner also mentioned those details during 
discussion. My next goal was to test the possibility that subjects had implicit 
memories of the alternate movie. 
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Experiment 3B: Implicit  Memory 
To investigate whether subjects had any implicit memory of the alternate 
movie version, I used a “second-choice test.” In a second-choice memory test, 
each question asks about a given detail and provides a list of alternative answers 
for subjects to choose from. After answering the question, subjects are asked to 
make a second choice, and pick their next best answer from the remaining 
options on the list. If subjects in my studies remembered aspects from both the 
movie version they saw and the alternate movie version, it should show up in 
their second choices. For instance, if Mollie remembered aspects of Chad in a 
laundry and aspects of Chad in a bedroom, she should use one of these answers 
as a first response and the other as a second response, thus demonstrating that 
aspects of both movie versions were accessible in her memory. One caveat is that 
subjects might also report both versions of a critical detail because the two 
options seem the most likely two of the offered alternatives. To control for the 
possibility that subjects would choose the correct detail from the alternate movie 
without any memory of it, I compared responses for overlapped details with 
responses for non-overlapped details, details for which subjects could not have 
any memory of the alternate movie.  
If the MORI technique led subjects to have implicit memories of the alternate 
movie their responses might be affected in several ways. First, their implicit 
memory of the alternate version might work to change the way they remember 
and report critical details from their own version. If subjects’ ability to report the 
correct critical details was affected by the alternate movie version, they would be 
worse at remembering overlapped details, and less confident when remembering 
overlapped details, relative to non-overlapped details. Second, if subjects did have 
some memory of the alternate version, they should be more likely to pick the 
correct answer from that version for overlapped than non-overlapped details. If 
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subjects are poorer at remembering overlapped details, less confident when 
remembering overlapped details or better at choosing the answer from the 
alternate movie version for overlapped details, it would provide evidence that 
people’s memories are influenced by the alternate version when movies are 
presented via the MORI technique. 
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 40 students from the IPRP pool took part in the study in return for 
course credit. Each session had either one or two subjects. 
Design 
I used a within-subjects design: subjects saw one version of the Chad movie 
with half of the critical details overlapped with the alternate movie version 
(blocked via the MORI technique) and half of the details not overlapped with any 
image. 
Materials and Procedure 
Movie. The experiment was set up in the same way as Experiment 3A, except I 
used four new versions of the Chad movie in combination with the original two 
versions. To create the four new versions, I split each of the original versions into 
two new half-length movies; each new half-version included four of the eight 
critical details. I used iMovie® to fill up the remaining duration of the new 
movies with a blank image; the half length movies kept time with the full length 
movies, but nothing was projected onto the screen for the blank half (see Table 
4.1). In the first-half movie versions, the Chad movie played for 3:03 min and then 
faded into a blank image for the remaining 3:31 min; for the second-half movies, 
a blank image played for 3:03 min and then faded into the Chad movie, which 
played for the remaining 3:31 min.  
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Table 4.1 
Critical details in each of the four half-length Chad movie versions 
 Version 1           
First-half 
Version 1           
Second-half 
Version 2           
First-half 
Version 2       
Second-half 
 
 
Rung bell 
 
 
Knocked  
 
 
 
Blue Mug 
 
 
Pink Mug 
 
 
 
Birthday Banner 
 
 
Tinsel 
 
 
 
Vodka 
 
 
 
 
 
FADE IN 
 
Wine 
 
 
 
 
 
FADE IN 
 FADE OUT 
 
Laundry 
FADE OUT 
 
Bedroom 
  
 
Red Balloons 
 
 
Blue Balloons 
  
 
Lemon 
 
 
Drug 
  
 
Steals wallet 
 
 
Leaves wallet 
 
 
3.
03
 m
in
 
3.
31
 m
in
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For example, a subject might have been shown Version 1 of the movie 
overlapped with the new Version 2 first-half movie. In this case, the first four 
critical details in the movie would have acted as overlapped details. After these 
details were presented (3:03 min through the movie) the Version 2 first-half 
movie faded to a blank image, and the remaining four critical details would have 
acted as non-overlapped details. Critical details were fully counterbalanced and 
acted equally often as overlapped and non-overlapped details. 
In order to parallel the time subjects in Experiments 2A and 2B took to 
complete the filler tasks and discussion (between the movie and the recognition 
test), following the movie subjects completed filler tasks for 20 minutes. After 
the filler tasks, subjects completed a second-choice recognition test. 
Test. There were twelve questions on the test—eight related to the eight 
critical details and four were fillers. Each question asked about a detail from the 
movie and suggested five answers. For the critical questions, the correct answer 
from each movie version was listed among the five alternatives. For example, 
one question read "Where did Chad put the wallet that he found on the bench? In 
the cupboard; Behind the microwave; Back where he found it; In his back pocket; 
In his bag.” Subjects selected their answer and rated their confidence on a 5-point 
scale, where 1 = not at all confident and 5 = very confident. Subjects were then 
asked to answer the same question again, providing their next best response. 
Finally, subjects were asked to explain why they selected their second response. 
Results and Discussion 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, subjects’ performance on the four filler questions 
was quite poor, M = 2.25 correct (56%), SD = 0.81. In retrospect, this result is not 
too surprising; two of the filler questions were originally discussion questions 
designed to encourage discussion between subject-pairs, and as such were quite 
difficult to answer.  
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Remembering Overlapped Details 
I first calculated the proportion of correct responses subjects gave for 
overlapped and non-overlapped critical details; these proportions appear in 
Figure 4.2. As the figure illustrates, subjects’ initial responses were just as likely 
to be correct whether the images were overlapped or not, t < 1, ns. Additionally 
the confidence interval—for the difference between nonoverlapped and 
overlapped details—was narrow, suggesting the null results were not due to a 
lack of power, 95% CI = - 0.12 < µ1 - µ2 < 0.08 (Aberson, 2002; Loftus, G., 1996). 
Finally, the effect size and corresponding confidence interval were also small, 
providing more support for the null result, Cohen’s d = .09, 95% CI = .01 < D < .15 
(Aberson, 2002; Thompson, 2002)6. Taken together, these results suggest that 
presenting a movie via the MORI technique did not affect subjects' memories of 
the critical details from their version of the movie, or their ability to report those 
memories. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of correct responses for nonoverlapped and overlapped details. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
                                                
6 Confidence intervals for the effect sizes were obtained using the calculator available at 
http://wilderdom.com/301/tutorials/Tutorial7-Power.html 
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Although subjects’ overall memory accuracy was not affected by the overlapped 
images, their memory for the individual critical details might have been. I next 
examined subjects’ responses for each of the eight critical details. These data are 
displayed in Figure 4.3. As the figure illustrates, subjects gave similar responses 
for the critical details whether they were overlapped or not, t < 1, ns. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Proportion of correct nonoverlapped and overlapped responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Confidence 
Figure 4.4 illustrates that subjects were just as confident in their answers for 
overlapped and non-overlapped details, t < 1, ns. Additionally, the confidence 
interval for the difference was small, 95% CI = - 0.28 < µ1 - µ2 < 0.35, as was the 
corresponding effect size, Cohen’s d = .05, 95% CI = -0.18 < D < 0.25, providing 
more support for the null result. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
alternate movie version did not affect the subjective feelings associated with 
remembering critical details. In short, subjects were just as good at remembering 
overlapped and non-overlapped details, and just as confident at remembering 
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overlapped and non-overlapped details. These results suggest that the MORI 
technique does not hurt subjects' memory of the critical details. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean confidence for nonoverlapped and overlapped details. Error bars depict standard 
errors of the means. 
 
Remembering Details from the Alternate Movie Version 
Next, I calculated the proportion of subjects’ first and second responses where 
they gave the correct answer from the alternate movie version. I compared these 
proportions for overlapped and non-overlapped details; these data are displayed 
in Figure 4.5. As the figure shows, subjects did not demonstrate any memory of 
the critical details from the alternate movie version. Subjects were equally likely 
to pick the correct answer from the alternate movie version for overlapped and 
non-overlapped details for both their first responses and their second responses, 
ts < 1, ns. Additionally, the confidence intervals around the differences were 
narrow, suggesting that the results were not due to a lack of power, 95% CI = -
0.09 < µ1 - µ2 < 0.07 and 95% CI = - 0.14 < µ1 - µ2 < 0.06, respectively. The effect size 
(for the difference between nonoverlapped and overlapped details) for subjects’ 
first choices was small, Cohen’s d = .04, 95% CI = - 0.02 < D < 0.09, further 
 93 
supporting the null result. However, there was a more substantial effect size for 
subjects’ second choices, Cohen’s d = .18, 95% CI = 0.11 < D < 0.25. Importantly, as 
displayed on Figure 4.5, any difference for subjects’ second choices is in the 
opposite direction to what reviewers are concerned about. In other words, even if 
there is an effect, it is for subjects to be slightly better at selecting the correct 
answer for the alternate version for nonoverlapped than overlapped details. 
Taken together these results suggest that subjects do not have any memory of 
the alternate movie version. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Proportion of first and second choices correct for alternate movie version for 
nonoverlapped and overlapped details. Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Although overall subjects were no more likely to pick the correct answer from 
the alternative movie version for nonoverlapped or overlapped details, they may 
have been more likely to do so for some specific critical details. I next examined 
the proportion of instances where subjects chose the correct answer from the 
alternate movie version for each critical detail when it acted as a nonoverlapped 
detail and an overlapped detail. Figure 4.6 shows that there were no differences 
for subjects’ first choices, and Figure 4.7 shows there were no differences for 
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subjects’ second choices, both ts < 1, ns. In short, subjects were no more likely to 
pick the correct answer from the alternate movie version when those details were 
overlapped. 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion of first choices correct for alternate movie version for nonoverlapped and 
overlapped details. Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Proportion of second choices correct for alternate movie version for nonoverlapped 
and overlapped details. Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
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Subjects’ Explanations 
Finally, subjects wrote explanations for why they chose the second answers 
that they did. If subjects remembered both versions of a critical detail, they 
should say so when explaining their second response. However, there was not 
one case where a subject mentioned anything even vaguely related to seeing 
both versions of a detail. By far, the most common way that subjects selected 
their second choice was through logical reasoning; for 71% of the explanations 
given, subjects selected their second choice by reasoning that it made sense, or 
by excluding other alternatives. Other strategies that subjects used to make their 
second choices included guessing, beliefs about base rates, personal preferences 
and expectations.  
Summary 
Taken together, these two studies do not raise concerns about using the MORI 
technique to research discussion and memory; specifically, the results suggest 
that when people watch a movie via the MORI technique, they do not notice the 
alternate—blocked—movie version. In Experiment 3A, subjects were generally 
not suspicious that I might have shown them two different movies, and the vast 
majority of subjects did not notice any overlapping details. Additionally, the one 
subject who did notice overlapping images did not think the different images 
came from different movies. In Experiment 3B, there was no evidence that 
subjects’ memories of the critical details were affected by watching the movie via 
the MORI technique. Subjects were just as good at remembering overlapped and 
non-overlapped details, they were just as confident when remembering 
overlapped and non-overlapped details, they were no more likely to choose the 
correct answer from the alternate movie version for overlapped or non-
overlapped details, and their explanations did not raise any concern that they 
had noticed the alternate movie version. In short, there is no evidence to support 
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reviewers’ concerns that the MORI technique might inflate misinformation 
effects. Instead, the best explanation of the results from Experiments 2A and 2B 
is that people were influenced by misinformation that other people mentioned 
during discussion.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the SMF suggests that when people make source 
monitoring decisions they might make social judgments about the 
misinformation messenger—in these experiments, their discussion partners—to 
decide whether the information conveyed is reliable or not (Johnson et al., 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). The findings from Experiments 2A and 
2B—that people’s memories are influenced by what other people tell them—
suggest that people probably see others with whom they have shared experiences 
as a reliable source of information about those experiences. Yet, although people 
might generally see others with whom they have shared experiences as a 
valuable source of information, in some situations these perceptions might 
differ. Indeed, in Experiments 2A and 2B people were not always influenced by 
what their partners told them. The SMF suggests one reason people might have 
resisted the influence of the misinformation is that they might have made 
unfavourable judgments about their discussion partners, and thus unfavourable 
judgments about the information conveyed.  
There are a number of reasons that people might judge their discussion 
partner unfavourably; perhaps they might feel that their partner did not pay 
much attention, or did not seem to be very smart or very confident.  People 
might also rely on stereotypes of age, appearance or gender—among other 
attributes—to make judgments about their partner’s credibility (Hollingshead & 
Fraidin, 2003; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985; Wegner et al., 1991). Additionally, 
people might make social judgments based on how well they know the people 
that they talk to. In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 1, transactive memory research 
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suggests that people might be more likely to trust what a friend or family 
member remembers than to trust what a complete stranger remembers. This 
trust might not only affect how much people believe what someone else says, 
but also how susceptible they will be to memory distortion based on what that 
person says. My next goal was to examine how people’s relationships with their 
discussion partners might affect their source monitoring decisions and thus their 
susceptibility to false memories. 
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Chapter 5 
Experiment 4: Romancing the Misinformation Messenger 
Generally, people talk about the past with other people that they know. Of 
course, in some situations—such as witnessing a crime or accident—people 
might talk with other people because they happened to be in the same place at 
the same time, rather than because they knew each other. In fact, Paterson, 
Chapman, and Kemp (2007) reported that although the majority of people who 
witnessed a crime or accident knew somebody else who witnessed the event, 
knowing another witness made no difference to whether people discussed the 
event or not. In other words, witnesses who knew another witness and witnesses 
who did not know another witness were just as likely to discuss the event. Yet, 
perhaps people who know each other might behave and respond differently in a 
conversation than people who do not know each other. Research shows that 
people’s judgments about the misinformation messenger affect their 
susceptibility to misinformation (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 
2005; Vornik et al., 2003); one possibility is that people who know each other 
might make different social judgments about each other, thus affecting their 
source monitoring decisions and their susceptibility to false memories. 
My main goal in this study was to see whether it made any difference to 
people’s susceptibility to misinformation if the misinformation was conveyed by 
a known and trusted person, or if it was conveyed by a complete stranger—
someone they had never met. To that end, I recruited romantic couples and pairs 
of strangers to take part in the study. I chose to use romantic couples because 
romantic relationships are based on components such as familiarity, trust and 
respect. By studying romantic couples, I could examine the effect of a collection 
of these kinds of factors that had arisen without experimental intervention. My 
primary interest was whether romantic partners would influence each other’s 
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memories more than strangers would. There are several reasons that intimate 
couples might influence each other more than strangers would. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 1, people in intimate relationships develop 
transactive memory systems; members rely on each other’s memories, and in 
doing so typically boost the amount of information they can remember, while 
minimising the effort each member has to exert to access the information 
(Hollingshead 1998a; 1998b; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985; Wegner et al., 
1991). Second, other research shows that an important predictor of success in 
romantic relationships is the willingness to be influenced by one’s partner; more 
specifically, a husband who yields to his wife’s influence is more likely to have a 
satisfying and lasting relationship (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998). 
Finally, people maintain relationships by negotiating a “shared reality” of their 
past experiences, and by agreeing on what “really” happened (Echterhoff, 
Higgins, et al., 2005; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Taken together, these three 
different lines of research lend support to the idea that members of couples may 
be more influenced by discussion with each other than strangers would be. Given 
that couples might rely on each other’s memories for the day-to-day functioning 
of their relationship, and that they might be practiced in yielding to each other’s 
influence and at incorporating each other’s memories into their shared 
memories of the past, they might also be more likely than strangers to 
incorporate each other’s misleading suggestions into their own subsequent 
memory reports.  
My primary objective was to determine if people’s memories would be more 
influenced by misinformation mentioned by their romantic partner than 
misinformation mentioned by a stranger. To address this question, I recruited 
romantic couples and pairs of strangers to take part in a study just like 
Experiment 2A. Pairs of subjects watched the adapted Eric movie, discussed some 
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aspects of the movie together and then completed a surprise memory test 
independently. If couples were worse than strangers at remembering discussed 
details on the final recognition test it would provide support for the idea that 
people’s memories are more influenced by misleading suggestions made by 
someone they know and trust than someone they do not know.  
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 64 people took part in the study; 32 took part with someone who they 
had never met and 32 took part with their romantic partner.7 I recruited subjects 
by advertising around the university campus and in staff and student 
publications. In advertisements targeting romantic partners, I specifically asked 
for "monogamous heterosexual couples" who had been together for at least three 
months. I chose three months as the minimum relationship duration because it 
was consistent with other studies (for example, Wegner et al., 1991); however, I 
did not obtain any further information on relationship duration. All pairs were 
made up of one male and one female. Subjects received a voucher to thank them 
for their time. 
Design 
The experiment used a 2 x 2 mixed design: subjects either took part with their 
romantic partner or with a stranger, and as in Experiments 2A and 2B, half of the 
critical details acted as discussed details, and half acted as nondiscussed details. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2A, except for one change. In 
order to decrease the magnitude of the misinformation effect—so that I could 
                                                
7 A further two couples and one stranger pair were not included in the study because one 
member in each pair did not follow instructions; one person repeatedly tilted his head during the 
movie, and the other two made no attempt at filler tasks. Another two stranger pairs were 
excluded because of a fault with the digital voice recorder. The data I present is for the 
remaining 64 subjects. 
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examine differences between the two relationship conditions—I shortened the 
duration of the filler tasks to 12 min and 3 min respectively. 
Results and Discussion 
In total, 16 romantic couples and 16 stranger-pairs completed the study; as in 
the previous experiments, all data were analysed on an individual level, yielding 
a total of 64 subjects. Consistent with Experiments 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B, subjects 
performed well on the 12 filler details, and there were no differences based on 
whether subjects took part with their romantic partner or a stranger, M = 10.13 
correct (84%), SD = 1.24; M = 10.22 correct (85%), SD = 1.16 respectively; t < 1, ns. 
Discussion Duration 
Also consistent with Experiments 2A and 2B, no one took the maximum time 
allowed to discuss the questions; discussion duration ranged 2:54 to 8:03 min, M = 
5:06 min, SD = 1:05. Couples did take slightly longer than stranger pairs to 
complete the discussion, however this difference was not significant, M = 5:24 
min, SD = 0:51; M = 4:49 min, SD = 1:14; t (30) = 1.57, p = .13. In fact, there was a 
marginal trend that couples took longer than strangers to discuss both filler 
questions—M = 26.54 s, SD = 4.92; M = 23.67 s, SD = 7.77—and critical questions—
M = 27.84 s, SD = 5.92; M = 24.80 s, SD = 7.25, F (1, 30) = 2.69, p = .11, perhaps 
suggesting that couples were more comfortable discussing the details together. 
Despite couples taking longer on average, couples and strangers received exactly 
the same number of warnings for their discussions about critical and filler 
questions; in total subjects were told that they had 10 seconds remaining 14 times 
when discussing filler questions (out of a possible 256; 5%), and 4 times when 
discussing critical questions (out of a possible 128; 3%). Unlike the previous 
experiments, both couples and strangers took only as long to discuss critical 
questions as filler questions, F  < 1, ns. Collapsing across couples and strangers, 
discussion time for critical details ranged from 6 s to 75 s, M = 26.32 s, SD = 6.80, 
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and discussion time for filler details ranged from 5 s to 79 s, M = 25.11 s, SD = 6.66. 
Exposure to Misinformation 
Subjects were exposed to between 0 and 4 misleading details, M = 2.41, SD = 
0.90; in total they were exposed to misinformation 154 out of a possible 256 times 
(60%). Couples and strangers were equally likely to be exposed to 
misinformation; of these 154 instances members of couples were exposed to 
misinformation 76 times (49%) and strangers were exposed to misinformation 
the remaining 78 times (51%).  
Remembering Discussed Details 
I next calculated the proportion of correct responses each subject gave for 
discussed and nondiscussed details in the same way as the previous experiments; 
these data are displayed in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Proportion of correct responses for nondiscussed and discussed details by relationship. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means 
 
Did couples wield more influence over each other’s memories than strangers 
did? As Figure 5.1 shows, the answer is yes. Both couples and strangers were good 
at remembering nondiscussed details and not as good at remembering discussed 
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details. Furthermore, couples were worse than strangers at remembering 
discussed details. In other words, on the independent test, subjects reported 
seeing details that they only heard about during the discussion, and they were 
even more likely to do so when they heard about those details from their 
romantic partner rather than from a stranger, F (1, 61) = 5.39, p = .02, f = 0.27. 
Consistent with Experiments 2A and 2B, as illustrated in Figure 5.2, subjects 
were more likely to give the correct response for critical details when they acted 
as nondiscussed details, t (7) = 5.20, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.84. 
 
Figure 5.2. Proportion of correct nondiscussed and discussed responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Following Experiments 2A and 2B, I next focused on subjects who were 
exposed to at least two misleading details. Of these 53 subjects, 15 (28%) were 
misled by everything their partner told them, 8 (15%) were not misled by 
anything their partner told them, and the remaining 30 (57%) were misled about 
some details but not others. Interestingly, these patterns were quite different for 
subjects who took part with their romantic partner and subjects who took part 
with a stranger; the proportion of couples and strangers who were never misled, 
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sometimes misled, and always misled are displayed in Table 5.1. In short, more 
couples were always misled by their partner’s suggestions, and more strangers 
were never misled.  
 
 
Table 5.1 
Proportion of strangers and couples who—when exposed to at least two misleading details—were 
never, sometimes, and always misled 
 RELATIONSHIP  
 Couples 
(n = 25) 
Strangers 
(n = 28) 
Never Misled .08  (2) .22  (6) 
Sometimes Misled .48 (12) .64 (18) 
Always Misled .44 (11) .14  (4) 
 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the relationships people have with 
each other might determine how susceptible they are to misinformation 
conveyed in a discussion. However, there is another possible explanation for the 
results—recall the trend for couples to take longer than stranger pairs to 
complete the discussion, potentially increasing the retention interval for couples 
over strangers. A well-established finding in the misinformation effect literature 
is that the longer the retention interval between the event and the memory test, 
the more misled subjects tend to be (Loftus et al., 1978). Perhaps, then, couples 
were more misled not because of their relationship with each other, but as a 
consequence of the increased retention interval, which caused poorer memory of 
the event and thus increased their susceptibility to the misleading suggestions. 
But, if couples did have inferior memories of the event, they should be worse 
than strangers at remembering nondiscussed details. In fact, they were not: 
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couples and strangers remembered nondiscussed details equally well, M = .73, SD 
= .25; M = .75, SD = .22; t < 1, ns, suggesting that the increased retention interval 
did not cause the effect.  
Another counterexplanation for the results is that the couples used the extra 
discussion time to present more evidence and to persuade their partner of their 
own views, and this extra effort meant they were more successful at influencing 
their partners. In other words, the longer couples discussed the critical details, 
the more persuaded and the less accurate they should be. To examine this 
possibility, I conducted a correlation analysis between the time couples took to 
discuss critical details where they were exposed to misinformation and their 
accuracy at remembering those details on the recognition test. Although there 
was a marginal trend, it was in the opposite direction: the longer couples spent 
discussing the critical details, the more accurate they were on the final test, r = 
.32, p = .08. In short, there was no support for the hypothesis that increased 
discussion duration led members of couples to be more persuaded by their 
partners. Instead, the results suggest that the longer couples took to discuss the 
critical questions, the more likely they were to resist the influence of their 
partner’s misleading suggestions.  
Confidence 
I next calculated subjects’ confidence for their responses to discussed and 
nondiscussed details; these results are displayed in Figure 5.3. The results are 
consistent with the previous experiments, and show that subjects were 
moderately confident in all their responses. Figure 5.3 also shows that there was 
no interaction between relationship and discussion: whether subjects were paired 
with their romantic partner or a stranger had no effect on their confidence when 
remembering discussed or nondiscussed details, F  < 1, ns. Yet there was trend 
toward a main effect for relationship: couples were more confident about all 
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their answers than strangers were, F (1, 60) = 3.30, p = .07, f = 0.23. There was no 
effect of discussion: subjects were just as confident when remembering discussed 
and nondiscussed details, F (1, 60) = 2.26, p = .14. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean confidence for nondiscussed and discussed details by relationship. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Next, I examined subjects’ confidence in their true memories (when they gave 
the correct response on nondiscussed details) and their false memories (when 
they gave the incorrect response on discussed details); these data appear in 
Figure 5.4. As the figure illustrates, there was no interaction between relationship 
and accuracy: whether subjects were paired with their romantic partner or a 
stranger had no effect on their confidence for either true memories or false 
memories, F (1, 49) = 1.30, p = .26. However, there was a main effect for 
relationship type: members of couples were more confident about their 
memories than strangers were, F (1, 49) = 12.83, p < .01, f = 0.45. This result fits well 
with the trend for overall confidence; couples were more confident in their 
responses whether or not they discussed those specific details and whether or not 
their responses were correct. Perhaps couples were used to verifying the past 
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with each other and—through previous experience—the verification boosted 
their confidence in memory for all details of the event, regardless of whether 
they actually discussed those specific details. Finally, consistent with 
Experiments 2A and 2B, Figure 5.4 also shows that there was a main effect for 
accuracy: couples and strangers were more confident about their true than their 
false memories, F (1, 49) = 8.76, p < .01, f = 0.42. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Mean confidence for correct responses on nondiscussed details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on discussed details (false memories) by relationship. Error bars depict 
standard errors of the means. 
 
Features of the Discussion 
As in the previous experiments, I used transcripts of subjects’ voicefiles to 
determine what happened during their discussions; for each of the 154 instances 
that subjects were exposed to the misinformation I examined four discussion 
features: if the subject spoke first; if the subject disputed what his or her partner 
said; if what the subject said was disputed by his or her partner; and if the subject 
used the misleading detail as an answer to the critical discussion question. Like 
in the previous experiments, of the 154 instances that subjects were exposed to 
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misinformation, there were only 19 instances (12%) where one subject disputed 
the other, and the other did not reciprocate. In other words these two factors—
whether the subject disputed his or her partner, and whether the subject was 
disputed by his or her partner—were not different enough to consider 
independently; instead, following Experiment 2B, I examined only whether 
subjects disputed what their partners said. I calculated the proportion of 
instances that each discussion feature occurred and the proportion of times that 
subjects went on to be misled; these data appear in Table 5.2.   
 
 
Table 5.2 
Proportion discussion feature occurrence and subsequent proportion of subjects misled for 154 
instances that subjects were exposed to misinformation 
 STRANGERS 
(n = 78 cases) 
COUPLES 
(n = 76 cases) 
Discussion Features Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled  
(n cases) 
Feature 
 (n cases) 
Misled  
(n cases) 
Answer     
Misinformation .56 (44) .75 (33) .55 (42) 1.00 (42) 
Alternative .44 (34) .06 (2) .45 (34) .29 (10) 
Dispute      
Dispute .46 (36) .19 (7) .51 (39) .44 (17) 
No Dispute .54 (42) .67 (28) .49 (37) .95 (35) 
Speaking Order     
Spoke First .33 (26) .27 (7) .30 (23) .43 (10) 
Spoke Second .67 (52)  .54 (28) .70 (53) .79 (42) 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE  .45 (35)  .68 (52) 
Note. Proportion Correct = 1 – Proportion Misled. For strangers (n cases Correct = 78 – n cases 
Misled); for couples (n cases Correct = 76 – n cases Misled). 
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As Table 5.2 illustrates, each of the discussion features occurred at similar 
rates in couples’ and strangers’ discussions, but their responses were quite 
different. The first two lines of Table 5.2 show that—consistent with Experiments 
2A and 2B—people were misled more often if they used the misinformation as 
their discussion answer; this pattern was especially true of couples. In fact, not 
one subject who took part with their romantic partner appeared to exhibit 
normative influence: instead, every time that members of couples used the 
misinformation as an answer during the discussion, they used the same 
information as an answer on the independent test. However, strangers did appear 
to exhibit normative influence some of the time, using the misinformation 
during discussion, but later reporting something different (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955). Consistent with the previous experiments, subjects sometimes used the 
misinformation as their answer during the independent test, even though they 
gave a different answer during the discussion, and again this behaviour was 
especially true for members of couples.  
Recall that couples took longer than strangers to complete their discussions. 
One possible explanation for this difference is that the couples were more 
comfortable arguing with one another. However, as the third line of Table 5.2 
shows, couples and strangers were just as likely as to dispute their partner’s 
suggestions. In other words couples’ longer discussion durations cannot be 
explained by a greater willingness to argue. 
Although couples and strangers disputed each other equally often, the 
outcomes were quite different. As Table 5.2 illustrates, the vast majority of the 
time that couples did not dispute their partner’s suggestions, they were 
subsequently misled. Additionally, couples who disputed their partners were 
misled twice as often as strangers who disputed their partners. Finally, both 
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couples and strangers were misled less often when they spoke first in the 
discussion of a critical detail. However, consistent with the other results, couples 
were still misled more often than strangers when they spoke first. 
In sum, even though members of couples and of stranger pairs were equally 
exposed to misinformation, and even though the features of their discussions 
were very similar, these data suggest that subjects’ experiences of the discussion 
were influenced by their relationships with each other. Couples never went along 
with their partner to be polite, or to “keep the peace”—or if they did, they 
maintained that behaviour even in an independent memory test. Furthermore, 
when couples refused to answer with the misinformation during discussion, they 
were more likely than strangers to use that same information at a later stage, on 
the independent test. These results suggest that couples might be more inclined 
than strangers to take their partner’s claims as evidence of reality. 
Predicting False Memories 
As in the previous experiments, I next examined if any features of the 
discussion predicted whether subjects were misled on a particular detail. I 
conducted the same two analyses, the all-items regression, which—consistent 
with Gabbert et al.’s (2006) approach—included all instances that subjects talked 
about critical details, regardless of whether they were exposed to 
misinformation; and the exposure-only regression, which addressed Lindsay’s 
(2007) concerns by only including instances where subjects were actually 
exposed to misinformation. For this experiment, I included an additional 
predictor in the analyses: whether subjects took part with their romantic partner 
or a stranger.  
All-items regression. When all 256 critical details that were asked about in the 
discussion were included in the regression—regardless of whether subjects were 
exposed to the misinformation—there were three predictors of whether a subject 
 111 
was misled. First, the odds ratio showed that subjects who took part with their 
romantic partner were nearly six times more likely to be misled than subjects 
who took part with a stranger, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 12.02, p < .01. Second, consistent 
with the previous experiments, when subjects used the misinformation as an 
answer during the discussion they were nearly 70 times more likely to be misled 
than if they answered with an alternative, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 65.03, p < .01. Finally, 
consistent with Gabbert et al. (2006), when subjects spoke first they were nearly 
four times less likely to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 9.85, p < .01. 
Exposure-only regression. When examining only the 154 instances in which 
subjects were exposed to misinformation, two factors predicted whether they 
would be misled. First, subjects who took part with their romantic partner were 
14 times more likely to be misled than those who took part with a stranger, χ2 (1, 
N = 154) = 11.94, p < .01. Second, when subjects used the misinformation as their 
discussion answer they were 87 times more likely to be misled than when they 
used an alternative, χ2 (1, N = 154) = 34.07, p < .01. Additionally, there was a 
marginally significant predictor—subjects who spoke first when discussing a 
critical detail were less likely to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 154) = 2.84, p = .09, 
suggesting that speaking order might in fact play some role in predicting 
susceptibility to false memories. 
In sum, consistent with the previous experiments, subjects were most likely to 
be misled when they answered with the misinformation during discussion. 
Additionally, subjects were more likely to be misled when the misleading 
information came from their romantic partner rather than a stranger. 
Interestingly, the marginal trend suggests that speaking order might actually 
play some role in susceptibility to false memories, not just in exposure to 
misinformation. However, speaking order was still a much better predictor of 
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being misled when exposure to misinformation was not considered—in the all-
items regression—suggesting that speaking order is most important because it is 
related to exposure to misinformation. 
Predicting exposure regression. Finally, as in the previous experiments, I 
conducted another regression to examine whether any features of the discussion 
predicted whether subjects were exposed to misinformation in the first place; the 
results were very similar to Experiment 2B. The odds ratios showed that subjects 
who disputed what their partner said were 4 times more likely to be exposed to 
misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 18.37, p < .01, and subjects who spoke first were 
four times less likely to be exposed to misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 20.07, p < 
.01. Additionally, there was an interaction between the two predictors: subjects 
who spoke first and disputed what their partners said were three times less likely 
to be exposed to the misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 256) = 13.06, p < .01. Subjects who 
took part with their romantic partner were just as likely as those who took part 
with a stranger to be exposed to misinformation. 
Summary 
In sum, the results of this study show that relationships matter; susceptibility 
to false memories is affected not only by people’s judgments about the 
misinformation messenger, but also by their relationship with the 
misinformation messenger. These results show that when people discuss the past 
with an intimate partner they might become not only less accurate but also more 
confident about their memories. 
The results fit with the social psychology literature suggesting that couples 
might be practiced in accepting their partner’s influence and in relying on each 
other’s memories (Gottman et al., 1998; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Hollingshead 
1998a; 1998b; Wegner et al., 1991). Although the findings fit with these studies, I 
did not obtain any measure of relationship duration, relationship satisfaction, 
 113 
areas of expertise within the relationship (evidence of specific transactive 
memory systems), nor gauge how the couples talked about their shared past. It 
might be that measures such as these can predict whether people in romantic 
relationships will be more or less susceptible to false memories. 
When couples rely on each other’s memories they experience an advantage by 
increasing the amount of information they can access while reducing the 
amount of effort required. However, this research shows that couples might also 
experience a disadvantage in memory accuracy when their partner conveys 
incorrect information. Often, when people discuss events together, they do so 
with someone they know rather than with a stranger. If people are even more 
susceptible to false memories when someone they know conveys the misleading 
information, then memory conformity studies to date (which do not account for 
relationship) may underestimate the true effect of discussion on memory (but 
see Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008). 
The results also fit with work showing the importance of the source of 
misinformation in determining the consequences for memory; people rely on 
their knowledge and judgments about each other to decide if the information 
conveyed is good or bad. For instance, misleading suggestions made by a 
reliable, credible, trustworthy, attractive or powerful messenger might be more 
influential than suggestions made by an unreliable, non-credible, untrustworthy, 
unattractive, or weak messenger (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et 
al., 2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Vornik et al., 2003). The major result of this 
study—that people were more influenced by their romantic partner’s misleading 
suggestions than by a stranger’s misleading suggestions—suggests that people 
probably make more favourable social judgments about their romantic partners 
than about strangers. Yet, given that a sizeable proportion of subjects were 
influenced by some misleading suggestions while resisting others, it seems that 
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rather than simply making broad judgments about whether the messenger is 
good or bad, people might make specific judgments depending on the content 
and context of each suggestion. Indeed, transactive memory research suggests 
that when people know each other very well they might judge information from 
specific domains to be more or less valuable depending on the messenger’s 
expertise. For instance, returning to the example from Chapter 1, my partner 
would not trust my recall of driving directions, but he would trust my recall of a 
phone number.  
In fact, some of the statements subjects made during the discussion suggest 
that they considered who was more expert in the specific area to decide whose 
memory to trust. For instance, when one couple discussed the colour of the 
couch, the male subject said, “You’re the colour expert”, and used the expert’s 
suggestion as his discussion answer. Similarly, when another couple discussed 
whether the bed was made, the female repeatedly stated that it was not; the male 
replied, “I thought it was made but I tend not to notice things like mess and 
unmade beds…” In fact, these kinds of statements were not limited to couples. 
For instance, one stranger communicated his lack of expertise. Specifically, when 
discussing the colour of the walls, he said, “I’m not that into interior design” and 
reiterated the same point when discussing the curtains, “…interior design—not 
my area!” In short, consistent with transactive memory theory, subjects seemed 
to consider each other’s expertise as a relevant factor during the discussion. 
Romantic couples might have been more familiar with each other’s expertise, 
whereas stranger pairs would have had to inform each other what they were 
good at or rely on stereotypes to make these decisions (Hollingshead & Fraidin, 
2003; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985; Wegner et al., 1991). Regardless of 
whether they relied on knowledge or assumptions about expertise, subjects 
seemed to use these expertise judgments to infer whose memory would be more 
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credible, and thus whose memory to trust.  
In everyday life, people probably make these kinds of credibility judgments by 
considering a whole host of factors beyond expertise. For instance, if a group of 
strangers witnessed an accident, each person might make different judgments 
about the reliability of different witnesses based on different criteria. Perhaps the 
man who forgot to put his glasses on might see himself as less reliable than the 
man who was up close as the accident happened; similarly, the woman who 
phoned for help might see herself as more knowledgeable than the woman who 
was chatting on her phone when the accident happened. Perhaps a teenage 
witness might see herself as more credible than a young child or an elderly 
person that was at the scene. In short, people’s expectations about their own 
credibility relative to the misinformation messenger’s credibility might be based 
on a wide variety of factors. Given that people might use credibility judgments to 
infer how reliable a given piece of information is, perhaps these judgments and 
expectations might also affect people’s susceptibility to misleading suggestions. 
For instance, perhaps the man who forgot his glasses might be more susceptible 
to misinformation conveyed by other witnesses, and the woman who called for 
help might be less susceptible. These ideas motivated my next study where my 
goal was to examine whether people’s expectations about their own abilities and 
about their discussion partner’s abilities would affect their source monitoring 
decisions, and thus their susceptibility to false memories. 
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Chapter 6 
Experiment 5: Great and Not-So-Great Expectations 
People’s perceptions of the misinformation messenger affect their 
susceptibility to false memories (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Ceci et al., 1987; 
Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Vornik et al., 2003). Yet it seems unlikely that these 
perceptions work in isolation. For instance, people who judge themselves very 
favourably might be less open to the influence of misleading suggestions than 
people who judge themselves less favourably. Put another way, people’s 
perceptions of themselves might also play a role in determining their 
susceptibility to misleading suggestions. 
In fact, some misinformation effect research shows that people's expectations 
about themselves can affect their susceptibility to false memories. Assefi and 
Garry (2003) conducted a misinformation effect study and provided subjects with 
placebo alcohol. Half of the people in the study were told they drank tonic water, 
and the other half were told that they drank alcohol. Everyone actually drank the 
same thing: tonic water. Yet, people who were told they drank alcohol were more 
influenced by the misleading suggestions. One explanation for this result is that 
people who thought they drank alcohol subsequently expected their memory to 
be poor and thus were more likely to capitulate to the misinformation 
messenger—in this case, the presumably sober experimenter who provided the 
written description. In short, people’s expectations about their own abilities 
might lead them to be more susceptible to the influence of misleading 
suggestions. Several subsequent studies have shown that these expectancy effects 
also operate in the opposite direction, leading people to be less susceptible to the 
influence of misleading suggestions. (Clifasefi, Garry, Harper, Sharman, & 
Sutherland, 2007; Parker, Garry, Engle, Harper, & Clifasefi, 2008). Specifically, 
instead of telling subjects that they drank alcohol, Clifasefi et al. told half of the 
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subjects in their study that they took a cognitive enhancing drug; the other 
subjects were told that they took an inactive placebo. In fact there was no drug: 
everyone took a placebo made of baking soda and water. Yet, people who were 
told they had taken the active drug were less influenced by the misleading 
suggestions. Perhaps people who thought they took the drug subsequently 
expected their memories to be very good, and thus they were less likely to 
capitulate to the misinformation messenger's suggestions.  
In sum—when examined independently—people’s judgments about the 
misinformation messenger and people’s expectations about themselves can lead 
them to be more or less influenced by misinformation conveyed in a narrative 
description. In the next two experiments, I examined these factors in 
combination to see whether people’s expectations about themselves and their 
expectations about other people work together to determine their susceptibility 
to misinformation conveyed in a social interaction. 
To date, two memory conformity studies have manipulated subjects’ 
perceptions of their own and their discussion partner’s credibility; in both studies 
the supposedly less credible subjects were more susceptible to false memories 
than the supposedly more credible subjects (Gabbert et al., 2007; Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2008). However, in both studies, within subject-pairs the balance was 
always tipped in one person’s favour: one member was perceived to have an 
advantage and the other was perceived to have a disadvantage. More specifically, 
one subject was told his or her partner had seen a target picture for more time 
and the other was told his or her partner had seen it for less time (although 
actual viewing time was equivalent; Gabbert et al., 2007); similarly, one person 
was allocated a low power role and the other was allocated a high power role 
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008).  
Although these studies showed that people in the apparently disadvantaged 
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roles were more susceptible to false memories, neither study had a baseline 
measure of susceptibility to false memories. In fact, the effects might actually 
occur because people in the supposedly advantaged roles were less susceptible to 
false memories. Additionally, the studies do not tell us whether perceptions of 
the self or perceptions of the misinformation messenger drive the effect. For 
example, we do not know what would happen if the misinformation messenger 
and the person were both highly credible, or if they both lacked credibility. 
I wondered whether the effect found by Gabbert et al. (2007) and Skagerberg 
and Wright (2008) was driven by some people being more susceptible to false 
memories, some people being less susceptible to false memories, or a 
combination of the two. Additionally, I wondered what mechanisms might drive 
the effect. If people in the disadvantaged roles were more susceptible to 
misinformation, it might be because they made favourable judgments of the 
misinformation messenger, because they made unfavourable judgments of 
themselves, or because of some interaction between the two. Likewise, if people 
in the advantaged roles were less susceptible to misinformation, it might be 
because they made unfavourable judgments of the misinformation messenger, 
because they made favourable judgments of themselves, or because of some 
interaction between the two.  
To answer these questions, I conducted a study just like Experiment 2B, but 
tried leading subject-pairs to believe that each person would have either good or 
slightly degraded vision during the movie. Thus, within pairs, subjects would 
expect to be more, equally, or less able than their partner to see the movie. If 
subjects’ expectations about their abilities and their partner's abilities affected 
their susceptibility to misleading suggestions, we should see differences in their 
memory for discussed details. These differences might occur in one of three 
ways. First, if susceptibility to false memories is driven by people’s expectations 
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about the misinformation messenger, then people who are told their discussion 
partner—the misinformation messenger—has good vision should be more 
misled than people who are told their discussion partner has degraded vision, 
regardless of what they are told about their own vision. Second, if susceptibility 
to false memories is driven by people’s expectations about themselves, then 
people who are told they have degraded vision should be more misled than 
people who are told they have good vision, regardless of what they are told about 
their partner’s vision. Finally, if susceptibility to false memories is affected by 
people’s expectations about themselves in combination with their expectations 
about the misinformation messenger, then we should see an interaction between 
the two factors. Additionally, any differences between the groups might be 
driven by one group being more susceptible to false memories, one group being 
less susceptible to false memories, or a combination of the two. 
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 160 IPRP students took part in pairs in return for course credit. 
Design 
The experiment used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design: subjects were told that their 
ability to see the movie was either good or slightly degraded, and that their 
partner’s ability was either the same as or different from their own. As in the 
previous experiments, for every subject, half of the critical details from the 
movie acted as discussed details and the other half acted as nondiscussed details. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2B, except for two changes. As 
before, subjects had the impression that they might be assigned to wear 35%, 
55%, 75% or 95% acuity glasses. But unlike the earlier experiments, instead of 
telling subjects they would be in the 95% acuity condition, each subject was 
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assigned to wear either 75% acuity glasses (slightly degraded vision) or 95% 
acuity glasses (good vision). Regardless of their acuity label, none of the glasses 
degraded subjects’ vision in any way: each pair of glasses was made of either 
horizontal polarising filter, or vertical polarising filter, and allowed each subject 
to see one movie while blocking the other from view. Prior to the movie, subjects 
chose an envelope to see which condition they would be in, and were handed 
glasses from the corresponding box. The envelopes were arranged to ensure that 
subjects were assigned to the correct condition. There were four possible 
expectancy combinations based on the glasses that subjects were given: [1] both 
the subject and his or her partner expected to have degraded vision; [2] both the 
subject and his or her partner expected to have good vision; [3] the subject 
expected his or her partner to have superior vision; or [4] the subject expected his 
or her partner to have inferior vision (see Table 6.1).  
 
 
Table 6.1.  
Expectancy combinations based on subject-pairs’ assigned glasses 
 PARTNER’S GLASSES  
 75% Acuity 95% Acuity 
75% Acuity Both Degraded 
Vision 
Messenger 
Superior Vision 
 
OWN 
GLASSES 
95% Acuity Messenger 
Inferior Vision 
Both Good 
Vision 
 
 
The second change I made from Experiment 2B was to add a manipulation 
check following the recognition test to see whether subjects believed that the 
glasses degraded (or did not degrade) their vision. Subjects rated their vision of 
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the movie on five different dimensions: overall vision, sharpness, brightness, 
contrast and vibrancy; they rated each aspect a 5-point Likert scale where 1 was 
low and 5 was high. A sixth scale asked subjects whether they experienced any 
sensory compensation—if they noticed their other senses being more switched 
on than usual while their vision was degraded; subjects rated their sensory 
compensation on another 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = “no different to normal” 
and 5 = “extremely switched on”. Finally, subjects were asked to report which 
type of glasses they wore and which type of glasses their partner wore. 
Results and Discussion 
In total 80 subject-pairs completed the study, but as in the previous 
experiments, all data were analysed on an individual level, yielding a total of 160 
subjects. Consistent with the previous experiments, subjects were good at 
remembering the twelve filler details, and there were no differences based on 
whether subjects wore 75% or 95% glasses, M = 8.89 correct (74%), SD = 1.48; M = 
8.74 correct (73%), SD = 1.51, t < 1, ns. 
Manipulation Checks 
To examine whether subjects believed that the glasses degraded (or did not 
degrade) their vision, for each subject I calculated an overall sensory impressions 
score, based on the mean of their five vision ratings. Subjects who wore 75% 
glasses rated their impressions of the movie as worse than subjects who wore 
95% glasses, suggesting that the manipulation did influence subjects’ beliefs 
about their ability to see, M = 2.95, SD = 0.62; M = 3.25, SD = 0.65; t (156) = 3.01, p < 
.01, Cohen’s d = 0.48.  
I next examined subjects’ responses to the sensory compensation measure. If 
the manipulation was effective, subjects who were told that their vision was 
degraded should give higher ratings on this item. In fact, there was no difference 
between subjects who wore 75% glasses and subjects who wore 95% glasses, 
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suggesting that either this item was a poor measure of the manipulation or the 
manipulation was not effective, M = 2.26, SD = 1.20; M = 2.04; SD = 1.16; t (156) = 
1.20, p = .23.  
Discussion Duration 
As in the previous experiments, there was no evidence that subjects were 
rushed to choose answers during the discussion. Pairs took between 2:18 min and 
7:17 min to complete the discussion, well under the 12 min allowed, M = 4:17 min, 
SD = 1:06 min. It made no difference to discussion duration whether subject-pairs 
wore the same or different glasses, M = 4:24 min, SD = 1:07; M = 4:10 min, SD = 
1:05; t < 1, ns. Additionally, subjects were given very few warnings to remind 
them they had 10 sec left. Pairs who wore the same glasses received 18 warnings 
when discussing filler details (out of a possible 320 instances; 6%) and 3 warnings 
when discussing critical details (out of a possible 160 instances; 2%). Pairs who 
wore different glasses received 12 warnings when discussing filler details (out of 
a possible 320 instances; 4%) and only 1 warning while discussing a critical detail 
(out of a possible 160 instances; < 1%). Collapsing across conditions, subjects took 
longer to discuss critical details than filler details, M = 23.31 s, SD = 6.67, range = 5 
– 63 s; M = 20.45 s, SD = 5.75, range 4 – 71 s; t (79) = 4.63, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.52. 
Exposure to Misinformation  
Subjects were exposed to between 0 and 4 misleading details, M = 2.73, SD = 
1.07. In total they were exposed to misinformation on 436 out of 640 possible 
instances (68%). Three subjects were exposed to misinformation for details that 
were intended to act as nondiscussed details (out of 640 possible instances; < 1%); 
as in Experiment 2B, these details were excluded from the analyses. 
Remembering Discussed Details 
Consistent with the previous experiments, I next calculated subjects’ 
proportion correct scores for discussed and nondiscussed details based on their 
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responses on the final recognition test; these data are displayed in Figure 6.1.  
 
 
Both 
Degraded  
Both     
Good  
Messenger 
Superior  
Messenger 
Inferior  
Same Glasses Different Glasses 
Figure 6.1. Proportion of correct responses for nondiscussed and discussed details by expectancy 
condition. Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Did subjects’ expectations about their own abilities and their expectations 
about their partner’s abilities affect their susceptibility to misinformation? As 
Figure 6.1 illustrates, the answer is no. Subjects’ memory performance was not 
affected by their expectations about their own or their partner’s ability to see, F < 
1, ns.8 In fact, the only interesting finding from this analysis is that—consistent 
with the previous experiments—subjects in all conditions demonstrated a 
misinformation effect: they were better at remembering nondiscussed than 
discussed details, F (1, 152) = 38.23, p < .01, f = 0.50.  
Additionally, as displayed in Figure 6.2, the item-analysis showed that subjects 
remembered each critical detail better when they had not discussed it, t (7) = 7.94, 
p < .01, Cohen’s d = 2.81.  
                                                
8 I repeated the analysis examining only discussed details. There were no differences between 
conditions—subjects’ expectations did not affect their susceptibility to misinformation, F < 1, ns.  
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Figure 6.2. Proportion of correct nondiscussed and discussed responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Following the previous experiments, I next examined subjects who were 
exposed to at least two misleading details. Of these 139 subjects, 35 (25%) were 
never misled by their partner’s suggestions, 14 (10%) were always misled by their 
partner’s suggestions, and the remaining 90 (65%) were misled about some 
details but resisted the suggestions about other details. These results suggest that 
people did make different judgments about the information conveyed—yet, their 
judgments did not appear to be driven by the manipulation. I grouped subjects 
based on their expectations of their own and their partner’s abilities (both-
degraded; both-good; messenger-superior; messenger-inferior) according to 
whether they were never misled, sometimes misled or always misled; these data 
are displayed in Table 6.2. As Table 6.2 illustrates—and consistent with the 
primary analysis—patterns of responding were similar across the different 
conditions, providing more evidence that the manipulation did not affect 
subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation. 
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Table 6.2 
Proportion of subjects who—when exposed to at least two misleading details—were never, 
sometimes, and always misled, by expectancy condition 
 PARTNER’S GLASSES 
 Same Different 
SUBJECT’S GLASSES 
 
75% Acuity 
(n = 30) 
95% Acuity 
(n = 34) 
75% Acuity 
(n = 36) 
95% Acuity 
(n =39) 
 Both 
Degraded 
Both    
Good 
Messenger 
Superior 
Messenger 
Inferior 
Never Misled .20 (6) .26 (9) .28 (10) .26 (10) 
Sometimes Misled .63 (19) .65 (22) .69 (25) .61 (24) 
Always Misled .17 (5) .09 (3) .03 (1) .13 (5) 
 
 
There are several possible explanations for the results. It might be that neither 
expectations about the self nor expectations about the misinformation 
messenger affect susceptibility to false memories during a social interaction. Yet 
the research described above (for example, Gabbert et al., 2007; Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2008) suggests that these kinds of judgments should have some effect. 
Recall that subjects rated only their own vision, not their beliefs about their 
partner’s vision: an alternative explanation is that the manipulation did not affect 
subjects’ expectations about their partner—the misinformation messenger—and 
thus did not affect their susceptibility to false memories. Another possibility is 
that—even though their memory performance was not affected—subjects in 
different conditions might have had different subjective experiences of their 
memories. For instance, subjects in the messenger-superior group might have 
been less confident about their memories because they thought their vision was 
degraded, or they might have been more confident when they were influenced 
by the superior messenger’s suggestions. To address these possibilities, I next 
examined subjects’ confidence in their responses. 
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Confidence 
Subjects’ confidence ratings for their responses to discussed and nondiscussed 
details are displayed in Figure 6.3. As the figure illustrates, subjects’ expectations 
about their own and their partner’s abilities had no effect on their confidence, F 
(1, 151) = 1.10, p = .30. Across conditions, subjects were moderately confident in all 
their responses.  
 
 
Both 
Degraded  
Both     
Good  
Messenger 
Superior  
Messenger 
Inferior  
Same Glasses Different Glasses 
Figure 6.3. Mean confidence for nondiscussed and discussed details by expectancy condition. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
I next examined subjects’ confidence in their correct responses on 
nondiscussed details (true memories) and their incorrect responses on discussed 
details (false memories); these data appear in Figure 6.4. As the figure illustrates, 
subjects’ expectations did not affect their confidence, F < 1, ns.9 However, across 
conditions, subjects were more confident in their true than false memories, F (1, 
107) = 30.04, p < .01, f = 0.53. 
                                                
9 I repeated the analysis examining only confidence in false memories—there were no 
differences in subjects’ confidence based on their expectations, F (3, 110) = 1.08, p = .36. 
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Both 
Degraded  
Both     
Good  
Messenger 
Superior  
Messenger 
Inferior  
Same Glasses Different Glasses 
Figure 6.4. Mean confidence for correct responses on nondiscussed details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on discussed details (false memories) by expectancy condition. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
In short, there was no evidence that the manipulation affected subjects’ 
memory performance or their subjective experiences of their memories, thus 
supporting the explanation that the manipulation may not have been effective at 
changing subjects’ perceptions of their discussion partners.  
Features of the Discussion 
As in the previous experiments, I next examined the features of subjects’ 
discussions to see if there were differences based on their expectations. I used the 
voicefiles and my written records of the discussions to determine whether each 
of four features occurred: whether the subject spoke first; whether the subject 
disputed his or her partner; whether the subject was disputed by his or her 
partner; and whether the subject used the misinformation as a discussion answer. 
Consistent with the previous experiments, for the most part, when one subject 
disputed the other, the other subject disputed back. In fact, there were only 50 
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occasions (out of 436 possible instances; 11%) where one subject disputed what 
the other said, and the other subject did not reciprocate, meaning that the two 
features were not different enough to analyse separately. Instead, as in the 
previous experiments, I examined only whether the subject disputed what his or 
her partner said. Focusing on the 436 instances where subjects were exposed to 
misinformation, I calculated the proportion of discussions where each feature 
occurred, and the subsequent proportion of instances where subjects went on to 
be misled. These data appear in Table 6.3. As the table illustrates, the discussion 
features occurred at similar rates, and subjects’ patterns of responding were 
similar regardless of their expectations about their own and their partner’s 
abilities.  
Consistent with the previous experiments, the first two lines of Table 6.3 show 
that subjects were misled more often when they used the misinformation as their 
discussion answer than when they used another alternative. Yet using the 
misinformation as a discussion answer did not always lead subjects to be misled: 
sometimes they answered with the misinformation during discussion but 
reverted to the correct answer at test. Additionally, subjects occasionally used a 
different answer during the discussion, and then changed to the misinformation 
at test. 
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Table 6.3 
Proportion discussion feature occurrence and subsequent proportion of subjects misled for 436 instances that subjects were exposed to misinformation 
 PARTNER’S GLASSES 
 Same  Different 
SUBJECT’S GLASSES 75% Acuity 
(n = 100 cases) 
Both Degraded 
95% Acuity 
(n = 112 cases) 
Both Good 
75% Acuity 
(n = 106 cases) 
Messenger Superior 
95% Acuity 
(n = 118 cases) 
Messenger Inferior 
Discussion Features Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
 (n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Answer         
Misinformation .59 (59) .81 (48) .42 (47) .77 (36) .43 (46) .70 (32) .47 (56) .79 (44) 
Alternative .41 (41) .07 (3) .58 (65) .12 (8) .57 (60) .08 (5) .53 (62) .08 (5) 
Dispute          
Dispute .52 (52) .23 (12) .58 (65) .11 (7) .56 (59) .08 (5) .54 (64) .06 (4) 
No Dispute .48 (48) .81 (39) .42 (47) .79 (37) .44 (47) .68 (32) .46 (54) .83 (45) 
Speaking Order         
Spoke First .37 (37) .41 (15) .38 (42) .26 (11) .36 (38) .24 (9) .47 (55) .35 (19) 
Spoke Second .63 (63) .57 (36) .63 (70) .47 (33) .64 (68) .41 (28) .53 (63) .48 (30) 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE  .51 (51)  .39 (44)  .35 (37)  .42 (49) 
Note. Proportion Correct = 1 – Proportion Misled. For each condition (n cases Correct = total n cases – n cases Misled). 
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Table 6.3 also shows that subjects were misled more often when they did not 
dispute what their partner said, and they were misled less often if they spoke first 
when discussing a critical detail. Additionally, when they were exposed to 
misinformation, subjects spoke first less often. However, this pattern was not true 
of subjects in one condition: subjects in the messenger-inferior group spoke first 
more often than subjects in the other three groups. Perhaps these subjects did 
believe they were superior to their partners, and as such spoke up first more 
often than subjects in other conditions. However, other than this one small 
difference, the patterns of responding were very similar to the previous 
experiments; the expectancy manipulation did not seem to affect subjects’ 
discussion behaviour or their memory responses. 
Predicting False Memories 
Following the previous experiments, I next examined whether any discussion 
features predicted whether subjects were misled on a given detail. I conducted 
two nominal logistic regressions, by entering each of the three dichotomous 
discussion features as predictors. Additionally, I entered subjects’ expectations 
about their own vision (75% or 95% acuity) and subjects’ expectations about their 
partner’s vision (same or different acuity) as predictors. In the first regression—
the all-items regression—I followed Gabbert et al.’s (2006) approach, and 
included all 640 instances where subjects were asked about a critical detail 
during the discussion, regardless of whether they were exposed to 
misinformation. In the second regression—the exposure-only regression—I 
addressed Lindsay’s (2007) concerns about not correcting for exposure to 
misinformation by examining only the 436 instances where subjects were 
exposed to misinformation. Neither subjects’ expectations about their own 
abilities nor their expectations about their partner’s abilities predicted whether 
they were misled in either analysis.  
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All-items regression. When I included all 640 instances that subjects were 
asked about a critical detail during the discussion, regardless of whether they 
were exposed to the misinformation, there were five predictors of being misled. 
First, subjects who used the misinformation as a discussion answer were nearly 
16 times more likely to be misled than subjects who gave an alternative answer 
during the discussion, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 79.61, p  < .01. Second, subjects who 
disputed what their partner said were 7 times less likely to be misled than those 
who did not dispute their partner, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 41.22, p < .01. Third, consistent 
with Gabbert et al. (2006), when exposure to misinformation was not taken into 
account, subjects who spoke first during the discussion of a critical detail were 
only half as likely to be misled as those who spoke second, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 8.21, p  
< .01. Finally, there were two interactions: when subjects disputed what their 
partner said, they were twice as likely to be misled if they answered with the 
misinformation than if they answered with an alternative, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 6.39, p 
= .01. Additionally, when subjects disputed what their partner said and used the 
misinformation as their discussion answer, they were only half as likely to be 
misled if they spoke first during the discussion of the detail, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 4.78, 
p = .03. 
Exposure-only regression. When examining only the 436 instances that 
subjects were exposed to misinformation, only two factors predicted being 
misled. First, subjects who used the misinformation as their discussion answer 
were 11 times more likely to be misled than subjects who used an alternative 
answer, χ2 (1, N = 436) = 59.14, p < .01. Second, subjects who disputed what their 
partner said were 8 times less likely to be misled than those who did not dispute 
their partner, χ2 (1, N = 436) = 47.83, p < .01.  
Consistent with the previous experiments, speaking first only predicted being 
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misled when exposure to misinformation was not taken into account, in the all-
items regression. This result supports Lindsay’s (2007) suggestion that speaking 
first is related to exposure to misinformation, but perhaps not susceptibility to 
false memories. 
Predicting exposure regression. Finally, I conducted another regression, to see 
if any discussion features predicted whether subjects would be exposed to 
misinformation. Consistent with the previous experiments, subjects who disputed 
what their partner said were 19 times more likely to be exposed to 
misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 640) = 98.11, p < .01. Additionally, in keeping with 
Lindsay’s (2007) hypothesis, subjects who spoke first during the discussion of a 
critical detail were 5 times less likely to be exposed to misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 
640) = 64.35, p < .01, thus protecting these subjects from being misled. These 
results provide more support for the idea that speaking order associated with 
exposure to misleading suggestions, but not necessarily susceptibility to 
misleading suggestions. 
Summary 
Taken as a whole, the results from this study fit with those of the previous 
experiments. Subjects remembered seeing details that they were merely told 
about during a discussion. Additionally, features within the interaction predicted 
whether subjects were more or less likely to be misled. However, the results do 
not shed any light on how people’s expectations of themselves or their 
expectations of the misinformation messenger might operate to produce false 
memories in a social interaction. Yet other research suggests that people’s 
expectations about themselves and about the misinformation messenger should 
affect false memories (for example, Assefi & Garry, 2003; Clifasefi et al., 2007; 
Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 2005; Gabbert et al., 2006; Parker 
et al., 2008; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008; Vornik et al., 2003). The best explanation 
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of these null results is that the manipulation was not effective at changing 
people’s perceptions of each other. My next goal was to improve the 
manipulation in the hope that I would be able to answer my original research 
question—whether people’s expectations about themselves and their 
expectations about the misinformation messenger work in combination to 
determine their susceptibility to false memories. 
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Chapter 7 
Experiment 6: Expecting the Best Protects People from False 
Memories that Arise from Discussion 
In Experiment 6, I made several methodological changes to cultivate subjects’ 
expectations about their own and each other’s abilities. I also set a minimum 
performance criterion on the filler tasks to ensure subjects at least attempted to 
do the tasks properly; if subjects made very little attempt on the tasks it would 
suggest that they were not motivated to do the tasks properly, thus decreasing 
the chance that they would consider the manipulation information, and 
decreasing the chance that they were concentrating enough to be sufficiently 
distracted during the filler tasks.  
Method 
Subjects 
In total, 96 IPRP students took part in pairs in return for course credit.  
Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 5. 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 5, except for five changes: [1] I 
changed the names of the acuity glasses; [2] extended the explanation of the 
glasses in the cover story; [3] added several preliminary manipulation tasks; [4] 
asked subjects to reiterate what type of glasses they wore immediately prior to 
the discussion; and [5] added a new manipulation check. 
To make it clearer to subjects what the glasses were supposed to do, I changed 
the names of the acuity glasses. Instead of labeling the boxes, 35%, 55%, 75%, and 
95% acuity (see Figure 2.1), I made new labels for “Poor”, “Moderate” and 
“Optimal” strength acuity glasses, each with a specified vision range (see Figure 
7.1). Thus, instead of requiring subjects to remember what 75% and 95% glasses 
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should do, they would know from the labels that they would have moderate or 
optimal vision. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Updated box labels for different strengths of “Acuity Glasses.” 
 
Additionally, I extended my explanation of the glasses in the cover story. 
Specifically, I said: 
As you can see we have three different strengths of glasses; basically the higher the 
percentage range, the closer they are to normal vision. So the optimal glasses provide 
ideal viewing conditions—they are like the equivalent of normal vision. The other two 
types of glasses both degrade your vision to a different extent; both types are 
significantly worse than normal vision and the poor strength should be even harder to 
see through than the moderate strength glasses.  
I wanted to ensure that subjects fully comprehended how the glasses would 
affect their ability to see; instead of just telling them and expecting them to 
believe me, I created several tasks so that subjects experienced normal and 
degraded vision. Because the glasses did not actually degrade subjects’ vision, I 
used the MORI technique to show subjects different quality images through the 
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different glasses. First, subjects were told: 
We have a couple of different tasks today. I’m going to show you a few different images 
on this screen and get you to look at them through the acuity glasses. First I am going to 
compare what you can see with the optimal glasses, and what you can see with the 
moderate glasses. You’ll each have a turn at wearing each type of glasses. 
Subjects each chose a card that told them what sort of glasses they would 
wear: one person was given glasses from the optimal box, and the other was 
given glasses from the moderate box. There were two tasks in the manipulation 
phase of the study, a letter array and a face recognition task. For each task, I 
created two different images, a clear image, and a degraded image. I used the 
MORI technique to present the poorer quality image to the subject who wore 
moderate glasses and the better quality image to the subject who wore optimal 
glasses, thus giving subjects the impression that the glasses affected their ability 
to see.  
Letter array. In the first task, subjects saw a six-line letter array, similar in 
appearance to an optician’s array. To create the degraded array, I used a lighter 
colour font, and increased the transparency of the letters so they would fade into 
the background (see Figure 7.2). I designed the arrays so that when subjects saw 
the normal version they could generally read to the end of the sixth line and 
when they saw the degraded version they could generally read only to the end of 
the fourth line. Subjects took turns to read the letters that they could see out 
loud, then swapped glasses, and repeated the task. As a result, subjects had the 
experience of better and worse vision from the different glasses, the experience 
of seeing letters that their partner could not see, and the experience of not being 
able to see letters that their partner could see. 
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Figure 7.2. Arrays used for letter recognition task. Subjects wearing optimal glasses saw clear 
array [A] and subjects wearing moderate glasses saw degraded array [B].  
 
Face recognition task. In the face recognition task, I presented four 
photographs of famous people—one at a time—for 2 seconds each. I created a 
second degraded version of each photo by adding grain and blur in Adobe 
Photoshop (see Figure 7.3). Typically subjects could recognise the normal 
photos very easily and confidently, but had much more difficulty with the 
degraded photos and often had no idea who these photographs depicted. After 
each photograph was presented, subjects were asked to report (out loud) whether 
they recognised the face, and if they did, how confident they were. After both 
subjects had answered these questions, each was asked who the photograph 
depicted. As before, subjects who wore moderate glasses saw the degraded 
photographs, and subjects who wore optimal glasses saw normal photographs. 
After two photographs, subjects swapped glasses so that each saw two degraded 
faces and two normal faces. 
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Figure 7.3. Celebrity photographs used for face recognition task. Subjects wearing optimal glasses 
saw clear photos [A] and subjects wearing moderate glasses saw degraded photos [B]. From the 
top, the photos depict Brad Pitt, Paris Hilton, Ben Stiller and Britney Spears. 
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Following the preliminary tasks, subjects were asked to give their glasses back, 
and were then told: 
The next thing I am going to do is show you a movie. The movie is about a guy named 
Chad who is at a party. All I want you to do is watch the movie through the acuity 
glasses, and then we will do a couple of related tasks afterwards. Its just like the other 
tasks—people see best when they keep their head straight rather than tilted, so as with 
the previous tasks I’ll ask you to keep your heads as straight and still as possible while 
you watch the movie. Because the movie takes longer than the tasks we have just done, 
for this part of the study you are only going to be able to wear one pair of glasses each. 
You each have an envelope in front of you; each envelope has three cards inside—one 
card for each type of acuity glasses. If you reach into those envelopes now and take out a 
card it will tell you what condition you’ll be in for the movie today.  
Each subject was given a pair of glasses from either the moderate or optimal box 
and watched the Chad movie as in the previous studies.  
I wanted to ensure that subjects remembered what type of glasses they wore 
and what type of glasses their partner wore when they discussed the movie. As a 
reminder, at the beginning of the discussion when the voice recorder had been 
started, subjects stated where they were sitting (left or right) and the type of 
glasses that they wore during the movie, under the guise that it would help me 
distinguish who said what in the voicefile. 
Finally, I added a new manipulation check. As in Experiment 5, subjects rated 
their vision and sensory compensation. However, before reporting which glasses 
they wore and which glasses their partner wore, subjects filled out another four-
item manipulation check. These four self-partner comparison measures asked 
subjects to rate how they compared to their partner in their ability to see the 
movie, their ability to make out the details, their credibility and their reliability; 
subjects responded on separate 7-point Likert scales ranging from -3 (partner 
better) to +3 (self better), where the midpoint 0 = “about the same.” 
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Results and Discussion 
To ensure that subjects were sufficiently distracted from thinking about the 
critical material during filler tasks, and to ensure that they were motivated 
enough to care about the preliminary manipulation tasks, I set a minimum 
performance criterion for the filler tasks. To be included in the dataset, subjects 
were required to attempt at least five squares during the 10 min of suduko 
puzzles, and find at least three words during the 5 min wordfind. In total 48 pairs 
completed the study and met this filler task criterion.10  
As in the previous experiments, all data was analysed on an individual level, 
yielding a total of 96 subjects. Subjects attempted between 6 and 84 squares on 
the suduko puzzle, M = 26.02, SD = 13.97, and found between 4 and 16 words in the 
wordfind, M = 7.66, SD = 2.66. Consistent with the previous experiments, subjects 
were good at remembering the 12 filler details, and it made no difference 
whether they wore moderate or optimal glasses, M = 8.69 correct (72%), SD = 1.17; 
M = 8.77 correct (73%), SD = 1.43; t < 1, ns. 
Manipulation Checks 
Did the manipulation affect subjects’ expectations of their own abilities? 
Consistent with Experiment 5, subjects who wore moderate glasses rated their 
vision as significantly worse than subjects who wore optimal glasses, suggesting 
that people's perceptions of their viewing ability were driven by the 
manipulation, M = 2.51, SD = 0.52; M = 3.67, SD = 0.69; t (94) = 6.87, p < .01, Cohen’s 
d = 1.90. Additionally, subjects who wore moderate glasses were marginally more 
likely to report higher sensory compensation than subjects who wore optimal 
                                                
10 Nine subject-pairs were excluded from the dataset because one person in each pair did not 
make a sufficient attempt on the filler tasks. Of these, five people attempted less than 5 squares 
during the 10 min suduko puzzle, and four people found less than 3 words during the 5 min 
wordfind.  
An additional three pairs were excluded because one person in each pair expressed suspicion that 
they might have seen different movies. 
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glasses, suggesting that they thought their vision was actually degraded, M = 
2.50, SD = 1.17; M = 2.06, SD = 1.10; t (94) = 1.89, p = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.39. 
I next examined whether the manipulation affected subjects’ perceptions of 
their partner’s abilities. For each subject I calculated a mean score based on their 
four self-partner comparison measures; these data are displayed on Figure 7.4. As 
Figure 7.4 illustrates, subject-pairs who wore the same glasses as each other rated 
themselves as very similar, regardless of whether they were in the both-degraded 
group or the both-good group; subjects in the messenger-superior group rated 
their partners as better; and subjects in the messenger-inferior group rated 
themselves as better. In short there was an interaction between subjects’ 
expectations of themselves and their expectations of their partner, F (1, 92) = 
49.89, p < .01, f = 0.74. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the credibility 
manipulation led subjects to believe that glasses affected their ability to see and 
their partner's ability to see. 
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Figure 7.4. Mean self-partner comparison ratings by expectancy condition. Error bars depict 
standard errors of the means. 
Self 
superior 
Partner 
superior 
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Discussion Duration 
As in the previous experiments, there was no evidence that subjects felt 
rushed to select their answers during the discussion; subject pairs took between 
2:05 min and 6:02 min to complete the discussion, M = 3:52 min, SD = 0:55. 
Interestingly, subject-pairs who wore the same glasses took less time to discuss 
the questions than subject-pairs who wore different glasses, M = 3:33 min, SD = 
0:48; M = 4:12 min, SD = 0:56; t (46) = 2.59, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.75. This difference 
was driven by both critical and filler details; pairs who wore different glasses 
took longer than pairs who wore the same glasses to discuss both critical 
details—M = 23.97 s, SD = 7.64; M = 19.75 s, SD = 5.83—and filler details—M = 19.46 
sec, SD = 5.16; M = 16.69 s, SD = 4.35; F (1, 46) = 6.87, p = .01, f = 0.10. Perhaps pairs 
who wore different glasses were less trusting of each other, or were curious 
about each other’s experience, thus extending their discussion time. Across all 
conditions, subjects took longer to discuss critical details than filler details, M = 
21.86 s, SD = 7.05, range = 5 – 65 s; M = 18.08 s, SD = 4.93, range = 4 – 68 s; F (1, 46) = 
13.04, p < .01, f = 0.53. 
Pairs were given a warning when they had 10 sec remaining to discuss a given 
question. In total, pairs who wore different glasses were given 3 warnings when 
discussing filler details (out of a possible 192 instances; 2%) and 2 warnings when 
discussing critical details (out of a possible 96 instances; 2%). Of pairs who wore 
the same glasses only one was given a warning when discussing a filler detail 
(out of a possible 192 instances; < 1%), and two were given warnings when 
discussing critical details (out of a possible 96 instances; 2%). Taken together, 
these results suggest that people were not rushed during the discussion phase of 
the study. 
Exposure to Misinformation 
Subjects were exposed to between 0 and 4 misleading details, M = 2.63, SD = 
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1.02; in total they were exposed to misleading details on 253 out of a possible 384 
instances (66%). Three people were exposed to misinformation for details that 
were intended to act as nondiscussed details; these details were excluded from 
the analyses. As in the previous experiments, I calculated—for each subject—a 
proportion-correct score for discussed and nondiscussed details.  
Remembering Discussed Details 
Recall that people’s expectations might affect their susceptibility to false 
memories in three different ways. First, if susceptibility to false memories is 
driven by people’s expectations about the misinformation messenger, then 
people who are told their discussion partner has optimal ability to see the movie 
should be more misled than people who are told their discussion partner has 
moderate ability, regardless of what they are told about their own abilities. 
Second, if susceptibility to false memories is driven by people’s expectations 
about themselves, then people who are told they have moderate ability to see the 
movie should be more misled than people who are told they have optimal 
ability, regardless of what they are told about their partner’s abilities. Finally, if 
susceptibility to false memories is affected by people’s beliefs about themselves 
in combination with their beliefs about the misinformation messenger, we 
should see an interaction between the two factors. Additionally, any differences 
could be driven by some subjects being more susceptible to false memories, 
some subjects being less susceptible to false memories, or a combination of the 
two. 
I compared subjects’ proportion correct scores based on their expectations 
about their own and their partner’s vision; these data are displayed on Figure 7.5. 
As the figure illustrates, subjects’ expectations about their own abilities 
interacted with their expectations about their partner’s abilities to determine how 
misled they were by their partner’s suggestions, F (1, 89) = 4.26, p = .04, f = 0.22. 
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Pairs who wore the same type of glasses as each other showed the typical 
misinformation effect, and were better at remembering nondiscussed details 
than discussed details. In other words, on the final test they incorrectly reported 
details that they were told about during the discussion, but never actually saw. 
These subjects were just as influenced by their partner’s suggestions whether 
they were in the both-degraded or the both-good group. However, when subject-
pairs wore different glasses these patterns were quite different. Specifically, 
subjects in the messenger-superior group were influenced by their partner’s 
suggestions, but subjects in the messenger-inferior group were not.  
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Figure 7.5. Proportion of correct responses for nondiscussed and discussed details by expectancy 
condition. Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Interestingly, regardless of whether the pairs wore the same or different 
glasses, subjects who wore moderate glasses were better at remembering 
nondiscussed details than subjects who wore optimal glasses, t (94) = 1.63, p = .05, 
Cohen’s d = 0.32. In other words, subjects who were told their vision was degraded 
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actually had better baseline memories of the critical details. Perhaps these 
people exerted more effort during the movie, thus boosting their performance. 
However, this advantage in memory accuracy did not translate to decreased false 
memories. 
In fact, subjects who wore moderate glasses did not experience any protection 
from false memories. As Figure 7.5 shows, subjects in the both-degraded group 
were only as accurate as their optimal counterparts—the both-good group—at 
remembering discussed details, t < 1, ns, and subjects in the messenger-superior 
group were actually worse than their optimal counterparts—the messenger-
inferior group—at remembering discussed details, t (46) = 2.82, p < .01, Cohen’s d 
= 0.84.  
Recall that the differences in false memories between the messenger-superior 
group and the messenger-inferior group might be driven by one group 
experiencing increased susceptibility to misinformation, the other group 
experiencing decreased susceptibility to misinformation, or a combination of the 
two. To investigate these possibilities I generated a grand mean of baseline 
susceptibility to misinformation; the grand mean was based on subject-pairs who 
wore the same glasses, collapsed across subjects in the both-degraded group and 
subjects in the both-good group. I examined whether the messenger-inferior and 
messenger-superior groups were more or less influenced by misinformation by 
comparing their accuracy on discussed details with the grand mean baseline 
measure. Subjects in the messenger-superior group were no worse at 
remembering discussed details than the baseline measure, suggesting that these 
subjects did not experience increased susceptibility to misinformation, M = .46, 
SD = .27; M = .51, SD = .35; t < 1, ns. However, subjects in the messenger-inferior 
group were significantly better at remembering discussed details than the 
baseline measure, suggesting that they experienced decreased susceptibility to 
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misinformation, M = .70, SD = .30; M = .51; SD = .35; t (68) = 2.15, p = .04, Cohen’s d 
= 0.58. In fact, as Figure 7.5 shows, there was no misinformation effect for these 
subjects: they were just as good at remembering nondiscussed and discussed 
details, providing evidence that they were not influenced by the messenger’s 
misleading suggestions at all, t < 1, ns. Put another way, subjects in the 
messenger-inferior group were protected from the influence of misleading 
suggestions. Instead of subjects in the messenger-superior group experiencing 
increased susceptibility to misinformation, the difference in false memories was 
actually driven by subjects in the messenger-inferior group who experienced 
decreased susceptibility to misinformation.  
However, recall that subjects who wore moderate glasses were better than 
subjects who wore optimal glasses at remembering nondiscussed details; in other 
words, subjects who wore moderate glasses had better baseline memories of the 
critical details. Perhaps subjects in the messenger-superior group were more 
susceptible to misinformation, but because the analysis did not take their 
superior baseline memories into account, this effect was hidden. Another way to 
examine susceptibility to misinformation is to compare the difference between 
subjects’ correct responses for nondiscussed details and their correct responses 
for discussed details; the bigger the difference between these two scores, the 
greater the influence of the misinformation. If subjects in the messenger-
superior group did experience increased susceptibility to misinformation, we 
should see bigger differences between their nondiscussed and discussed 
performance than we see for the other groups.  
To address this possibility, I calculated another grand mean based on subjects 
who wore the same glasses as each other, collapsing across the both-degraded 
and the both-good groups; this grand mean measured the difference between 
subjects’ accuracy for nondiscussed details and their accuracy for discussed 
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details. To examine whether subjects in the messenger-superior and messenger-
inferior groups had bigger or smaller difference scores than baseline, I 
compared each to the grand mean difference. In fact, there was a trend that 
subjects in the messenger-superior group had greater differences between their 
nondiscussed and discussed scores than the grand mean, supporting the idea that 
these subjects were more susceptible to misinformation, M = .40, SD = .33; M = .27, 
SD = .37; t (68) = 1.37, p = .09, Cohen’s d = 0.36. Additionally—consistent with the 
primary analysis—subjects in the messenger-inferior group had smaller 
differences between their nondiscussed and discussed performance than the 
grand mean, showing that they were less susceptible to misinformation, M = .04, 
SD = .31; M = .27, SD = .37; t (68) = 2.64, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.63. In sum, subjects in 
the messenger-inferior group were less influenced by misinformation, and 
subjects in the messenger-superior group were more influenced by 
misinformation, suggesting that both factors probably contributed to the 
differences in false memories between these groups.  
Taken as a whole, the results fit with the idea that people's judgments about 
the misinformation messenger—in this case their discussion partner—do not 
work in isolation. When subjects were told they had the same abilities as the 
messenger, they were equally misled by a messenger with apparently optimal 
ability and a messenger with apparently moderate ability. Yet, when subjects 
were told that their abilities were inferior to the messenger’s abilities they were 
more susceptible to the messenger's misleading suggestions, and when subjects 
were told that their abilities were superior to the messenger's abilities they were 
not susceptible to the messengers' suggestions at all. These results build on 
Gabbert et al. (2007) and Skagerberg and Wright (2008): subjects in the 
supposedly disadvantaged role were more susceptible to false memories, but 
subjects in the supposedly advantaged role were also protected from false 
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memories. Additionally, these differences were not by driven by subjects’ 
perceptions of themselves, or their perceptions of the messenger, but by the two 
in combination. 
Correcting for exposure to misinformation. One caveat with correcting for 
exposure to misinformation is that subjects in one condition were exposed to 
more misleading details than subjects in the other three conditions. Specifically, 
subjects in the messenger-superior group were exposed to 74 misleading details 
(out of a possible 96; 77%) whereas subjects in the other three groups were only 
exposed to between 57 and 61 misleading details (59% to 64%). This result is 
consistent with Gabbert et al.’s (2007) study, and suggests that—regardless of 
susceptibility to false memories —people who are seen as inferior might have a 
greater chance of being influenced by misinformation simply because they 
might come into contact with more bad information from other people who 
think they know better. Naturally, being exposed to more misinformation means 
that people have more opportunity to be misled; however, my calculations 
eliminated any contributing effects of exposure to misinformation. To account 
for this problem, I repeated the major analysis without correcting for exposure. 
In other words, I completed a second analysis, examining people's memories for 
the four critical details that were asked about during the discussion, regardless of 
whether they were exposed to misinformation when discussing those details.  
I found exactly the same pattern of results as those displayed in Figure 7.5; 
subjects’ expectations about their own abilities and about the messenger’s 
abilities affected their susceptibility to false memories, F (1, 92) = 5.20, p = .03, f = 
0.24. Additionally, follow up t-tests confirmed the same patterns of results. 
Subjects in the messenger-superior condition were just as accurate at 
remembering discussed details as the grand mean baseline measure—based on 
subjects in the both-degraded and both-good groups, M = .56, SD = .24; M = .64, SD 
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= .27; t (70) = 1.20, p = .24, but subjects in the messenger-inferior group were more 
accurate than the baseline measure, M = .80, SD = .21; M = .64, SD = .27; t (70) = 
2.55, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.61. Additionally, subjects in the messenger-inferior 
group were not only not misled by their partner’s suggestions, they were actually 
better at remembering discussed than nondiscussed details, providing more 
evidence that these subjects resisted the messenger’s suggestions, M = .80, SD = 
.21; M = .73, SD = .16; t (23) = 1.66, p = .05, Cohen’s d = 0.33.  
I next calculated the difference between subjects’ correct responses for 
nondiscussed details and their correct responses for discussed details. As before, I 
compared subjects in the messenger-inferior group, and subjects in the 
messenger-superior group to the grand mean difference score, to see if they were 
any more or less susceptible to misinformation than the baseline measure. The 
results were consistent with the previous findings. Specifically, subjects in the 
messenger-superior group had bigger difference scores than the grand mean, 
suggesting that they experienced increased susceptibility to misinformation, M = 
.28, SD = .35; M = .15, SD = .33; t (70) = 1.60, p = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.38, and subjects in 
the messenger-inferior group had smaller difference scores than the grand 
mean, suggesting that they experienced decreased susceptibility to 
misinformation, M = -.07, SD = .21; M = .15, SD = .33; t (70) = 2.91, p < .01, Cohen’s d 
= 0.70. In summary, whether or not exposure to misinformation was accounted 
for, the results were very similar. Subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation 
depended on their expectations of themselves and their expectations of the 
misinformation messenger. 
Following the previous experiments, I next conducted an item-analysis to 
examine the contribution of each critical detail when acting as a nondiscussed 
and discussed detail. These data are displayed in Figure 7.6. As the figure 
illustrates, and consistent with the previous experiments, subjects remembered 
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each critical detail better when they had not discussed it, t (7) = 8.81, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 3.11.  
 
Figure 7.6. Proportion of correct nondiscussed and discussed responses for each critical detail. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
As in the previous experiments, I next focused on subjects who were exposed 
to at least two pieces of misinformation. Of these 83 subjects, 10 (12%) were 
misled by everything their partner told them, 14 (17%) were not misled by 
anything their partner told them, and the remaining 59 (71%) were misled about 
some details but not others. As in Experiment 5, I grouped subjects based on 
their expectations of their own and their partner’s abilities (both-degraded; both-
good; messenger-superior; messenger-inferior) according to whether they were 
never misled, sometimes misled, or always misled; these data appear in Table 7.1.  
What is most interesting about this table is the different ways that subjects 
responded. Although the manipulation largely protected subjects in the 
messenger-inferior group from being misled, there was still variation within the 
conditions. For instance, one subject in the messenger-inferior group was still 
misled by all of the messenger’s suggestions. Additionally, two subjects in the 
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messenger-superior group were never misled by any of the messenger’s 
suggestions. In short, these results suggest that although people’s judgments 
about their own abilities and about the misinformation messenger’s abilities are 
important in determining their susceptibility to false memories, there are other 
factors at play as well. These factors might include judgments that subjects made 
about each other beyond the manipulation, features of the interaction that I did 
not manipulate or measure, and even personality differences, such as how 
confident or extraverted people are (Asch, 1952; 1953; 1966). 
 
 
Table 7.1 
Proportion of subjects who—when exposed to at least two misleading details— were never, 
sometimes, and always misled, by expectancy condition 
 PARTNER’S GLASSES 
 Same Different 
SUBJECT’S GLASSES 
 
Moderate 
(n = 20)  
Both   
Degraded  
Optimal 
(n = 21) 
Both     
Good  
Moderate 
(n = 23)  
Messenger 
Superior  
Optimal 
(n =19) 
Messenger 
Inferior  
Never Misled .10 (2) .24 (5) .09 (2) .26 (5) 
Sometimes Misled .80 (16) .52 (11) .82 (19) .69 (13) 
Always Misled .10 (2) .24 (5) .09 (2) .05 (1) 
 
 
One puzzling result is that subjects who were told that they had degraded 
vision were actually better at remembering nondiscussed details, yet they were 
not protected from being misled. Given that their baseline memories were 
superior, these subjects should have been better able to notice the discrepancies 
between their own memories and the misleading suggestions, and thus better 
able to resist the influence of those suggestions (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 
1986). Even though these subjects’ memories were better, perhaps their subjective 
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experiences of their memories were different, and somehow caused them to be 
influenced by—rather than protected from—their partner’s misleading 
suggestions. To address this possibility, I next examined subjects’ confidence in 
their responses. 
Confidence 
I first calculated how confident subjects were in their responses to 
nondiscussed and discussed details, and compared these ratings based on 
subjects’ expectations about their own and their partner’s vision; these data are 
displayed in Figure 7.7. As the figure illustrates, subject-pairs who wore the same 
glasses as each other—the both-degraded and both-good groups—were equally 
confident in their memories of discussed and nondiscussed details, but subject-
pairs who wore different glasses—the messenger-superior and messenger-
inferior groups—were more confident in their memories of nondiscussed details 
than their memories of discussed details, F (1, 89) = 4.72, p = .03, f = 0.23. This 
result suggests that pairs who wore different glasses may not have trusted each 
other: when they discussed critical details, their confidence dropped. 
Additionally subjects who wore optimal glasses tended to be more confident 
in all their memories than subjects who wore moderate glasses, F (1, 89) = 3.33, p 
= .07, f = 0.10. As Figure 7.7 shows, this effect was driven by subjects-pairs who 
wore different glasses. Follow up t-tests showed that subjects in the messenger-
superior group tended to be less confident than subjects in the messenger-
inferior group in their responses to both nondiscussed details, t (46) = 2.08, p = 
.04, Cohen’s d = 0.60, and discussed details, t (44) = 1.72, p = .09, Cohen’s d = 1.46. 
These results suggest a possible mechanism by which the people who had better 
memories ended up being more misled: even though their memories were 
better, subjects in the messenger-superior group had less confidence in their 
memories, and so were more susceptible to the influence of the messenger’s 
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suggestions. In short, having a good memory might not be sufficient to protect 
people from being misled.  
 
 
Both 
Degraded  
Both     
Good  
Messenger 
Superior  
Messenger 
Inferior  
Same Glasses Different Glasses 
Figure 7.7. Mean confidence for nondiscussed and discussed details by expectancy condition. 
Error bars depict standard errors of the means. 
 
I next compared subjects’ confidence in their correct and incorrect responses; 
these data appear in Figure 7.8. As the figure illustrates, across conditions, 
subjects were more confident in their true memories than their false memories, 
F (1, 68) = 40.09, p < .01, f = 0.77. Additionally, there was a trend that subjects who 
wore different glasses—the messenger-superior and messenger-inferior groups—
were less confident in their memories than subjects who wore the same glasses—
the both degraded and both-good groups—F (1, 68) = 3.20, p = .08, f = 0.18.  
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Both 
Degraded  
Both     
Good  
Messenger 
Superior  
Messenger 
Inferior  
Same Glasses Different Glasses 
Figure 7.8. Mean confidence for correct responses on nondiscussed details (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on discussed details (false memories) by expectancy condition. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the means. 
 
Follow-up t-tests confirmed that this effect was driven by subject-pairs who 
wore different glasses being less confident when they were misled. Subjects who 
wore different glasses and subjects who wore the same glasses were just as 
confident in their correct responses on nondiscussed details, t (70) = 1.10, p = .27, 
but subjects who wore different glasses were less confident in their incorrect 
responses on discussed details, t (70) = 1.91, p = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.44. Taken 
together, these results suggest that subjects who were told their abilities were 
different from the misinformation messenger’s were not very trusting of what 
the messenger said, regardless of whether they expected the messenger to be 
inferior or superior. Additionally, subjects in the messenger-superior group were 
less confident in their correct memories than subjects in the messenger-inferior 
group, providing more evidence for the mechanism by which subjects who had 
superior memories were more misled than their discussion partners with inferior 
memories, t (46) = 2.67, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.77.  
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Gauging subjects’ expectations. One limitation to the results reported so far is 
that I did not consider what subjects actually thought of the misinformation 
messenger or of themselves. Another way to look at how people's expectations 
affect their susceptibility to false memories is to examine their ratings on the 
manipulation checks, and see how those ratings relate to memory performance. I 
next conducted a correlation analysis between subjects’ mean self-partner 
comparison scores and their proportion correct scores for discussed details. The 
better that subjects rated themselves compared to the misinformation 
messenger, the more accurate they were at remembering discussed details, r = 
.38, p < .01. This result provides more evidence that perceptions of credibility 
might work to both increase and decrease people's susceptibility to false 
memories: people who thought the messenger was less credible were less misled 
and people who thought the messenger was more credible were more misled. 
One limitation to this analysis is that subjects completed the manipulation check 
at the end of the study; instead of subjects being influenced to the extent they 
thought their partner was credible, they might have rated their partner as 
credible to the extent that they were influenced.  
Features of the Discussion 
As in the previous experiments, I next examined the features of subjects’ 
discussions. Once again, there were very few instances where one subject 
disputed the other and the other did not reciprocate (18 out of a possible 253; 7%); 
as in the previous experiments, I examined whether the subject disputed what 
his or her partner said. I grouped subjects according to what they were told about 
their own and their partner’s abilities, and for each of the 253 instances that 
subjects were exposed to misinformation, I examined the proportion of instances 
that each discussion feature occurred, and the proportion of times that subjects 
went on to be misled; these data appear in Table 7.2. 
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As Table 7.2 illustrates, the discussion features occurred at similar rates across 
three of the four groups; however, for the fourth group—the messenger-inferior 
group—these rates were different. As the first two lines of Table 7.2 show, and 
consistent with the previous experiments, people were misled more often when 
they used the misinformation as their answer in the discussion. However, as 
Table 7.2 illustrates, subjects in the messenger-inferior group used the 
misinformation as their discussion answer less often than subjects in the other 
three groups, suggesting that they resisted the messenger’s suggestions. Like the 
previous experiments, subjects occasionally answered with an alternative during 
the discussion, but changed their answer to the misinformation at test; this 
behaviour was rare across all four groups. 
Table 7.2 also shows that subjects were misled less often when they disputed 
their partner’s suggestions. Interestingly, subjects in the messenger-inferior 
group disputed their partners more often than subjects in any other group, again 
supporting the idea that they resisted the misinformation messenger’s 
suggestions. Additionally, when subjects did dispute their partners, subjects in 
the messenger-superior group were misled more often than subjects in the other 
three groups, suggesting that even though these subjects initially disagreed they 
were eventually persuaded by the apparently superior misinformation 
messenger. 
When subjects were exposed to misinformation, they spoke first less often, 
and, when they did speak first, they were misled less often. However, this pattern 
was also slightly different for the messenger-inferior group. Although these 
subjects were misled less often when they spoke first, they spoke first more often 
than subjects in the other three groups. Additionally, when they did speak 
second, subjects in the messenger-inferior group were misled less often than 
subjects in the other groups. 
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Table 7.2 
Proportion discussion feature occurrence and subsequent proportion of subjects misled for 253 instances that subjects were exposed to misinformation 
 PARTNER’S GLASSES 
 Same  Different 
SUBJECT’S GLASSES Moderate 
(n = 61 cases) 
Both Degraded 
Optimal 
(n = 61 cases) 
Both Good 
Moderate 
(n = 74 cases) 
Messenger Superior 
Optimal 
(n = 57 cases) 
Messenger Inferior 
Discussion Features Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
 (n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Feature 
(n cases) 
Misled 
(n cases) 
Answer         
Misinformation .57 (35) .89 (31) .54 (33) .82 (27) .61 (45) .80 (36) .28 (16) .88 (14) 
Alternative .43 (26) .04 (1) .46 (28) .07 (2) .39 (29) .10 (3) .72 (41) .12 (5) 
Dispute          
Dispute .39 (24) .08 (2) .41 (25) .04 (1) .47 (35) .23 (8) .67 (38) .16 (6) 
No Dispute .61 (37) .81 (30) .59 (36) .78 (28) .53 (39) .79 (31) .33 (19) .68 (13) 
Speaking Order         
Spoke First .33 (20) .30 (6) .33 (20) .20 (4) .27 (20) .35 (7) .47 (27) .26 (7) 
Spoke Second .67 (41) .63 (26) .67 (41) .61 (25) .73 (54) .59 (32) .53 (30) .40 (12) 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE  .52 (32)  .48 (29)  .53 (39)  .33 (19) 
Note. Proportion Correct = 1 – Proportion Misled. For each condition (n cases Correct = total n cases – n cases Misled). 
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Finally, based on proportions, subjects in the messenger-inferior group were 
misled less often than subjects in the other three groups. Additionally, based on 
the actual instances that subjects were misled, subjects in the messenger-superior 
group were misled more often than the other three groups. These subjects were 
exposed to more misleading details than any other group; this result suggests 
that these subjects fell prey to their increased opportunity to be misled. 
In sum, subjects’ expectations about themselves and about the misinformation 
messenger affected both their behaviour during a social interaction and their 
susceptibility to misinformation. Subjects who were told they were superior 
mentioned misinformation to their partner more often, relied on their partner’s 
suggestions less often, and disputed what their partner said more often. Subjects 
who were told they were equal to the misinformation messenger exhibited very 
similar patterns of discussion behaviour and memory responses, regardless of 
whether their expectations were high or low. Subjects who were told they were 
inferior were misled more often because they were exposed to more misleading 
suggestions. Taken together, the results provide more evidence that people’s 
expectations about themselves work in combination with their expectations 
about their discussion partners to determine their susceptibility to false 
memories. 
Predicting False Memories 
I next examined if any discussion features predicted whether subjects would 
be misled on a given detail. I conducted the same analyses as Experiment 5. 
Consistent with Experiment 5, neither subjects’ expectations of their own abilities 
nor their expectations of their partner’s abilities predicting whether they were 
misled in either regression. 
All-items regression. When I followed Gabbert et al.’s (2006) approach and 
included all 384 instances that subjects were asked to discuss a critical detail, 
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regardless of whether they were exposed to misinformation, three factors 
predicted whether subjects were misled. First, the odds ratio showed that subjects 
who used the misinformation as their discussion answer were 28 times more 
likely to be misled than those who did not, χ2 (1, N = 384) = 96.33, p < .01. Second, 
subjects who disputed what their partner said were nearly three times less likely 
to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 384) = 7.51, p < .01. Finally, consistent with Gabbert et al., 
subjects who spoke first during the discussion of a critical detail were nearly four 
times less likely to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 384) = 15.58, p < .01. 
Exposure-only regression. When I addressed Lindsay’s (2007) concerns by 
including only the 253 instances where subjects were exposed to misinformation, 
the results were very similar. First, subjects who used the misinformation as their 
discussion answer were 20 times more likely to be misled than those who did not, 
χ2 (1, N = 253) = 42.33, p < .01. Second, subjects who disputed their partners 
suggestions were four times less likely to be misled, χ2 (1, N = 253) = 9.59, p < .01. 
Finally, there was a trend that subjects who spoke first were only half as likely to 
be misled as those who did not, χ2 (1, N = 253) = 3.95, p = .05. In other words, these 
results fit with those of Experiment 4, and suggest that speaking order may play 
some role in susceptibility to false memories over and above exposure to 
misinformation. However, speaking first was still a better predictor of being 
misled when exposure to misinformation was not considered, thus suggesting 
that it’s main influence is in determining whether people will be exposed to 
misleading suggestions. 
Predicting-exposure regression. Finally, I conducted another nominal logistic 
regression to see if any features of the discussion predicted whether subjects 
would be exposed to misinformation during the discussion of a given detail. 
Consistent with the previous experiments, subjects who disputed their partner’s 
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suggestions were 8 times more likely to be exposed to misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 
384) = 35.57, p < .01; subjects who spoke first were 6 times less likely to be exposed 
to misinformation, χ2 (1, N = 384) = 26.39, p < .01; and there was an interaction 
between the two factors, subjects who disputed what their partner said were only 
half as likely to be exposed to misinformation if they spoke first, than if they 
spoke second, χ2 (1, N = 384) = 4.27, p = .04. 
Summary 
In sum, people's expectations about themselves and about other people can 
affect their susceptibility to misleading suggestions made during a conversation. 
Specifically, these results build on previous research by showing that it is not 
only people's perceptions of the misinformation messenger that determine their 
susceptibility to misleading suggestions, but also their perceptions of themselves 
(for example Ceci et al., 1987; Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al., 
2005; Vornik et al., 2003). In this study, the influence of ostensibly able and not-
so-able misinformation messengers depended on people's expectations about 
their own abilities: when people expected to have similar abilities to the 
messenger, they were equally influenced by the messenger's suggestions 
regardless of whether those expected abilities were good or not-so-good. Yet 
when the messenger was apparently superior, people were more influenced, and 
when the messenger was apparently inferior, people were not influenced. Even 
the most credible and knowledgeable misinformation messenger may not 
influence people’s memories if those people perceive their own abilities to be 
better. 
Consistent with earlier research, people who were told they were at a 
disadvantage were more misled than people who were told they were at an 
advantage (Gabbert et al., 2007; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Yet my experiment 
also builds on the previous findings by showing that this difference is caused in 
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part by the apparently advantaged people being protected from false memories, 
not simply by the apparently disadvantaged people being more susceptible to 
false memories.  
Additionally, the results show that people’s expectations about themselves and 
about other people can affect their behaviour during a conversation. People who 
were told they were superior to their discussion partner behaved quite differently 
to people who were told they were inferior and people who were told they were 
the same. For instance, subjects who were told they were better conveyed more 
misleading suggestions than any other group. Perhaps in real life, people who 
see themselves as more credible and knowledgeable than others might pass on 
more information than vice versa. As a result, the people they talk to might be 
more likely to experience false memories simply because they have more 
opportunity for their memory to be distorted. Of course, to the extent that the 
new information passed on is accurate, this mechanism may be beneficial, and 
may help people who know less to know and remember more. Yet, these results 
suggest that this helpful mechanism might become unhelpful when the 
information conveyed is bad. One additional problem is that people who believe 
they are very knowledgeable and credible may not necessarily be either 
knowledgeable or credible (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger & Kruger, 2003; Kruger 
& Dunning, 1999). 
In fact, in this study people who expected to have degraded vision actually 
remembered critical details better than their counterparts who expected to have 
optimal vision. Yet, despite having better memories, these people were less 
confident in their memories; the people with worse memories were more 
confident. In short, people's perceptions about their own abilities, and their 
perceptions about other's abilities can be misguided. Unfortunately these 
perceptions can affect not only people’s baseline memory accuracy but also their 
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susceptibility to misleading suggestions. Future research might investigate how 
to create the ideal balance between encouraging people to perform at their 
optimum, while also encouraging them to be confident in their performance; 
such research might be useful for educational settings and work places. 
These results also build on cognitive-enhancing and memory-dampening 
placebo research by showing that it is not necessary for people to ingest an inert 
substance to change their expectations about their memory ability and their 
susceptibility to false memories (Assefi & Garry, 2003; Clifasefi et al., 2007; 
Parker et al., 2008). Simply changing the dynamics of a social interaction and 
telling people that they had the same or different abilities as their discussion 
partner led people to be more or less influenced by their partner's misleading 
suggestions.  
Finally, other research shows that people are more influenced by 
misinformation conveyed in a social interaction than misinformation conveyed 
in a non-social way, such as through a written narrative (Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Paterson & Kemp, 2006b). The results of this study suggest that the influence of 
misinformation conveyed in a social interaction might depend on factors in that 
social interaction. In some situations—such as those in Gabbert et al.’s (2004) and 
Paterson and Kemp’s (2006b) studies—socially conveyed information may be 
more persuasive, but in other situations—such as when people are very sure of 
their own abilities or very confident in their own memories—it may not be 
persuasive at all.
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
There were two overarching questions in this thesis. First, would people 
influence each other's memories of a shared experience when they discussed it? 
Second, would different social dynamics in the discussion affect how much they 
influenced each other’s memories?  
To address these questions I used the MORI technique to show pairs of people 
slightly different movies on the same screen at the same time. As a result, pairs 
of people shared an experience but each had systematic differences in their 
memories of the experience, and the effect of those differences could be tracked 
through discussion. 
Overview of Key Results  
Across nine experiments, there were three major findings. First, I found that 
the MORI technique was an effective means to show people different movies 
without them realising they each saw something different. When people watched 
a movie via the MORI technique, they could see and remember the details of the 
movie (Experiments 1A and 1B) and they did not notice or implicitly remember 
details from the alternate (blocked) movie version (Experiments 3A and 3B). 
Second, I found that people who shared an experience influenced each other's 
memories of that experience. In other words, people falsely remembered details 
from their partner’s version of the event, even though those details contradicted 
what they personally saw. Additionally, I generalised this pattern of results 
across two different events and stimulus sets (Experiments 2A, 2B, 4, 5 and 6). 
Finally—consistent with the SMF—the specific social dynamics of people's 
discussions led them to be both more and less influenced by each other's 
suggestions (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008). Put another way, the corrupting 
influence of the discussion depended on social factors in the interaction. 
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Specifically, people were more likely to remember false details that their 
romantic partner suggested than false details that a stranger suggested 
(Experiment 4), and telling people that their counterpart’s vision was better or 
worse than their own led them to be more or less influenced by their 
counterpart’s false suggestions (Experiment 6). 
Source Monitoring Framework 
When people make source monitoring decisions they consider their social 
evaluations about the person who conveyed the information (Johnson et al., 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008). Across my five discussion experiments, subjects were influenced 
by their partner's misleading suggestions, a finding that suggests people 
generally evaluate others with whom they have shared experiences as credible 
sources of information about those experiences. 
However, although subjects were generally misled by their partner's 
suggestions, the social dynamics of the conversation played a role. Subjects’ 
relationship with the misinformation messenger, and their expectations of their 
own abilities and the messenger's abilities, led them to be both more and less 
influenced by the messenger's suggestions. In short, people do not always see 
others with whom they have shared experiences as a valuable source of 
information about those experiences; sometimes these people might be seen as 
valuable sources, yet other times they might be seen as worthless. People were 
the most misled by people they knew and trusted, yet completely resisted the 
suggestions when they afforded the messenger little credit. In real life, these 
patterns might be adaptive: known and trusted others probably convey valuable 
information, whereas people with inferior abilities probably do not.  
Finally, across the five discussion experiments, 64% of subjects who were 
exposed to two or more misleading details were influenced by some of their 
partner's suggestions but were not influenced by others (218 0f 339 people). This 
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result fits with the idea that rather than making a blanket assessment of the 
misinformation messenger and all the information conveyed, subjects probably 
made their source monitoring decisions based on different dimensions, and 
assigned different weights to these dimensions in each decision (Johnson et al., 
1988; Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). 
When does the Influence Occur? 
Although subjects’ responses on the independent test can be explained as 
source monitoring errors, it is not clear when the influence or the errors actually 
occurred. Perhaps subjects were influenced during the discussion, and their 
responses at test simply reflected the earlier errors. Alternatively, subjects might 
have absorbed information throughout the experiment, and made errors only as 
they tried to answer the relevant discussion questions. In fact, there are a number 
of different pathways that might have led subjects to respond with the 
misinformation on the test.  
For instance, perhaps during the discussion, while trying to figure out where 
Chad put the wallet, Mollie remembered seeing Chad stand beside the bench. 
Because Mollie's memories were activated when her partner (Jack) suggested 
that Chad stole the wallet, Mollie might have incorporated the new information 
into her memory, thus affecting her later memory responses (Meade & Roediger, 
2002; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). Another possibility is that details from the 
discussion might work their way into Mollie’s memory because she processed 
them at a “deeper level” than the movie details (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & 
Tulving, 1975). During the movie Mollie would have to pay attention to a large 
number of details, but during the discussion she might spend more time and 
effort thinking about a few specific details, thus she might encode those details—
the misleading suggestions—more deeply. As a result those details might be 
more accessible and feel qualitatively different when she completes the final 
 166 
memory test, leading her to report the misinformation instead of what she saw 
(Kronlund & Whittlesea, 2005). Alternatively, at the test, Mollie might have 
remembered some details consistent with Chad stealing a wallet, and some 
details consistent with Chad looking at a wallet but putting it back. When she 
tried to figure out what Chad actually did in the movie, she might have relied on 
features of her memories as well as her beliefs and knowledge to do source 
monitoring and decide which details came from the movie. If Mollie did make 
an error on the test, it could be because she falsely remembered a misleading 
detail, or because she falsely believed the detail was correct. 
If Mollie did falsely remember a detail from Jack's version of the movie she 
might have visualised that detail and then later confused the image with reality, 
incorrectly deciding that she had seen something she only thought and heard 
about. Alternatively, Mollie might have simply confused what she heard Jack say 
with what she saw. Another possibility is that Mollie might have capitulated to 
Jack's suggestion, perhaps because she made a strategic decision that Jack's 
memory was correct. These types of errors might occur during the discussion or 
during the test. One final possibility is that Mollie might have capitulated to 
Jack's suggestion during the discussion—not because she thought he was 
accurate, but because she felt pressured to do so—and then later she confused 
what she agreed to in conversation with what she saw. In sum, there are a 
number of ways that subjects might come to answer with the misinformation at 
test; we do not know whether the influence occurs during the discussion or 
during the test. My results provide some evidence for both possibilities. 
Discussion. Across the five discussion experiments, the majority of the time 
that subjects used the misinformation as their discussion answer they 
subsequently used it as an answer on the independent test (439 of 544 instances; 
weighted mean = 81%). In fact, when subjects answered with the misinformation 
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during the discussion they were up to 87 times more likely to be misled on the 
final test. These results suggest that subjects were influenced by the suggestions 
during the discussion, and that influence persisted until the final test.  
Test. But, subjects’ discussion answers did not always match their independent 
test responses. Some subjects did not answer with the misinformation during 
discussion, but went on to use it as their answer at test, suggesting that they were 
influenced after—rather than during—the discussion. Additionally, some of the 
time that subjects answered with the misinformation during discussion, they 
subsequently reverted to the correct answer at test (105 of 544 instances; weighted 
mean = 19%) suggesting that they only agreed with their partner in the 
discussion to be polite or to avoid arguing. In short, misinformation did not work 
its way into subjects’ independent reports simply because they used it as a 
discussion answer, and it still worked its way into their independent reports even 
when they did not use it as a discussion answer. Perhaps the influence occurred 
during both the discussion and the test.  
Of course, I do not know whether subjects actually remembered the false 
details they reported, or whether they simply reported those details because they 
believed them to be accurate. Although I told subjects that I was testing their 
memory for the movie, some may have reported their partner's suggestions even 
though they had no memory of those details. 
Future research might attempt to distinguish whether people actually 
remember or simply believe that the misinformation is correct. For instance, 
future research might use a source monitoring test to examine whether subjects 
remember seeing the false details that their partner suggested. To isolate where 
the influence occurs, future research could combine the basic elements of my 
studies with Lindsay's (1990) logic of opposition study. Specifically, subject-pairs 
could be warned just before the test that they watched different movies, and that 
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any information their partner suggested was wrong. If subjects still reported 
misinformation on the test it would show that they remembered that 
information, and that their memories were influenced before the test. 
Considered as a whole, these data provide evidence that people can be 
influenced by misleading suggestions conveyed in a conversation about a shared 
experience, and that the specific social dynamics of the conversation can lead 
people to be either more or less influenced by those suggestions. However, 
questions about when people are influenced and why they are influenced 
remain. 
Remembering in Groups 
Some of the broader literature on group behaviour provides insight as to why 
subjects might be influenced by their partner's suggestions.  
Informational and Normative Influences 
As described in Chapter 1, social pressure can lead people to provide responses 
that contradict their perceptions (Asch, 1952; 1953; 1966). When people provide 
false responses, sometimes they believe that the responses are correct 
(informational influence) and other times they simply capitulate because of the 
social pressure of the situation (normative influence; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  
Subjects in my studies appeared to demonstrate both informational and 
normative influence. Recall that 81% of the time that people used the 
misinformation as their discussion answer, they subsequently used that answer 
on the independent test, a finding suggesting that they capitulated to their 
partner’s suggestion because they believed the information was correct. These 
people might have strategically decided that their partner's answer was accurate, 
or they might have come to falsely remember seeing the details their partner 
suggested. The remaining 19% of the time that subjects used the misinformation 
as their discussion answer, they reverted to the correct answer from their own 
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version on the test, a finding suggesting that they capitulated to their partner’s 
suggestion only because of the social pressure of the situation. In short, the 
social context of the discussion might have led subjects to believe their partner’s 
responses were accurate, or might have pressured them not to challenge their 
partner’s suggestions.  
One caveat is that I did not set out to measure these two influences, so my 
results provide only a rough measure. Specifically, in my experiments subjects 
always provided a public answer during the discussion, so it is impossible to 
know whether their discussion responses were driven by the pressure to 
capitulate, or by a genuine belief that their partner’s suggestions were correct. 
When subjects agreed with their partner during the discussion and subsequently 
conformed on test, I deemed their responses to demonstrate informational 
influence. Perhaps in some of these instances, subjects initially agreed due to 
social pressure, and then made a source monitoring error at test—confusing 
what they agreed to with what they believed to be the answer. In other words, 
some instances that I deemed to be informational influence might have been 
driven by normative influence. Likewise, when subjects agreed with their partner 
during the discussion but reverted to their own answer on the test, I deemed 
their responses to demonstrate normative influence. Yet some subjects may have 
actually believed their partner during the discussion, and later made a source 
monitoring error in the other direction, answering with the correct information 
on the test instead of what their partner told them. Future research could 
examine the role of these influences in subjects’ discussion responses by 
comparing discussion responses made privately and publicly. Additionally, 
future research might examine how each influence contributes to false 
memories by comparing independent test responses that follow private and 
public discussion responses.  
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Collaborative Inhibition 
Instead of being influenced by social pressure, another possibility is that the 
experience of remembering with another person affected what subjects 
remembered and reported. People who remember in groups remember less than 
they would if each member remembered individually and the members' 
memories were pooled (for example see Andersson & Ronnberg, 1997; Meudell, 
Hitch & Kirby, 1992; Takahashi & Saito, 2004; Weldon, 2001; Weldon & Bellinger, 
1997). This finding is known as collaborative inhibition, and has a variety of 
social and cognitive explanations (Weldon & Bellinger, 1997).  
One explanation is social loafing (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979); people 
may remember less in a group setting because they can rely on others to do the 
work; as a result they might not put in much effort to search their own 
memories (Weldon & Bellinger, 1997; Weldon, Blair & Huebsch, 2000). 
Alternatively, perhaps people do not convey everything they remember because 
they are worried about looking bad—this explanation overlaps with normative 
influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Stasser, 1999). Another possibility is that the 
social interaction itself makes it more difficult for people to retrieve relevant 
information; this kind of disruption could occur in at least two ways. First, it 
might be that each person’s ability to remember is actually disrupted by being 
exposed to what other people remember. Specifically, when people hear 
someone else suggest an answer, it might disrupt their own retrieval strategies, 
making it difficult for them to recall what they actually saw (for example see 
Finlay, Hitch, & Meudell, 2000; Basden, Basden, Brynor, & Thomas, 1997; Wright 
& Klumpp, 2004). A second possibility is that the act of communicating might 
work to deplete people’s cognitive resources (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). As 
a result, the communicators will have fewer resources available to discern 
whether suggested information is correct or to find an alternative answer, 
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perhaps leading them to agree with their partner’s suggestions.   
Whether socially or cognitively driven, collaborative inhibition might explain 
why subjects in my experiments did not always expose each other to the 
misinformation, and why they were influenced by each other's suggestions. 
Across the five discussion studies, when critical details acted as nondiscussed 
details, subjects remembered the correct detail from their version of the event 
78% of the time (on the independent test; 1241 of 1600 instances). However, when 
critical details acted as discussed details, subjects mentioned the correct detail 
from their version of the event—the misinformation—only 64% of the time 
(during the discussion; 1030 of 1600 instances). Taken together, these results 
suggest that subjects could remember the critical information, but did not 
always convey it in the discussion. Collaborative inhibition might lead subjects to 
be less likely to mention misinformation, and thus more likely to answer with 
their partner’s misleading suggestions—at least during the discussion.  
However, in my experiments, people were not influenced as soon as a false 
detail was suggested; instead, people often disputed their partner's suggestions. 
Across the five experiments, half of the time that people were exposed to 
misinformation they disputed it (517 out of 1030 instances). Additionally, 17% of 
the time, subjects who disputed their partner’s suggestions subsequently 
answered with the misinformation on the final test, showing that they were 
influenced, but not as a result of inhibition during the discussion. In sum, 
collaborative inhibition cannot fully explain why people were influenced by their 
partner's suggestions. 
Expertise and Group Remembering 
One factor that might play a role in determining whether subjects will 
mention misinformation to their discussion partner—and whether they will 
dispute their partner’s misleading suggestions—is their perceptions of expertise. 
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When remembering in groups, people generally talk about information that 
other members already know, rather than new or unique information (Larson, 
Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Stasser, 
Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Wittenbaum, 1998). This 
behaviour is especially true of members who have little experience on the task at 
hand; people who have previous experience on a given task are just as likely to 
mention unique and shared information (Wittenbaum, 1998). Additionally, when 
expert roles are assigned or are made known to group members, or when group 
members already know each other—and each other's areas of expertise—more 
unique information is mentioned during discussion (Stewart & Stasser, 1995; 
Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995).  
Consistent with the social explanations of collaborative inhibition and 
normative influence, these findings suggest that group members might be 
worried about looking bad if they mention information that is new to other 
group members, especially if they are worried about being wrong or challenging 
other members’ memories, and especially if they see other people as more expert 
than themselves (Stasser, 1999).  
In my studies, each member of a subject-pair had unique memories of the 
critical details. If Jack mentioned a misleading detail during the discussion, 
Mollie would have to challenge Jack’s suggestion to mention the unique—
misleading—detail from her version. If Mollie judged herself to be non-expert or 
was reluctant to open herself up to criticism or rejection she might have decided 
not to mention the opposing detail. In fact, the results of Experiment 6 suggest 
that subjects’ perceptions of expertise did play some role in exposure to 
misleading suggestions. Subjects in the messenger-inferior group—those who 
saw themselves as the expert in the interaction—conveyed more unique 
information (misleading suggestions) and disputed their partner's suggestions 
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more often than any other group. These results provide more evidence that 
social pressure might have led subjects not to mention the misinformation, and 
to use their partner’s suggestion as their discussion answer. Additionally, the 
results also suggest that the social pressure of a situation might depend on 
people’s perceptions of expertise within that situation. 
Transactive Memory Systems 
Subjects’ judgments about expertise affected not only how much 
misinformation they conveyed and how much misinformation they were 
exposed to, but also how influenced they were by misinformation. These results 
fit with the literature on Transactive Memory Systems (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et 
al., 1985). Specifically, consistent with transactive memory theory, my results 
demonstrated that subjects relied on other people’s memories to supplement 
their own memories, that subject-pairs who were in romantic relationships—
presumably with established transactive memory systems—were more likely to 
rely on each other's memories than subject-pairs who were not in relationships, 
and that subjects’ perceptions of each other's abilities affected how much they 
relied on each other's memories.  
Transactive memory literature suggests that people rely on each other within 
different domains of expertise; instead of one person always relying on the other, 
each person benefits from the other’s expertise (Hollingshead, 1998b; 
Hollingshead, 2000; Stephenson et al., 1991; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985). 
Perhaps subject-pairs in romantic relationships were more misled than other 
subjects because they knew who would be more expert at remembering each 
critical detail, and were comfortable relying on the expert’s suggestion. 
Although I examined only global expertise judgments—where each person was 
seen as better or worse in general—there was some evidence that people did 
make judgments about expertise in different domains to decide whose memories 
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were the most reliable (for examples, see Chapter 5). Future research might 
examine whether judgments about domain-specific expertise affect false 
memories. People with expertise in different areas—or people who believe they 
have expertise in different areas—might be more or less susceptible to influence 
in those and other areas.  
Finally, my findings build on the previous research by suggesting that 
transactive memory systems may not always be beneficial; although relying on 
each other’s memories gives people an opportunity to increase they amount they 
remember, when someone conveys false information, they may come to 
remember that false information too.  
Implications  
Although my research does not tell us the precise mechanisms driving false 
memories, it has important theoretical, methodological and practical 
implications. 
Source Monitoring Framework 
First, these findings help us to understand the role of social features in the 
SMF. Although it is widely accepted in the SMF that people’s appraisals about the 
messenger affect their source monitoring decisions (for example see Cook et al., 
2003; Hicks & Cockman, 2003; Holtgraves et al., 1989; Johnson et al. 1993; Lindsay, 
2008; Mather et al., 1999), very little research has investigated how these social 
evaluations might operate in actual social interactions. To examine how people’s 
evaluations of their conversational partners affect their source monitoring 
decisions, I first established that people’s memories were influenced by new 
information conveyed in a conversation about a shared experience. Next, to see 
what role different social judgments played in these source errors, I varied the 
nature of the pairs—comparing people who knew and trusted each other with 
those that did not—and I varied people’s perceptions of their own and each 
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other’s abilities. Both of these factors affected people’s susceptibility to false 
memories. Of particular interest was the finding that people’s perceptions of the 
source were only important in relation to their perceptions of themselves. That 
is, people were no more or less influenced by a supposedly good or a supposedly 
bad source when they were told they had the same abilities as the source; yet, 
when people were told their abilities were better than the source they were less 
influenced, and when they were told they were worse then the source they were 
more influenced. This result suggests that to fully understand how social 
appraisals affect source monitoring, social appraisals cannot be examined in 
isolation. For instance, telling people information is provided by a credible or 
non-credible source neglects the important aspect of how those people perceive 
themselves in relation to the source. 
Interestingly the same factors that influenced source monitoring (subjects’ 
test responses) also influenced social capitulation (subjects’ discussion responses). 
For instance, people in romantic relationships appeared not to demonstrate 
normative influence at all—they never went along with their partner only to be 
polite in the discussion, or if they did, they maintained their prior commitment 
in the independent test. Additionally, people who were told they were superior to 
their partners capitulated to their partners’ suggestions less often—and disputed 
their partners more often—than subjects in the other groups. Finally, subjects 
who were told they were inferior to their partners capitulated to their partner’s 
suggestions most often. In short, subjects’ social appraisals led them to be both 
more and less likely to capitulate during the discussion. Put another way, some 
of the factors used in the SMF to explain retrospective source monitoring 
decisions also explain immediate decision-making behaviour. For instance, 
subjects in Asch’s (1952; 1953; 1966) studies might have capitulated to the 
confederate’s responses because they judged the confederates to be a credible 
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source of information. In fact, Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) research supports this 
explanation—subjects sometimes capitulated even though they gave private 
responses, suggesting that they took the confederates’ claims to be more credible 
than their own perceptions.  
In sum, people’s relationships with each other, and their perceptions of their 
own and each other’s abilities led them to be more and less likely to capitulate 
during the conversation, and to be more and less susceptible to source 
monitoring errors following the interaction. These results suggest that people 
make the social appraisals that affect their source monitoring decisions during 
their social interactions. An interesting question that remains is whether these 
appraisals might also affect people’s source decisions in retrospect. For instance, 
if someone discovered only after a conversation that her partner had an ulterior 
motive, would she be able to resist the influence of that person’s suggestions?  
One study suggests that people might be able to use these kinds of judgments 
in retrospect; Echterhoff, Hirst, et al. (2005) showed that people resisted the 
influence of misinformation when they were warned that the messenger was not 
reliable, even though the misinformation had already been presented. Yet, in 
that study, misinformation was presented in a written form, and may have 
missed the vast array of social dynamics that would be at play during an actual 
interaction. Perhaps people would not be able to resist the influence of 
misinformation conveyed in a conversation, especially given that the social 
dynamics of the conversation might have already led them to capitulate to their 
partner’s suggestions. A future study might attempt to address this question by 
adapting the design of Experiment 6 in line with Echterhoff, Hirst, et al. 
Specifically, pairs could be told what type of acuity glasses each member wore 
only after the discussion. If subjects are more and less misled based on the post-
discussion warning, it would suggest that people can consider social appraisals 
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retrospectively when they make source decisions; if subjects’ responses are not 
affected by the post-discussion warning, it would suggest that social appraisals 
are important only during their actual interactions. 
Considered as a whole, this research builds on other source monitoring 
research by highlighting the importance of the social context for examining 
social aspects of source monitoring. Of course, I examined only two of 
potentially hundreds of social factors that might influence people’s source 
monitoring decisions; the MORI technique provides unique means to examine 
other social factors. 
The MORI Technique 
In my experiments, pairs of people sat next to each other and watched 
ostensibly the same event on the same screen at the same time, while systematic 
differences were brought into their memories of the experience; as a result, the 
effect of those differences could be tracked through a real-life discussion about a 
genuinely shared experience.  
The results show that the MORI technique provides an effective way to 
investigate the role of a variety of social factors in false memories. For instance, 
future research might examine false memories in different work and family 
relationships. Additionally, future research might follow up Asch's (1952; 1953; 
1966) idea that different personality dispositions lead people to be more or less 
influenced in social interactions. Perhaps researchers could pair—for example—
more extraverted and more introverted people to see whether these personality 
dispositions also affect susceptibility to false memories. 
Measuring False Memories 
One difference between my experiments and other memory conformity 
research is the way I operationalised “discussed” details. I was interested in how 
people’s memories would be affected when someone who had shared an 
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experience conveyed misinformation. To address this question, I counted 
"discussed" details as details where subjects were exposed to misinformation. 
However, other researchers examine details mentioned during pairs’ discussions 
without differentiating between subjects who were and were not exposed to 
misinformation (see for example Gabbert et al., 2006; Gabbert et al., 2007).  
To be concrete, consider the example of Jack—who saw Chad steal the 
wallet—and Mollie—who saw Chad put the wallet back. Let’s say Jack told 
Mollie that Chad stole the wallet, and Mollie did not respond. In short, Mollie 
and Jack talked about the wallet detail; Mollie was exposed to misinformation, 
but Jack was not. In my research, this detail would be counted as a discussed 
detail for Mollie but not for Jack. By contrast, in Gabbert et al.’s (2006; 2007) 
research it would be counted as a discussed detail for both Mollie and Jack. These 
different approaches have generated inconsistent findings. 
For instance Gabbert et al. (2006; 2007) found that speaking order predicts 
whether people will be misled: people who speak first are less likely to be misled 
than people who do not speak first. Consistent with these studies, across my 
experiments, when I examined all instances that subjects discussed a critical 
detail, regardless of whether they were exposed to misinformation, I found that 
people who spoke first were less likely to be misled. However, as Lindsay (2007) 
argued (see Chapter 3), people who spoke first might have been exposed to less 
misinformation, thus decreasing the risk that they would be misled.  
When I repeated the same analyses, examining only the instances that people 
were exposed to misleading details, speaking order was not a good predictor of 
being misled: in three experiments speaking order did not predict being misled 
at all, and in two experiments speaking order was only a marginal predictor of 
being misled. Additionally, across all five experiments, speaking order predicted 
exposure to misinformation. In short, consistent with Lindsay's (2007) concerns, 
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people who spoke first were less likely to be exposed to misinformation, thus 
protecting these people from being influenced by that misinformation.  
Taken together, these results show that people who speak first are less likely 
to be misled. Yet speaking order determines exposure to misinformation, and not 
necessarily susceptibility to false memories. Theoretically it is important for 
researchers to decide how to address exposure to misinformation, and to draw 
conclusions based on their approach. In short, whether subjects’ responses should 
be included in the analyses when they have not been exposed to any 
misinformation depends on the research question.  
Costs and Benefits of Memory Distortion 
In my experiments, I investigated only the negative effects of discussion on 
memory by creating a no-win situation: information correctly reported by one 
member of a pair was incorrect if adopted by the other member. But the 
mechanisms driving the effect I found might also work to improve memory 
accuracy outside of this specific experimental situation. Because people do not 
remember everything they see, they might increase their ability to report 
accurate information about an event in the same way they incorporate 
inaccurate information (Meade & Roediger, 2002). In other words, people might 
come to know and remember more than they otherwise would by absorbing 
information from lots of different sources. Presuming that most of the 
information conveyed in the world is good information, the effect of the 
mechanism should generally be good. However, when the information conveyed 
is bad, the mechanism might end up producing negative effects, like those found 
in my experiments. In short, whether discussion leads to positive or negative 
outcomes for memory depends in part on the accuracy of the information 
conveyed during discussion. In situations where the content of people’s 
memories is important—such as in the justice system—the consequences of 
 180 
discussion might be serious. 
Eyewitness Memory 
The justice system relies on people to accurately remember what happened at 
a crime or accident. Additionally, corroboration is taken as evidence of accuracy; 
when two people recall the same details their testimony is given more credit 
than the testimony of either person alone (Pickel, 1993). Yet, my research 
suggests that people may report the same details as the result of post-event 
discussion, rather than because they each noticed and remembered those details. 
If one witness makes an error, other witnesses might also come to remember 
incorrect details, increasing the consistency of their testimony, but decreasing 
their accuracy. Witnesses' consistency with each other’s reports may convince 
them of their own accuracy, increasing their confidence in their memories (Luus 
& Wells, 1994). Additionally, confident witnesses seem more credible to other 
people (Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Brewer & Burke, 2002). As a result, investigators 
and jurors may give the consistent and confident reports more credit than they 
are due when weighing up the evidence in a case, potentially misleading the 
course of the investigation and the outcome of the trial. In fact, the same kinds 
of problems might occur in any situation where the transmission of information 
is important. 
Transmission of Information 
People in work places, educational settings, social or family groups might 
incorporate one person’s error into their own memories, and as a result be led to 
the wrong course of action, disrupting their goals or productivity. To the extent 
that the information conveyed in social interactions is accurate, groups will 
probably benefit from the interaction. But if one person gets some information 
wrong, it could lead others to remember false information. However, my 
research suggests that whether people will be influenced depends in part on who 
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conveys the false information, and how they judge that person. To the extent 
that people's perceptions of their own and other's expertise are accurate, these 
processes might work to their benefit. Although people might experience 
benefits as a result of remembering more accurate information, it is dubious to 
conclude that their memories will be “better.”  
Remembering More Accurate Information.  
At face value, remembering more good information seems advantageous. But 
consider the example of several eyewitnesses who talk about a witnessed event 
and incorporate accurate details from each other’s reports into their own 
memories. In this case, the eyewitnesses’ reports would become more accurate, 
more informative, and just like in the example above more consistent, more 
confidently told, more credible—by all accounts the report would be better. Still, 
it remains a matter for debate whether these memory reports should be 
considered better—and given the extra credit of corroborated evidence—simply 
because the new information happened to be accurate.  
Mind Over Memory Distortion 
Finally, my results suggest that people exercise some control over the fate of 
their memories. People's relationships with the misinformation messenger, and 
their judgments about the messenger and about themselves led them to be more 
and less likely to incorporate new information into their memories. Future 
research might investigate potential interventions to protect people from false 
memories, especially in situations where the content of their memories is 
important. For instance, in work settings, employers could gauge their 
employees skills regularly and ensure that team-members are aware of their own 
and other’s skills, thus increasing the chance that people will access good 
information from true experts, and decreasing the risk that they will be misled 
by someone less expert and more likely to make errors. Interventions might also 
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be valuable in the justice system; it is unlikely that we will ever stop witnesses 
from discussing their experiences, however we might be able to intervene to 
protect them from false memories. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, when people share an experience then talk about it, they can 
come to remember seeing things that they were only told about after the event. 
Discussion probably works to help us remember more information than we 
otherwise would—my results suggest that sometimes this memory mechanism 
might work to sweep up inaccurate details. In situations where the content of 
people’s memories is important, or where their memories are used to guide 
future behaviour, discussion might create problems. Yet under the right 
circumstances, people can be protected from false memories that arise from 
discussion. 
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Appendix A: Sample Misinformation Narrative  
(Experiments 1A and 1B) 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with 
brown hair, had a job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house in his 
blue “AJ’s Electricians” van and parked in the driveway. After getting his tool 
belt and drill kit out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key 
that was left for him from under a flowerpot.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from 
the homeowner on the hallstand, next to a vase of flowers. After reading the 
note, Eric put it in his pocket and put his drill kit down. Although being an 
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could 
be nosy. He walked into a bedroom on the right, past the bed with its bright pink 
bedspread, and over to the dresser. He noticed the dresser was covered with a 
navy cloth. Curious, Eric bent down to lift it up and investigate the drawers 
underneath. Seeing nothing very interesting, Eric checked out the items on the 
dresser, including a wooden jewellery box. He opened the box and removed a 
pair of earrings, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of his girlfriend’s 
upcoming birthday—slipped them into his pocket.  
Eric headed down the hallway to the living area, picking up his drill on the 
way. He thought the house was getting a little hot and stuffy, so he opened the 
French doors in the lounge and went into the adjacent kitchen. He put his drill 
kit down on the bench and thought he was feeling hungry, so he helped himself 
to a can of pepsi from the fridge and an apple from the fruit bowl. He continued 
to look around the kitchen, finding nothing interesting in the pantry. Always 
curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of 
papers next to a mug on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t much interesting 
there either.  
Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked over to the broken oven 
and bent down to examine it. He removed a screwdriver from his tool belt and 
repaired the front panel. His kitchen repair finished, Eric headed down the 
hallway again to the second bedroom. In the bedroom, he kneeled down to check 
one of the power points that the homeowners said was not working. Once that 
was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room. He tried on a blue cap and 
checked his reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on 
him. After replacing the cap on the bed, he browsed through the wardrobe, but 
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didn’t see anything he liked. Eric sat down on the bed to read a news magazine, 
but found it boring, and tossed it back on the floor. Looking up, he spotted a 
silver ring next to the stereo and tried it on. Thinking it looked pretty good on 
him, he pocketed the ring and started to look through a pile of CDs on the 
stereo. After selecting a CD he knew he would enjoy, Eric went back into the 
lounge to play it on the stereo in there, thinking he would listen to it while he 
finished his work in the lounge. His last job was a light fitting on the lounge 
wall. After removing the light cover, and working on the wiring, Eric flicked the 
switch on and off but nothing happened. He adjusted things a bit and the light 
finally came on.  
Now that his work was completed, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a 
while. He sat down on the couch, turned off the stereo and—finding the black 
remote on the coffee table in front of him—switched on the TV. He picked up a 
red photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked through 
it. After a while, he checked his watch. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, 
Eric got up and turned the TV off. He retrieved the CD from the stereo and, 
thinking it would be good to listen to back in the van, he put it in his drill kit. 
After shutting and locking the French doors, he stopped to look at a picture on 
the wall. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick look through the bathroom 
cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he might be 
able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and 
closed it behind him as he left. 
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Appendix B: Example Discussion Questions for Eric Materials  
(Experiments 2A and 4) 
The walls in the hallway were painted: 
Cream Red Green Brown Blue 
In the kitchen, Eric fixed the:  
Dishwasher Oven Microwave Extractor fan Fridge 
Eric got the remote from the: 
Television Kitchen bench Floor Coffee table Couch 
The name of Eric’s company was: 
AJ’s Electricians EJ’s Electricians JD’s Electricians DJ’s Electricians RJ’s Electricians 
Outside the lounge doors, Eric could see a: 
Road School Swimming pool Dog kennel Lawn 
Eric drank a can of:  
Fanta Coke Export gold Pepsi Sprite 
Eric left his drill and drill case:  
On the 
doorstep 
In the driveway In the hallway In the first 
bedroom 
In his van 
The curtains in the lounge were:  
Brown White Blue Patterned Green 
Eric tried on a ______ cap: 
Blue Black Green Red Grey 
Eric stole a CD by hiding it in his:  
Pocket Van Bag Hat Drill case 
In the lounge, Eric sat on a _____ couch: 
Purple Red Green White Brown 
Eric checked the time:  
On his 
cellphone 
On the 
microwave 
On the video 
player 
On his watch On the wall 
clock 
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Appendix C: Recognition Test for Eric Materials 
(Experiments 1A, 1B, 2A, and 4) 
 
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing 
your memory for this video. 
 
Each question has two parts: 
1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video; 
2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer. 
 
Here is a sample question. 
 
Eric was working in ________ 
 
 a. a house  b. a shop 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
 
 
 
 
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE 
QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST. 
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1. Eric was wearing _______ 
 
a.   overalls  b. jeans  
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Eric ate ________ 
 
 a.  an apple  b.  a banana 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The magazine that Eric read was _______ 
 
a. Time   b. Newsweek 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Eric read the note from the homeowner in the ______ 
 
 a.  kitchen  b.  hallway  
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The tool that Eric used in the kitchen was ________ 
 
 a. pliers  b. a screwdriver 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
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6. In the lounge the picture Eric looked at was the _______Tower 
 
a. Eiffel  b. Leaning 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The bed in the first bedroom was _________ 
 
a. made  b. unmade 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In the second bedroom, Eric tested a ______ 
 
 a. power point    b. light fitting 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Eric played a _______  
 
 a. video  b. CD 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In the second bedroom, Eric tried on a _______ cap 
 
 a. red    b. black 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
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11. The name of Eric’s company was  ________ 
 
a. AJ’s Electricians b. RJ’s Electricians 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Eric checked the time _______ 
 
a. on his watch b. on the wall clock 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The jewellery that Eric stole in the first bedroom was ______ 
 
 a. earrings  b. a necklace 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In the lounge Eric looked through a ________ 
 
a. journal  b. photo album 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Eric’s van was_________ 
 
 a. blue   b. red 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
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16. Eric found the house key under a ________ 
 
 a. door mat  b. flower pot 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Eric rummaged through papers that were next to a _______mug 
 
a. green  b. white 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Eric drank a can of _______ 
 
a. coke b. pepsi 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In the bathroom Eric stole ________ 
 
 a. pills   b. perfume 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Eric stole ________ in the second bedroom 
 
 a. money  b. a ring 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
   
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5  
Not at all                                                                               Very  
Confident                                                                         Confident 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix D: Example Discussion Questions for Chad Materials 
(Experiments 2B, 5 and 6) 
How many people did Chad talk to during the party?  
Eight Nine Ten Eleven Twelve 
What number was the house that the party was at?  
2A 5A 12A 22A 122A 
Where did Chad leave his bag when he got to the party? 
Kitchen Hallway Bathroom Bedroom Lounge 
What decoration was hanging over the doorway to the lounge? 
Tinsel Streamers Happy Birthday 
Banner 
Farewell Banner Congratulations 
Banner 
Where did Chad find his cup? 
Kitchen cupboard Kitchen bench Table in lounge Lounge window 
sill 
Dishwasher 
How did Chad get into the house? 
He walked 
straight in. 
He used his 
key 
He made a 
phone call  
He rang the 
doorbell  
He knocked on 
the door  
How many times did Chad check his cell phone? 
One Two Three Four Five 
What was Chad wearing? 
Button shirt and 
jeans 
Button shirt 
and dress pants 
Singlet and 
shorts 
T shirt and 
shorts 
T shirt and jeans 
 
Where did Chad go when he was trying to find the bathroom? 
Conservatory Bedroom Linen cupboard Laundry Wardrobe 
What colour was the front door? 
White Brown Cream Yellow Green 
Where did Chad put the wallet he found on the bench? 
In the cupboard Behind the 
microwave 
Back where he 
found it 
In his back 
pocket 
In his bag 
What was Chad reaching for when he spilled the drink? 
A CD His drink Pizza Chips Playing cards 
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Appendix E: Recognition Test for Chad Materials 
(Experiments 2B, 5 and 6) 
 
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing your 
memory for this video.    
 
Each question has two parts:  
1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;  
2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer. 
 
 
Here is an example question. Circle the correct answer, then rate your confidence using 
the scale. 
 
 
What colour was Chad’s shirt?  
 
a. Brown b. Blue 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
confident 
 
 
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE 
QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST. 
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1. What sort of bag did Chad bring to the party?  
 
a. Satchel b. Backpack 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
confident 
 
2. What was the painting hanging over the drinks table of? 
 
a. Daffodils b. Sunflowers 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
3. Where did Chad go when he was trying to find the toilet? 
 
a. Laundry b. Bedroom 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
4. Where was Chad when his cell phone rang? 
 
a. Leaving the kitchen b. Leaving the bathroom 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
5. What did Chad sort through at the small table in the lounge?  
 
a. Cutlery b. CDs 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
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6. What drink did Chad take out of his brown paper bag? 
 
a. Vodka b. Wine 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
7. What decoration was hanging over the doorway to the lounge? 
 
a. Tinsel b. Happy Birthday Banner 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
8. When Chad knocked over the drink, what did he clean up the spill with? 
 
a. Paper towels b. Tea towel 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
9. What colour were the lounge walls painted? 
 
a. Peach b. Pink 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
10. What colour cup did the person who opened the front door have? 
 
a. Pink b. Blue 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
 212 
 
11. Where did Chad put the wallet he found on the kitchen bench? 
 
a. In his back pocket b. Back where he found it 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
12. What colour balloons were hanging over the bathroom door? 
 
a. Blue b. Red 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
13. How many jacket hooks were there beside the drinks table? 
 
a. Four b. Five 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
14. What colour was the kitchen bench? 
 
a. Yellow b. Green 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
15. What did Chad eat on his way back from the toilet?  
 
a. Chips b. Carrots 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
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16. How many doors did Chad close at the party?  
 
a. Three b. Four 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
17. How did Chad get into the house? 
 
a. Knocked on the door b. Rang the doorbell 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
18. What did Chad add to the drink he made for the woman? 
 
a. A squeeze of lemon b. A vial of liquid 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
19. Were the curtains in the lounge closed or open?  
 
a. Closed b. Open 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
 
20. When Chad found it, was the toilet seat up or down?  
 
a. Up b. Down 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
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Appendix F: Questions in Red Herring Test Booklet 
(Experiment 3A) 
1. Do you think Chad is likeable? 
2. If you were at the party with Chad, would you have spent time talking to 
him? 
3. If you saw Chad at the party, would you have tried to change his behaviour in 
any way? 
4. Did you notice anything unusual about Chad’s behaviour at the party? 
5. Did you notice anything unusual about the movie that you watched? 
6. Do you think Chad is like most people his age? 
7. Would you trust Chad to keep a promise? 
8. Would you trust Chad to pay you back money that you had lent him? 
9. Do you think the person sitting next to you would share your opinions of 
Chad? 
10. You and another student both watched the movie together—each of you 
wearing the same kind of acuity glasses—suppose that afterwards I asked you 
to answer a list of questions about the movie together.  
You and the other student agreed on some of the answers and disagreed on 
others. Please list all the reasons you can think of that would explain why you 
and the other person did not agree on some of those answers. 
11. Many psychology studies use deception. The purpose of deception is to keep 
subjects from responding in a particular way because they know what the 
experimenters are looking for. 
This study used deception to hide the true nature of the study. That is, we told 
you this was a study about people’s sensory impressions at different levels of 
visual acuity. By this point in the study, you may have your own theory about 
what the study was really about. Please use the space below to provide your 
best guess, and explain your reasoning if you can. 
12. Before you saw this question, did you think that you and the person next to 
you saw the same movie? 
13. What did you know about this study before you took part today? 
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Appendix G: Second-Choice Test  
(Experiment 3B) 
You will now be asked some questions about the movie you saw. We are testing your 
memory for this movie. Please circle your answers.    
 
Each question has four parts:  
 
1)  The first part asks you about a particular item from the movie. 
 
2)  The second part asks you how confident you are about your answer. 
 
3)  Next you are asked to imagine that your first answer is wrong, and to 
answer the question again with a second choice. You cannot choose the 
same answer twice. Circle the answer you think is the next most likely to 
be correct. 
 
4)  Finally we want you to explain, in your own words, why you chose the 
second answer that you did. 
 
Please answer this example question:  
 
What colour was Chad’s hair?  
 
a. Blonde b. Brown c. Black d. Ginger e. Grey 
 
How confident are you that your answer is  correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
What colour was Chad’s hair?  
 
a. Blonde b. Brown c. Black d. Ginger e. Grey 
 
 
Please explain why you chose this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE 
QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST. 
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1 .  What colour was the kitchen bench? 
a. Green b. Blue c. Grey d. Yellow e. Orange 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
1a. What colour was the kitchen bench? 
a. Green b. Blue c. Grey d. Yellow e. Orange 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 .  What colour cup did the person who opened the front door have? 
a. Yellow b. White c. Green d. Blue e. Pink 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
2a. What colour cup did the person who opened the front door have?  
a. Yellow b. White c. Green d. Blue e. Pink 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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3. What colour balloons were hanging over  the bathroom door? 
 
a. Blue b. White c. Red d. Yellow e. Green 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
3a. What colour balloons were hanging over the bathroom door? 
 
a. Blue b. White c. Red d. Yellow e. Green 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  What number was the house the party was at?  
 
a. 2A b. 5A c. 12A d. 22A e. 122A 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
4a. What number was the house the party was at?  
 
a. 2A b. 5A c. 12A d. 22A e. 122A 
 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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5 .  What did Chad add to the drink he made for the woman? 
 
a. A Sugar cube b. A pinch of 
Salt 
c. A Squeeze of 
lemon 
d. A vial of 
liquid 
e. A cherry 
 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
5a. What did Chad add to the drink he made for the woman? 
 
a. A Sugar cube b. A pinch of 
Salt 
c. A Squeeze of 
lemon 
d. A vial of 
liquid 
e. A cherry 
 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. What decoration was hanging over the doorway to the lounge? 
 
a. Tinsel b. Streamers c. Birthday Banner d. Farewell 
Banner 
e. Congratulations 
Banner 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
6a. What decoration was hanging over the doorway to the lounge? 
 
a. Tinsel b. Streamers c. Birthday 
Banner 
d. Farewell 
Banner 
e. Congratulations 
Banner 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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7. Where did Chad leave his bag when he got to the party? 
 
a. Kitchen b. Hallway c. Bathroom d. Bedroom e. Lounge 
 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
7a. Where did Chad leave his bag when he got to the party?  
 
a. Kitchen b. Hallway c. Bathroom d. Bedroom e. Lounge 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 .  How did Chad get into the house? 
 
a. He walked 
straight in 
b. He used his 
key 
c. He made a 
phone call  
d. He rang the 
doorbell  
e. He knocked on 
the door  
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
8a. How did Chad get into the house? 
  
a. He walked 
straight in 
b. He used his 
key 
c. He made a 
phone call  
d. He rang the 
doorbell  
e. He knocked on 
the door  
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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9. Where did Chad put the wallet he found on the bench? 
 
a. In the 
cupboard 
b. Behind the 
microwave 
c. Back where 
he found it 
d. In his back 
pocket 
e. In his bag 
 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
9a. Where did Chad put the wallet he found on the bench? 
 
a. In the 
cupboard 
b. Behind the 
microwave 
c. Back where he 
found it 
d. In his back 
pocket 
e. In his bag 
 
 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What did Chad sort through at the small table in the lounge?  
a. Cutlery b. CDs c. Bills 
 
d. Photos e. Tapes 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
10a. What did Chad sort through at the small table in the lounge? 
a. Cutlery b. CDs c. Bills 
 
d. Photos e. Tapes 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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11 .  Where did Chad go when he was trying to find the toilet? 
a. Conservatory b. Bedroom c. Linen 
cupboard 
 
d. Laundry e. Wardrobe 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
 
11a. Where did Chad go when he was trying to find the toilet?  
a. Conservatory b. Bedroom c. Linen 
cupboard 
 
d. Laundry e. Wardrobe 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 .  What drink did Chad take out of his brown paper bag? 
a. Beer b. Wine c. Rum d. Vodka 
e. Orange juice 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
   Very  
Confident 
 
Now imagine that the first answer you gave is wrong. Please answer the question again 
with your second choice. Make sure you don’t select the same answer as above. 
12a. What drink did Chad take out of his brown paper bag? 
 
a. Beer b. Wine c. Rum d. Vodka e. Orange juice 
Please explain why you selected this answer as your second choice: 
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Appendix H: Acuity Manipulation check  
(Experiment 5 and 6) 
 
Please circle your answers to the following questions based on your 
impressions while you were wearing the acuity glasses. 
 
 
How would you rate your vision while you watched the movie through the acuity 
glasses? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Extremely 
degraded  
 Slightly degraded   As clear as 
normal vision 
 
 
How would you rate the sharpness of the movie through the acuity glasses? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Fuzzy    Very Clear 
 
 
How would you rate the brightness of the movie through the acuity glasses? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Dull    Very Bright 
 
 
How would you rate the contrast of the movie through the acuity glasses? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Dull    Very Bright 
 
 
How would you rate the vibrancy of the colours in the movie through the acuity 
glasses? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Dull    Very Bright 
 
 
Did you notice any of your other senses feeling more switched on that usual 
while the acuity glasses degraded your vision? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
No different to 
normal 
   Extremely 
switched on 
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Please answer the following questions without looking on the front of 
your booklet or talking to your partner. 
 
 
What strength of acuity glasses did you wear? 
 
35% 55% 75% 95% 
 
 
What strength of acuity glasses did your partner wear? 
 
35% 55% 75% 95% 
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Appendix I: Credibility manipulation check  
(Experiment 6) 
 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
 
Compared to your partner, how well do you think you could see the movie? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
His/her 
vision was 
better  
  About the 
same  
  My vision 
was better  
 
 
 
Compared to your partner, how well do you think you could make out the details 
in the movie? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
He/she was 
better  
  About the 
same  
  I was better  
 
 
 
Compared to your partner, how credible is your memory of the movie? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
His/her 
report is 
more 
credible  
  About the 
same  
  My report 
is more 
credible 
 
 
 
Compared to your partner, how reliable is your memory of the movie? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
His/her 
report is 
more 
reliable 
  About the 
same  
  My report 
is more 
reliable 
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Appendix J: Independent vs. Dyadic Analyses 
In Experiments 2A, 2B, 4, 5, and 6, people participated in pairs so that each 
member could expose the other to some misleading suggestions in the 
conversation. Put simply, each person acted as a vehicle to convey 
misinformation, and as such improved on the ecological validity of earlier 
misinformation effect research. Yet, because the people took part in pairs, it is 
possible that their responses were not independent, thus violating the statistical 
assumptions of the analyses.  
If the pairs’ responses were interdependent, but they were treated 
independently, it might underestimate or overestimate the effects found. 
Specifically, if the interdependence led pairs to behave in the same way, but they 
were treated independently, the analysis would underestimate the variance, and 
overestimate any effects found. Alternatively, if the interdependence led pairs to 
behave in different ways, but they were treated independently, it could 
overestimate the variance, and thus underestimate any effects found. An 
alternative approach is to use a dyadic or multilevel analysis, which would take 
into account any variation within pairs  (Griffin & Gonzalez, 1995; Kashy & 
Kenny, 2000; Kenny, 1996; Kenny, Kashy & Cook, 2006; Kraemer & Jacklin, 1979). 
To determine whether a dyadic analysis was necessary, I first examined the 
data from Experiments 2A and 2B to see whether there was any evidence of 
interdependence within the pairs’ responses. I followed Kashy and Kenny’s (2000) 
formulas, and calculated the intraclass correlations between subjects. Because 
the intraclass correlation is a low power test, Kashy and Kenny recommend 
using a liberal alpha level of .20 to determine whether there is any relationship 
between subjects’ responses. In Experiment 2A—even using the liberal alpha of 
.20—there was no evidence of interdependence in subjects responses to either 
discussed details, rI = 0.19, F (18, 19) = 1.48, p = .40 (2 tailed), or nondiscussed 
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details, rI = -0.08, F (20, 19) = 1.18, p = .72 (2 tailed). Similarly, in Experiment 2B, 
there was no evidence of interdependence for subjects responses to discussed 
details, rI = 0.27, F (19, 20) = 1.72, p = .24 (2 tailed) or nondiscussed details, rI = -0.13, 
F (20, 19) = 1.29, p = 0.58 (2 tailed). In short, there was no evidence of 
interdependence between subject-pairs’ responses. These results suggest that it is 
acceptable to use the individual as the unit of analysis. 
Although a significant correlation would provide evidence of a relationship, 
lack of a correlation does not necessarily rule out the possibility that there is 
some relationship. I next examined whether treating subjects as independent 
affected the results in any way. One way to examine whether interdependence 
has any impact on the results is to exclude a random member of every pair and 
conduct the same analyses (Kraemer & Jacklin, 1979). If the same patterns of 
results hold true, it suggests that any interdependence does not affect the results. 
I repeated the major analyses from Experiments 2A and 2B, with one member 
from each pair randomly excluded from the analyses. These results are displayed 
on the figures below, alongside the results from Experiments 2A and 2B. As the 
figures illustrate, I found exactly the same pattern of results, suggesting that any 
interdependence does not cause a problem for these data. 
Taken together, these results suggest that it is acceptable to treat each subject 
as an independent data point. There was no evidence of a relationship between 
subjects’ responses (within pairs), and no evidence that treating subjects as 
independent affected the results in any way. As such, I treated each subject as an 
independent data point throughout the thesis. 
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Experiment 2A 
Complete data set  
 
t (39) =  6.82, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.11  
One member discarded  
 
t (19) =  5.49, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.23 
 
 
 
Experiment 2B 
Complete data set  
 
t (39) =  5.64, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.88 
One member discarded  
 
t (19) = 5.08, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.14 
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